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Abstract 
 
Since 1974, governments have created a series of statutory public involvement 
institutions in the English NHS: Community Health Councils; Patient and Public 
Involvement Forums; Local Involvement Networks; and, from 2013, local Healthwatch.  
This study presents the role of these institutions as a puzzle, given the growth of 
alternative forms of public involvement.  Public involvement in the NHS tends to be studied 
for its contribution to democratising the NHS or for its role in a choice-led consumer 
market, but these analyses generally focus on involvement led by NHS personnel or by 
independent patient organisations.  This dissertation uses a different body of political 
science theory to assess roles that statutory public involvement institutions may play in 
Ministers‟ political management of the NHS. 
One approach is to see these institutions as „sheepdogs‟, rounding up and 
organising diverse groups, thus providing a form of corporatist interest intermediation.  
Alternatively, they could be „watchdogs‟, raising the alarm when standards slip critically 
and thereby helping to safeguard the NHS against disasters.  The explanatory value of 
these two interpretations is reviewed over the period 1974-2010, using policy documents 
and archive material, including the records of these organisations and the archives of 
public inquiries into problems in hospitals. 
The findings suggest that at various times national political actors have used 
statutory public involvement institutions to manage the representation and mobilisation of 
interests and to alert them to problems in local health services.  There is more recent 
evidence for the watchdog than for the sheepdog role.  The watchdog role has been 
reappraised following the failure of statistical monitoring and regulatory police patrols to 
prevent disasters in the NHS.  The discussion also shows how the sheepdog powers of 
these institutions mean that they can round up opposition, rather than moderating it, 
resulting in Ministerial reforms to statutory public involvement institutions. 
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Chapter One:  Introduction to statutory public involvement 
A Secretary of State for Health is faced with the complex task of overseeing the 
management of the National Health Service (NHS).  The political aspects of management 
involve both oversight of expert health service providers and accountability to the public for 
NHS services.  On the accountability dimension, many members of the public wish to 
influence the range of services that is available through the NHS.  In particular, people 
who have an issue-specific concern, such as experience of living with a particular health 
condition, form groups that aim both to provide mutual support and to ensure that the NHS 
meets the needs of their members (Baggott, Allsop and Jones, 2005; Wood, 2000).  NHS 
personnel also seek to engage the public, gathering their input into proposed changes to 
health services (Chambers, Drinkwater and Boath, 2003).  In addition to these self-
generating and NHS-led forms of public involvement, the state invests in statutory public 
involvement institutions.  When first established in 1974, the statutory public involvement 
institutions cost £4 million annually; whilst this had fallen in real terms by 2010, the 
institutions still represented a significant investment at £24.4 million per year (Department 
of Health and Social Security and Welsh Office, 1979; Commissioning, Analysis and 
Intelligence Team, 2010).  The state has created and funded a series of statutory public 
involvement institutions in England, abolishing and replacing each in turn: Community 
Health Councils; Patient and Public Involvement Forums; and Local Involvement 
Networks.  Research into these institutions is timely, as the Government is planning a 
further reform, replacing Local Involvement Networks with local Healthwatch in 2013.  
Given the existence of alternative public involvement mechanisms, this study starts from 
the perspective that the state‟s ongoing investment in funding and reforming statutory 
public involvement institutions is something of a puzzle. 
In this study, I identify theoretical approaches from the political science literature 
and use these to explore the role played by statutory public involvement institutions in the 
NHS.  One approach is to see these institutions as „sheepdogs‟, rounding up and 
organising the diverse patient and community groups that have an interest in NHS 
management and reform.  Alternatively, they could be „watchdogs‟, raising the alarm when 
standards slip critically and thereby helping to safeguard the NHS against scandals.  
These approaches cast light on national politicians‟ interest in the institutions and on the 
roles the institutions have played over time in political management of the NHS.  They add 
to the existing literature, which tends to portray public involvement as a means either to 
support consumerism in the NHS or to reduce a democratic deficit (Lupton, Peckham and 
Taylor, 1998: 45).  This chapter introduces the study.  The opening section sets the 
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context for the study in terms of political management of the NHS.  The second section 
introduces the research territory and presents the history of statutory public involvement 
institutions within the context of wider changes affecting the NHS.  This leads into a 
discussion of self-generating interest groups and NHS-led engagement as alternatives to 
statutory public involvement institutions.  The chapter closes by introducing the specific 
aims of this study, including an introduction to the forthcoming chapters. 
 
 
1.1 Political management of the NHS 
Under the Westminster model of government, the Secretary of State for Health is 
accountable nationally to the public for the locally-delivered National Health Service 
(Weale, 2003: 44).  As a national politician, the Secretary of State needs to create the 
means to provide a form of accountability for the NHS at a local level, both for NHS 
decision-making processes and for the services that it delivers.  Whilst involvement in local 
decisions can be seen as a means to address a democratic deficit, localising activity also 
provides tools for political management of the NHS.  There are two major incentives in 
keeping these political management activities at a local level: on a practical basis, local 
experience of health services is needed to inform decisions and to identify problems; and 
on a more political basis, resolution of issues at a local level keeps problems at a distance 
from the Secretary of State.  There is a fine line, however, between supporting local 
resolution of issues and ensuring that there is a means to gather intelligence nationally 
when it is needed, most notably when there are serious problems in local NHS services 
that could become disasters.  Disasters in the NHS are likely to gain media attention and 
the centralised accountability mechanisms mean that Ministers may be blamed by the 
public for failure either to prevent the problem or to act swiftly enough to reduce its impact 
(Alaszewski and Brown, 2012: 138).  A Secretary of State therefore needs both 
mechanisms that enable the public to participate locally and the means to ensure an alarm 
before a problem becomes a disaster. 
This research starts from the premise that statutory public involvement institutions, 
as state-funded mechanisms granted powers by the state, may have roles to play in 
political management of the NHS.  In this context, „public involvement‟ refers to „the 
involvement of members of the public in strategic decisions about health services and 
policy‟, rather than the involvement of individuals in decisions about their personal 
treatment and care (Florin and Dixon, 2004: 159).  The „public‟ therefore includes citizens 
with an interest in health services, not just patients who are active consumers of health 
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services at a given point in time (Klein, 1984: 20).  The statutory public involvement 
institutions consist of local groups of volunteers supported by a paid secretariat.  Working 
with committed volunteers could provide local intelligence to a Secretary of State, whilst 
keeping resolution of issues at a local level.  Political management of the NHS extends 
beyond health policy to local service delivery (Moran, 1999: 4).  Health services are 
experienced locally, but have never been fully devolved, leaving complex tensions over the 
balance of local and national responsibility (Dawson and Dargie, 2002: 50).  The National 
Health Service enjoys unparalleled popularity amongst citizens as a public service (Salter, 
1998: 1).  This popularity makes it difficult for politicians to undertake reforms.  Health 
services are experienced locally and, particularly in the case of hospitals, are visible 
locally.  It is these visible hospital services for which a Secretary of State is accountable, 
rather than primary care services such as dentistry, pharmacy or the activity of General 
Practitioners (also known as family doctors) (Harrison and McDonald, 2008: 89).  As part 
of strategies for national management of the NHS, a Secretary of State therefore needs to 
be able to manage the impact of local opposition to changes to local services, particularly 
changes to hospitals.  This local experience of NHS services has implications for different 
dimensions to the political management of the NHS, whether limiting expenditure, 
overseeing professional activity in the NHS, demonstrating public accountability or 
managing interest groups. 
Finite resources for the NHS mean that there will always be individuals whose 
health needs cannot be met.  In a mature welfare state, the ageing population and the 
creation of expensive new medical interventions, often for conditions that were previously 
untreatable, mean that there is a climate of perpetual austerity (Pierson, 2001: 103).  The 
welfare state retrenchment literature suggests that there has been a shift from an 
expanding welfare state to one that faces cost-constraints and has to be managed.  Rather 
than politicians taking credit for the expansion of services, welfare state retrenchment 
highlights a new kind of politics in which politicians seek to avoid the spread of opposition 
(Pierson, 1994: 8).  The National Health Service was established on „the rhetorical 
promise‟ of citizen entitlements to health services, despite the reality that access to health 
services would always need to be rationed (Moran, 1999: 63). The rationing of health 
services is an emotive issue, which can generate adverse publicity for those who are seen 
to be putting the lives of citizens at risk.  The reality of rationing is also unpopular with 
health professionals.  When the NHS was first established, many health professionals 
hoped that the new service would enable them to practise their craft without financial 
inhibitions, only to find that they became agents for the state‟s rationing of resources 
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(Klein, 2006: 27).  Many of the costs in the NHS, such as building costs, are fixed; the 
costs that vary are those for treatments that have been prescribed by health professionals.  
Managing the cost of NHS services therefore involves overseeing the activities of health 
professionals. 
National politicians are dependent on health professionals to deliver health 
services.  Within their specific areas of work, health professionals generally have greater 
expertise than the Ministers overseeing their activity; during the period between 1968 and 
2012 none of the Secretaries of State for Health were medically qualified (Alaszewski and 
Brown, 2012: 39).  Considered in terms of the roles played by Ministers and those played 
by health professionals, a Secretary of State may be seen as a principal who is dependent 
upon the activity of expert agents to deliver services.  Where there are expert agents, they 
may seek to maximise the budget available to them in order to deliver what they perceive 
to be the best public service (Niskanen, 1971: 39).  This presents national politicians with 
financial challenges, particularly in a context of limited resources.  When politicians seek to 
introduce top-down reforms, Harrison and Pollitt suggest that governments tend to see 
health professionals as obstacles to change (1994: 5).  
In addition to the politics of limiting budgets and introducing reforms, Ministers have 
to be confident of the quality of the services provided.  This leads to the introduction of 
regulatory strategies to assure Ministers of the quality of services (Moran, 1999: 99).  If a 
Secretary of State is accountable to the public for the NHS, then Ministers want to know 
that health professionals are providing a high-quality service and that there are regulatory 
mechanisms in place to reduce the risk of any high-profile disasters in NHS services.  
Disasters are not new phenomena, but there has been an increase in disasters that have 
been created through human intervention (as opposed to disease), for which members of 
the public blame Ministers (Alaszewski and Brown, 2012: 115-116).  The pressures around 
being seen to respond to a disaster limit opportunities for rational decision-making 
processes (Alaszewski and Brown, 2012: 138).  Creating regulatory mechanisms enables 
Ministers to oversee the quality of health services and helps them to retain accountability 
through oversight of the National Health Service. 
There are several different forms of accountability within the NHS.  Baggott 
distinguishes between managerial accountability of the NHS to Government, the political 
accountability of Government to Parliament and the clinical accountability of health 
professionals to patients (2004: 187).  These forms are not entirely discrete, as clinical 
accountability of individual health professionals to individual patients, particularly since the 
introduction of a national quality framework in 1999, forms part of a managed mechanism 
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for clinical governance (Gray, 2004: 2).  The clinical accountability of health professionals 
to individual patients then becomes integrated into management structures developed by 
governments and, since major structural changes require legislation, authorised by 
Parliament.  Whilst there are connections between the different forms of accountability, 
they are different types of accountability: a patient is dependent on a health professional to 
deliver a medical service in a clinical relationship that is unconnected to the role played by 
that same patient as a citizen electing a Member of Parliament, unless the local Member of 
Parliament happens also to be the Secretary of State for Health.  Where providing services 
to a particular patient impinges on the services available to the wider population, 
accountability of the NHS to that patient may be in conflict with accountability to a wider 
group of citizens (Cooper et al., 1995: 4).  The lack of a direct electoral relationship, 
whether local or national, between citizens and health service management, has been 
interpreted as a democratic deficit in health (Cooper et al., 1995: 75).  Weale discusses 
the implications of centralised political accountability for the National Health Service.  He 
suggests that the national accountability has resulted in local health service issues being 
brought to the national agenda (Weale, 2003: 45).  In this context, public involvement can 
be seen as a means both to devolve routine decisions and to act as a local collective voice 
that counterweights local professional dominance (Weale, 2003: 46-47).   
One of the ways, I suggest, that governments have shaped public involvement into 
mechanisms for devolved decision-making and countering local professional expertise is 
through the creation of statutory public involvement institutions.  In this study, I use the 
phrase „statutory public involvement institution‟ to describe state-funded local volunteer-led 
groups established by governments and granted both public involvement roles and 
statutory powers.  The precise structure and powers of the successive statutory public 
involvement institutions has varied over time.  The NHS is increasingly devolved across 
the UK nations, which is also reflected in the statutory public involvement institutions 
(Greer, 2004a, 2004b).  The variations over time and by nation are presented in Figure 
1.1.  There are five main characteristics to the institutions:  they are local bodies; they are 
established and funded by the state; they are volunteer-led groups with voluntary 
members, supported by a paid secretariat; they have statutory powers, such as the 
authority to enter and inspect NHS premises; and they have statutory rights, generally the 
right to be consulted on proposed changes to local health services.  The first institutions, 
Community Health Councils and Local Health Councils, were established in England, 
Wales and Scotland in 1974-75.  Health and Social Services Councils in Northern Ireland 
started to operate in 1991.  With the exception of Wales, where Community Health 
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Councils have been retained, there have been changes to the institutions in each UK 
nation since 2000.  Where statutory public involvement institutions have been abolished, 
the institutions have been replaced.  Given that these are state-funded bodies, they could 
have been abolished without replacement and there would have been opportunities for the 
voluntary members of statutory public involvement institutions to join interest groups or to 
get involved in NHS-led activities.   
 
Figure 1.1: NHS statutory public involvement institutions by nation over time 
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Changes to statutory public involvement institutions have been most marked in 
England.  Community Health Councils (CHCs) were replaced by Patient and Public 
Involvement Forums (PPI Forums) in 2003, to be followed by Local Involvement Networks 
(LINks) in 2008.  The LINks will in turn be replaced with local Healthwatch1 in 2013.  It is 
this succession of statutory public involvement institutions in England that is the focus of 
this study. 
Funding and reforming institutions is a difficult and costly process, particularly as 
the voluntary members of statutory public involvement institutions are likely to have a high 
degree of commitment and not to want their organisations to be abolished.  The ongoing 
funding suggests that the institutions fulfil a role for national politicians, which is not met by 
                                                 
1
 Initial consultation documents referred to local HealthWatch <sic>, but this was revised to local 
Healthwatch (without the capitalised W).  The latter form is used in this document. 
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other forms of public involvement.  As discussed in Section 1.3, both self-generating 
interest groups and NHS-led activity provide alternative forms of public involvement.  
Successive changes may reflect a deliberate re-shaping if the institutions evolve in ways 
that no longer meet political needs.  An explicitly political approach to examining the role of 
these state-sponsored institutions complements existing studies of public involvement in 
the NHS and may increase understanding of the ways in which politicians seek to involve 
members of the public in the management of public services. 
To provide a context for possible understandings of the roles these institutions may 
play in political management of the NHS, the next section discusses changes to the 
statutory public involvement institutions in England within the context of wider 
developments affecting the National Health Service. 
 
1.2 The context for statutory public involvement, 1974-2010 
Political management of the NHS varied considerably during the period of this 
study.  The trends in the style of political management provide context both for apparent 
stability and for changes to statutory public involvement institutions.  This section 
discusses changes to political management of the NHS, including changes to statutory 
public involvement institutions in England.  The history of statutory public involvement 
institutions is covered in greater detail in Chapter Four and Chapter Five.  This section 
closes with a timeline in Figure 1.2 charting the history of statutory public involvement 
institutions against major events affecting the NHS in England.  The timeline includes 
references for relevant Acts of Parliament and Statutory Instruments.  The focus of this 
study is from the creation of Community Health Councils in 1974 to the announcement in 
2010 that Local Involvement Networks would be replaced by local Healthwatch.  This 
discussion, however, starts from the point when Community Health Councils were 
proposed in 1971 and continues to the formal legislation in the Health and Social Care Act 
2012 that confirmed the replacement of Local Involvement Networks. 
The phrase „community health council‟ first appeared as part of proposals by the 
Conservative Keith Joseph within a consultation document on the future structure of the 
NHS (Secretary of State for Social Services, 1971a: §17; Hogg, 2009: 18).  Edward 
Heath‟s Conservative government introduced the NHS Reorganisation Act 1973 and 
associated statutory instrument National Health Service (Community Health Councils) 
Regulations 1973, but the two General Elections in 1974 resulted in Labour governments 
under Harold Wilson and so the Community Health Councils formed part of the 
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implementation of the NHS reorganisation under Labour.  A Community Health Council 
was established in each District Management Team area, the most local level of NHS 
administration.  The CHC members were appointees: half of the members appointed by 
local authorities; a third by local voluntary organisations; and a sixth by the Regional 
Health Authority overseeing that district.  The guidance ensured that interest groups, 
particularly those representing more vulnerable communities, were represented with in the 
CHCs‟ membership (Department of Health and Social Security, 1974a).  The preceding 
NHS hierarchy had included a degree of local representation, with local authority 
appointees in the Hospital Management Committees.  Community Health Councils 
provided a new form of local representation within the NHS (Klein and Lewis, 1976: 11).   
The NHS Reorganisation Act 1973 introduced a more structured hierarchy for the 
NHS, in which the prestigious teaching hospitals lost their independence (Klein, 2006: 71).  
The line of authority for the nationalised hospitals went directly to Ministers (Harrison and 
McDonald, 2008: 89).  Incorporating hospitals was significant, as it gave politicians 
influence over the distribution of hospital services (Webster, 2002: 59).  Barbara Castle 
and David Owen, as Secretary of State and Minister for Health, extended the powers of 
CHCs on the specific consultation issue of hospital closures.  Whereas hospital closures 
had needed to be approved by the Secretary of State, Barbara Castle and David Owen 
gave CHCs the authority to agree a local hospital closure without the proposal needing to 
be considered by the Secretary of State (Department of Health and Social Security, 
1974b).  Plans for hospital development were controversial during the 1970s: there was a 
predominance of Victorian hospital buildings that were no longer fit for purpose; and the 
additional funding to develop new District General Hospitals under the 1962 hospital plan 
came to an end in 1972 (Alaszewski and Brown, 2012: 20, 23).  In 1976, the Resource 
Allocation Working Party reviewed the distribution of NHS services on the basis of the 
need of local populations and found that there were more hospitals than necessary for the 
population in London and Oxfordshire and that there was a deficit in hospital services in 
the north of England (Webster, 2002: 85-87).  This meant that there were unpopular 
decisions to be made in relation to the closure of hospitals in the south of England.   
In the austerity of the 1970s, the Labour government was criticised for 
underfunding the NHS.  This led to the establishment of the Royal Commission on the 
NHS, also known as the Merrison commission, to look into the management of human 
resources and finances (Crinson, 2009: 63; Ham, 2009: 26).  Despite the financial crisis 
that called a halt to the expansion of public services, funding continued for CHCs 
themselves and for their support mechanisms.  The Royal Commission on the NHS 
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proposed additional resources for Community Health Councils (Gerrard, 2006: 114).  Its 
report, however, came out following the 1979 General Election and a change of 
Government.  It was therefore the Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher that 
responded to the Royal Commission on the NHS. 
The Conservative government‟s response to the Royal Commission was the 
Patients first consultation paper (Department of Health and Social Security and Welsh 
Office, 1979).  The main thrust of Patients first was the need to reduce bureaucracy, 
replacing the tiers of District Management Teams and Area Health Authorities with the 
single tier of District Health Authorities (Ham, 2009: 27).  As part of the reduction in NHS 
bureaucracy, respondents to Patients first were asked to consider whether there was a 
need for Community Health Councils as the smaller District Health Authorities would be 
„more closely in touch with the needs of the community‟ (Department of Health and Social 
Security and Welsh Office, 1979: §26).  Responses to Patients first affirmed public and 
professional support for Community Health Councils (Hogg, 2009: 42).  A further 
consultation, Community Health Councils in England, stated that „Ministers see CHCs as 
local bodies, representing the interests of their local population in the health service, and 
not having a role in the formation of policies at national level‟ (Department of Health and 
Social Security, 1981a: 1).  Community Health Councils were asked to „take the 
opportunity to consider‟ whether the national Association of Community Health Councils 
for England and Wales (ACHCEW) should continue (Department of Health and Social 
Security, 1981a: 6).  ACHCEW was retained alongside the local Community Health 
Councils, but the Conservative government had demonstrated its willingness to consider 
changes to statutory public involvement institutions within structural changes to reduce 
bureaucracy in the NHS. 
Ministers in the Conservative government had hoped that granting greater 
discretion to District Health Authorities would mean that less national input was needed in 
steering the NHS, but economic austerity meant that a more direct role was needed ro 
control NHS expenditure (Harrison and McDonald, 2008: 90).  Rather than making further 
structural changes to the NHS, Ministers introduced a new management approach 
(Harrison and McDonald, 2008: 90-91).  This new management approach drew upon 
expertise from the retail sector.  Initially, Ministers focused on curtailing costs by 
commissioning Derek Rayner, from the retail chain Marks and Spencers, to review the 
efficiency of the NHS (Webster, 2002: 166).  This was followed by a wider inquiry into 
management within the NHS by Roy Griffiths, Chairman of the Sainsbury‟s retail group 
(Klein, 2006: 117).  In a now-famous statement, Griffiths suggested that „if Florence 
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Nightingale were carrying her lamp through the corridors of the NHS today, she would 
almost certainly be searching for the people in charge‟ (Department of Health and Social 
Security, 1983: General Observation 5).  Griffiths proposed the introduction of general 
managers overseeing the activity of clinical personnel.  Within a general management 
framework, Griffiths refers to Community Health Councils briefly as a means to gather 
feedback from consumers (Department of Health and Social Security, 1983: §30). 
Through the emphasis on general management and efficiency, Ministers aimed to 
restrain NHS expenditure in order to make the choice of private healthcare more attractive 
(Pierson, 1994: 133).  A market with the choice of private healthcare fitted a Conservative 
ideology, but market advocates in the 1980s were restricted by the lack of substantive 
alternatives to the NHS for much of the population (Pierson, 1994: 132; Hogg, 1999: 32).  
In the early-to-mid 1980s, policies were put into place to make private health insurance 
more affordable and regulations on the medial profession were relaxed, so that it became 
easier for NHS doctors to see patients privately (Pierson, 1994: 133).  Rumours of reviews 
of NHS funding, including the possibility of moving away from a centrally-funded health 
service, created a difficult atmosphere for the Conservatives – resulting in statements such 
as Margaret Thatcher declaring in 1982 that the NHS is „safe in our hands‟ (Webster, 
2002: 154-155).  The popularity of the NHS, alongside the lack of a viable alternative in the 
private sector, meant that Ministers were reluctant to introduce market-based reforms in 
the 1980s (Crinson, 2009: 64).  It was clear by 1988 that a privatised alternative to the 
NHS was not possible and that radical approaches to funding, such as compulsory health 
insurance, needed to be considered (Pierson, 1994: 134). 
The radical alternative developed by the Thatcher government was an „internal 
market‟, splitting purchasers from providers.  Plans for the internal market were announced 
in the 1989 White Paper Working for patients.  Within the internal market, hospitals were 
encouraged to opt out of District Health Authority management and to compete for patients 
(Crinson, 2009: 65).  General Practitioners had the opportunity to become fund-holding 
GPs; the fund-holding GPs were granted budgets and so became the purchasers of 
services from hospitals and other health service providers.  The internal market provided a 
form of choice, but the selection was made by a fund-holding GP rather than the patient, 
so the selection of services did not provide direct consumer feedback.   Working for 
patients referred to Community Health Councils in England, as being „a channel for 
consumer views‟ (Secretaries of State for Health, Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland, 
1989: 66).  Community Health Councils were therefore framed as a means to provide 
feedback to NHS management in order to improve services.  John Major, Margaret 
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Thatcher‟s successor as Prime Minister, continued to develop the internal market, 
producing the first guidance on market management in 1994 (Ham, 2009: 43).  Despite 
being encouraged to take on a fund-holding role, over half of General Practitioners in 1997 
had not taken on fund-holding status (Crinson, 2009: 65).  It was therefore a partial internal 
market.  Whilst Community Health Councils were cited in the policy documentation as a 
means to gather consumer feedback, NHS-led alternative mechanisms were also 
encouraged, as discussed in Section 1.3. 
The 1997 General Election brought Labour into power.  The new Government 
proposed to reform the internal market into an integrated care system, based on 
partnership and driven by performance (Secretary of State for Health, 1997).  Instead of 
GP fund-holding, GPs were encouraged to collaborate through primary care organisations, 
which from 2000 became Primary Care Trusts, holding the majority of the NHS budget and 
commissioning services from hospitals and other health service providers (Harrison and 
McDonald, 2008: 94-97).  In essence, Labour‟s modernisation of the NHS balanced the 
market with command-and-control style regulation (Klein, 2006: 216).   From 1999, 
standards were set by the National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE), establishing 
guidelines for clinical management of health conditions and judging whether it was cost-
effective to make drugs and other treatments available to NHS patients.  Implementation of 
NICE guidance was fostered by the Commission for Health Improvement, which 
conducted clinical audit reviews of NHS services (Webster, 2002: 248).  The combination 
of guidance from NICE and review by the Commission for Health Improvement provided a 
clear quality framework within the NHS for the first time.   
 Initially, New Labour seemed to show greater interest in Community Health 
Councils than the preceding Conservative government had done.  A new All-Party 
Parliamentary Group on CHCs attracted 240 MPs as participants, many of whom had 
been CHC members (Hogg, 2009: 110).  Community Health Councils did not fit the 
modernisation agenda for the NHS, however, and Alan Milburn announced the abolition of 
Community Health Councils and ACHCEW within the White Paper The NHS plan: a plan 
for investment, a plan for reform.  The public involvement functions, including the statutory 
rights to enter and view services, were to be transferred to „patients‟ forums‟ (later 
renamed Patient and Public Involvement Forums) and support for complainants was 
transferred to Patient Advocacy and Liaison Services (later renamed Patient Advice and 
Liaison Services, or PALS) (Secretary of State for Health, 2000: 93).  Patient Advice and 
Liaison Services were NHS functions run by NHS staff, whereas PPI Forums were 
statutory groups of volunteers supported by a paid secretariat.  It was therefore PPI 
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Forums that succeeded Community Health Councils as statutory public involvement 
institutions.  Initially, legislation to abolish Community Health Councils in England was 
included in the Health and Social Care Bill 2001, alongside a new duty placed on NHS 
organisations to consult the public on proposed changes to NHS services.  There was 
considerable opposition to the abolition of CHCs and the changes were deferred until after 
the 2001 General Election, passing into legislation in the National Health Service Reform 
and Health Care Professions Act 2002.  Concerns about the changes led to a small-scale 
inquiry by the House of Commons Health Committee into public involvement in the NHS 
(House of Commons Health Committee, 2003).  Community Health Councils in England 
and the Association of Community Health Councils for England and Wales were abolished 
in November 2003. 
Patient and Public Involvement Forums (PPI Forums) replaced CHCs in December 
2003.  The Commission for Patient and Public Involvement in Health (CPPIH) recruited 
members for the PPI Forums.  Under the Commission for Patient and Public Involvement 
in Health (Functions) Regulations 2002, CPPIH was responsible for providing the 
secretariats to support PPI Forums and for coordinating the PPI Forums‟ activity.  This 
centralised activity reflects a greater emphasis on consistency and regulation in the NHS.  
CPPIH set up a PPI Forum for each of the NHS trusts; in most cases these were hospitals, 
but also included specialist trusts, such as ambulance services, and Primary Care Trusts.  
A public inquiry into the deaths of babies following heart surgery at the Bristol Royal 
Infirmary stated that „the involvement of patients and the public in the NHS must be 
embedded in its structures‟ (Secretary of State for Health, 2001: 19).  The Department of 
Health responded that „we agree that the voices of citizens, patients and their carers 
should be on the inside‟ and the alignment of PPI Forums with NHS trust structures 
reflects this (Secretary of State for Health, 2002: 12).  Initially, there were 572 PPI Forums, 
although the precise number shifted over time as trusts merged or changed boundaries 
(Hogg, 2009: 134).   
Whilst PPI Forums were being established and developed, there were significant 
changes within the NHS that had implications for public involvement.  Firstly, plans were 
made for the creation from 2004 of Foundation Trusts.  NHS trusts that demonstrated 
good governance could apply to become Foundation Trusts and were then granted greater 
autonomy.  Foundation Trusts provided new ways for local communities, patients and NHS 
personnel to become involved in decisions, including rights to be elected to governing 
boards (Baggott, 2005: 543).  The Government confirmed that each Foundation Trust 
should still have a PPI Forum, but the existence of two forms of trust-level public 
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involvement created some confusion (Baggott, 2005: 543).  Secondly, greater co-
ordination across health and social care was planned as part of the 2006 reorganisation of 
the NHS (Ham, 2009: 67).  Encouraging activity across health and care enabled regulators 
to consider the complete experience of a patient or carer and made the institution-specific 
role of the PPI Forums less relevant.  Thirdly, consumer choice emerged as a stronger 
expectation, with patients gaining the right from 2006 to choose from at least four 
providers proposed by their General Practitioner (Klein, 2006: 234).  If choices were made 
by patients as direct consumers of health services, rather than by fund-holding GPs on 
their behalf, the choices made by consumers rather than a collective voice on behalf of the 
community could be used to inform NHS service developments. 
The Commission for Patient and Public Involvement in Health was given a very 
short life in which to prove itself as a model of national co-ordination for statutory public 
involvement institutions.  In July 2004, a review of the Department of Health arm‟s-length 
bodies resulted in the decision to abolish CPPIH (Hogg, 2009: 140).  An expert panel on 
patient and public involvement in health was set up following this decision (Department of 
Health, 2006a).  On the basis of the expert panel‟s findings, Rosie Winterton, as Minister 
of State for Health Services, announced in July 2006 that PPI Forums would be abolished 
as well as the Commission (Department of Health, 2006b).  The phrase suggested by the 
expert panel to describe looser mechanisms through which people could get involved was 
„local involvement networks‟.  This phrase was used as the name of the new organisational 
structure, introduced in the Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007.  
Under the terms of the Act, PPI Forums were abolished and replaced by Local 
Involvement Networks (LINks) with effect from April 2008.  The House of Commons Health 
Committee took a keen interest in this further change to statutory public involvement 
institutions in the NHS and conducted a second, more extensive, inquiry into public 
involvement in the NHS (House of Commons Health Committee, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c).  
The committee members expressed disquiet at a further change to statutory public 
involvement institutions and concern that „the Government has taken insufficient account 
of the cost of change‟ (2007a: 88).   
Unlike their predecessors, Local Involvement Networks were granted a remit 
covering both health and social care.  Reflecting this remit, arrangements for supporting 
Local Involvement Networks were established by local authorities, the bodies overseeing 
social care.  As part of the 2006 reorganisation of the NHS, the number of Primary Care 
Trusts had been reduced from 303 to 152, aligned with the boundaries of local authorities 
(Ham, 2009: 67).  The boundaries for LINks were set up to follow these combined local 
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authority and Primary Care Trust areas.  Local Involvement Networks did not have a 
centralised recruitment process or a definitive membership model.  Each LINk could 
establish its own membership structure and, unlike PPI Forums, LINks could include local 
voluntary organisations as members.  Under the Local Involvement Network Regulations 
2008, the LINks were required to produce a list of authorised representatives who could 
enter and inspect NHS premises on the behalf of the LINk.  The regulations required NHS 
and social care organisations to admit authorised LINk representatives to enable them to 
inspect premises.  Service providers were also required to respond within 20 days to any 
requests for information or comments made by LINks.  The combined health and social 
care remit granted to LINks when they were established in April 2008 was reflected in the 
combination of regulators for health and social care from April 2009 in the form of the Care 
Quality Commission (Ham, 2009: 71). 
A new Conservative / Liberal Democratic Coalition government took office in May 
2010.  The Secretary of State, Andrew Lansley, had held the lead for health in the Shadow 
Cabinet during six years of Labour government and had plans to reshape the NHS.  On 22 
June 2010, Andrew Lansley launched the Coalition government‟s consultation on 
„increasing democratic legitimacy in health‟, including the proposal to transfer Local 
Involvement Networks into a new set of organisations, local Healthwatch (Department of 
Health and Communities and Local Government, 2010).  Rather than a further abolition 
and replacement, the proposal was to encourage existing LINks to become the new local 
Healthwatch groups.  The announcement came thirteen days after Andrew Lansley 
announced that there would be a full public inquiry into the events at the Mid Staffordshire 
NHS Foundation Trust, following earlier investigations that had included criticisms of the 
Stafford Hospital PPI Forum and the Staffordshire LINk in turn for failing in turn to alert 
authorities to the extent of problems at the hospital (Healthcare Commission, 2009; 
Francis, 2010a; Wood and Cunnett, 2009a, 2009b).  Arrangements for local Healthwatch 
and a national body, Healthwatch England, were included in the Health and Social Care 
Act 2012.  The transition was incorporated into a major reorganisation of the NHS, 
including the abolition of Strategic Health Authorities and the replacement of Primary Care 
Trusts with smaller, clinically-led commissioning groups.  Arrangements for establishing 
the statutory public involvement institutions remained with the local authorities, a point of 
stability in the midst of major changes in the NHS. 
The changes to statutory public involvement institutions and concurrent 
developments affecting the NHS are summarised in the timeline in Figure 1.2.  Each 
replacement, including the proposed replacement as part of Patients first, of the statutory 
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public involvement institutions took place as part of wider structural changes in the NHS.  
In part, this is a reflection of the statutory nature of the institutions and the need for 
legislation to abolish them or to change their powers.  Changes to statutory public 
involvement institutions were therefore likely to be incorporated into wider Acts of 
Parliament.  The timeline also shows that alternative forms of public involvement have 
been encouraged at different points in time.  Some of these are NHS-led forms of public 
involvement and some promote greater activity with self-generating interest groups, 
particularly patients‟ organisations, in the voluntary sector.  As discussed in Section 1.3, 
these forms provided Ministers with alternatives to replacing statutory public involvement 
institutions and form part of the puzzle of ongoing investment. 
Figure 1.2  Timeline for the history of statutory public involvement institutions 
against major events affecting the NHS in England 
Year Major developments affecting NHS Statutory public involvement institutions 
1971  Keith Joseph proposes Community Health 
Councils (CHCs) as part of NHS 
reorganisation: consultative document
2
 
1973 NHS Reorganisation Act 1973 CHCs included in Act and subsequent 
statutory instrument
3
 
1974 Two General Elections: Labour 
minority government followed by Labour 
majority of 4 seats 
Guidance on CHC appointments issued by 
Conservative government
4
; 
184 CHCs established; 
Barbara Castle includes right of CHCs to 
agree hospital closures in Democracy in the 
NHS
5
 
1975  David Owen announces steering committee to 
consider national council for CHCs; 
DHSS funding starts for CHC News 
1976 Resource Allocation Working Party 
(RAWP) reports on redistribution of 
NHS services according to need; 
Royal Commission on the NHS 
established 
Decision of the majority of CHCs to form the 
Association of CHCs for England and Wales 
1977  Association of CHCs for England and Wales 
(ACHCEW) formed 
1978 Normansfield Hospital Inquiry Local CHC praised by Normansfield inquiry 
1979 General Election: Conservative 
government majority of 43 seats; 
Report of the Royal Commission on the 
NHS
6
 
Royal Commission on the NHS proposes 
more resources for CHCs; 
Patients first
7
 consultation questions the need 
for CHCs 
                                                 
2
 SECRETARY OF STATE FOR SOCIAL SERVICES, 1971. NHS reorganisation: consultative document.  
London: Cabinet Papers. 
3
 National Health Service (Community Health Council) Regulations 1973, S.I. 2217 of 1973, London: Her 
Majesty’s Stationery Office. 
4
 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SECURITY, 1974. NHS reorganisation circular: 
Community Health Councils. HRC (74) 4. London: Department of Health and Social Security. 
5
 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SECURITY, 1974. Democracy in the National Health 
Service. London: Department of Health and Social Security. 
6
 ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE, 1979. Report. Cmnd. 7615. London: 
Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. 
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Year Major developments affecting NHS Statutory public involvement institutions 
1980 Reduction in layers of NHS 
bureaucracy, merging Area and District 
levels 
Following Patients first responses, 
announcement that CHCs will remain, but 
functions will be reviewed 
1981  Community Health Councils in England
8
 
consultation queries need for ACHCEW;  
DHSS announces withdrawal of central 
ACHCEW funding over two years 
1982 First Rayner review DHSS funding for CHC News withdrawn 
1983 General Election: Conservative 
government majority of 144 seats 
Griffiths report
9
 proposes general 
management in the NHS; 
Managers encouraged to gather 
consumer feedback 
Griffiths supports CHCs as means to gather 
consumer feedback; 
ACHCEW in financial crisis 
1985  DHSS restores central grant to ACHCEW; 
CHCs lose right to agree hospital closures 
1987 General Election: Conservative 
government majority of 102 seats 
 
1988  Statutory rights of CHCs to access information 
reaffirmed
10
 
1989 Working for patients
11
 White Paper 
proposes NHS internal market 
CHCs as means of gathering consumer 
feedback and representing the community in 
Working for patients 
1990 NHS and Community Care Act 1990 
implements internal market 
 
1992 General Election: Conservative 
government majority of 21 seats; 
Local voices
12
 encourages involvement 
of local voluntary sector 
 
1996  Right to establish CHCs transferred to 
Secretary of State and delegated to regional 
offices of the NHS Executive
13
 
1997 General Election: Labour 
government majority of 179 seats 
 
1998 First Compact between Government 
and the voluntary sector
14
 
 
1999 Patient and public involvement in the 
new NHS encourages NHS-led 
involvement
15
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
7
 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SECURITY AND WELSH OFFICE, 1979. Patients first: 
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8
 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SECURITY, 1981. Community Health Councils in England: 
consultation paper on role and membership. London: Department of Health and Social Security. 
9
 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SECURITY, 1983. Letter to Health Authority Chairmen, 
DHSS Circular. HC (84) 13. London: Department of Health and Social Security. [The Griffiths report] 
10
 Community Health Councils (Access to Information) Act 1988. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. 
11
 SECRETARIES OF STATE FOR HEALTH, WALES, NORTHERN IRELAND AND SCOTLAND, 1989.  
Working for patients. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. 
12
 NHS MANAGEMENT EXECUTIVE, 1992. Local voices: the views of local people in purchasing for 
health. London: NHS Management Executive. 
13
 Community Health Councils Regulations 1996, S.I. 640 of 1996, London: The Stationery Office. 
14
 SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT, 1998. Compact on relations between 
Government and the voluntary and community sector in England. London: Central Office of Information. 
15
 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, 1999. Patient and public involvement in the new NHS. London: 
Department of Health. 
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Year Major developments affecting NHS Statutory public involvement institutions 
2000 The NHS plan White Paper
16
 provides 
additional NHS funding in return for 
reforms 
Abolition of CHCs announced in The NHS 
plan, to be replaced by „patients‟ forums‟ 
2001 General Election: Labour 
government majority of 167 seats; 
Bristol Royal Infirmary inquiry 
published; 
Health and Social Care Act 2001  
Section 11 introduces duty of NHS to 
consult the public 
 
2002  National Health Service Reform and Health 
Care Professions Act 2002 abolishes CHCs 
and establishes Commission for Patient and 
Public Involvement in Health (CPPIH) and 
„patients‟ forums‟ (PPI Forums) 
2003 First House of Commons Health 
Committee inquiry into public 
involvement in the NHS 
CPPIH starts formal role with PPI Forums; 
ACHCEW and CHCs abolished; 
572 PPI Forums established 
2004 First Foundation Trusts established Review of Department of Health arm‟s-length 
bodies proposes abolition CPPIH 
2005 General Election: Labour 
government majority of 66 seats 
 
2006 Our health, our care, our say
17 White 
Paper promises patients choice of GP 
and hospital; 
NHS reorganisation aligns boundaries 
of local authorities and Primary Care 
Trusts; 
National Health Service Act 2006 
Section 242 reaffirms duty of NHS to 
consult the public 
NHS Centre for Involvement opens; 
A stronger local voice
18
 proposes Local 
Involvement Networks (LINKs); 
PPI Forums‟ abolition announced 
2007 Second House of Commons Health 
Committee inquiry into public 
involvement in health 
Local Government and Public Involvement in 
Health Act 2007 abolishes PPI Forums and 
CPPIH to be replaced by LINks 
2008  Closure of CPPIH and PPI Forums; 
152 LINks established 
2009 Healthcare Commission publishes 
investigation into Stafford Hospital 
NHS Centre for Involvement closes 
2010 General Election: Conservative / 
Liberal Democrat coalition 
Renewed Compact
19
 with voluntary 
sector; 
Independent inquiry by Robert Francis 
reports on Stafford Hospital 
Consultation
20
 on transfer from LINks to local 
Healthwatch is one of the first consultations 
by the new Coalition government 
                                                 
16
 SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HEALTH, 2000. The NHS plan: a plan for investment; a plan for reform. 
London: The Stationery Office. 
17
 SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HEALTH, 2006. Our health, our care, our say: a new direction for 
community services. London: The Stationery Office. 
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London: Department of Health. 
19
 CABINET OFFICE, 2010.The Compact: the Coalition Government and civil society organisations working 
effectively in partnership for the benefit of communities and citizens in England. London: Cabinet Office. 
20
 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH and COMMUNITIES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, 2010. Liberating 
the NHS: local democratic legitimacy in health; a consultation on proposals. London: Department of Health. 
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1.3 Alternative forms of public involvement in the NHS 
Statutory public involvement institutions represent a particular form of public 
involvement in the NHS.  As outlined in Section 1.2, Ministers have invested to varying 
degrees in reshaping and reforming statutory public involvement institutions since their 
inception.  Alongside these statutory public forms of public involvement, Ministers have 
sometimes encouraged NHS-led forms of involvement and Ministers have also supported 
to differing degrees activity with self-generating interest groups in the voluntary sector.  
Given the existence of these alternative forms of public involvement, the ongoing 
investment in funding and reforming statutory public involvement institutions suggests that 
the statutory form of involvement provided a benefit for Ministers that was not met through 
self-generating interest groups or NHS-led participation.  The following discussion 
considers the roles played by self-generating interest groups and by NHS-led public 
involvement in turn. 
A high proportion of health care was provided under the auspices of voluntary 
organisations prior to the establishment of the NHS in 1948 (Hatch, 1984: 104).  These 
voluntary organisations were often charitable institutions set up by local communities or by 
religious groups to provide care.  During the 1950s and 1960s, groups based around 
specific medical conditions started to take on new roles in representing the interests of 
their constituents in the nationalised health service (Hatch, 1984: 105).  The number of 
such patient organisations and other self-generating interest groups has increased 
significantly since the 1970s (Coulter, 2011: 165; Wood, 2000: 39).   Interest groups 
started to promote the needs of their users, notably for users of mental health and 
maternity services, before the NHS started to take a managerial interest in consumer 
views in the 1980s (Barnes, 1999a: 73).  Self-generating interest groups tend to focus on 
the needs of a specific community.  In the health sector, interest groups usually consist of 
people with a particular health condition, although there are also „Leagues of Friends‟ that 
support specific NHS institutions.  Some groups have specific objectives and disband or 
change focus after these objectives have been met (Williamson, 2010: 11).  Many groups, 
however, commenced as organisations for self-help amongst members and then, on 
discovering that members had problems which could only be resolved by changing the 
way that services were offered, started to campaign for change (Baggott, 2005: 535). 
The Thatcher governments portrayed interest groups as selfish and their dominant 
response was to ignore particularly active groups, such as the Child Poverty Action Group 
(Pierson, 1994: 158).  Pierson suggests that interest groups in the United Kingdom were 
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traditionally less influential than their counterparts in the United States, so the Thatcher 
government did not see reducing their power or managing their involvement as a priority 
(1994: 158).  The major health issue that generated activity in the voluntary sector during 
the 1980s was the discovery of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), the precursor to 
acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS).  Early activists, such as representatives of 
the Terrence Higgins Trust, were mainly gay young men who did not observe the 
conventions of the core policy-making group in either dress or speech (Alaszewski and 
Brown, 2012: 93).  Alaszewski and Brown suggest that their „otherness‟ meant that they 
were treated with caution and not provided with information „in case they made it available 
to the media‟ (2012: 93). 
In 1992, the NHS Management Executive published Local voices, which 
encouraged NHS organisations to consult local interest groups (NHS Management 
Executive, 1992).  As part of the developing market of alternatives to statutory health and 
social care services, some interest groups started to take on contracts to provide services 
(Harris, Rochester and Halfpenny, 2001: 5; Nevile, 2010).  This changed the relationship 
between the state and interest groups, leading to the first compact between the 
Government and the voluntary sector shortly after the Labour government took office in 
1997 (Secretary of State for the Home Department, 1998).  The compact sets out codes of 
behaviour between the sectors, including consultation and contracting for services (Martin, 
2011: 911).   
At a national level, Baggott, Allsop and Jones discovered that since the 1990s 
issue-specific health groups in the voluntary sector have started to work together in 
broader alliances on policy-related matters, so that other healthcare stakeholders could 
not „take advantage of differences between groups‟ (2005: 151).  Baggott and his 
colleagues found that „the desire for greater policy influence‟ was the main reason why 
voluntary groups in the health sector joined alliances (Baggott, Allsop and Jones, 2005: 
183-184).  The increasing influence of interest groups at the national level was reflected in 
the inclusion of voluntary sector representatives as co-signatories of The NHS plan 
(Secretary of State for Health, 2000: 6-7).  The relationship between Government and the 
voluntary sector was renewed by the Coalition government of 2010 in an updated version 
of the compact (Cabinet Office, 2010).  The increasing role of the voluntary sector in policy 
has provided national politicians with the opportunity to consult with the sector, rather than 
investing in funding and reforming statutory public involvement institutions. 
The second main alternative to statutory public involvement institutions is the 
engagement activity that is led by NHS personnel.  Since the Griffiths report on NHS 
Ruth Carlyle           Sheepdog or watchdog? Statutory public involvement in the NHS 29 
management in 1983, NHS personnel have been encouraged to seek feedback from 
consumers of health services in order to improve the services provided (Department of 
Health and Social Security, 1983).  During the 1990s, innovative mechanisms were 
promoted to enable NHS personnel to engage with the public at a local level: this 
encouragement came both from Government and from think tanks such as the King‟s 
Fund.  The King‟s Fund experimented with citizens‟ juries as a means to involve the public 
in complex choices about health services (McIver, 1998).  Unlike juries in a court of law, 
citizens‟ juries in health services did not make decisions but provided evidence that could 
be considered by NHS managers alongside other sources (Mort, Harrison and Dowswell, 
1999: 105).  Harrison and Mort found in the late 1990s that NHS-facilitated public 
involvement exercises were often led by public relations or communications personnel and 
that public involvement was used as a „legitimation strategy‟ to justify actions (1998: 64, 
67).   
The emphasis on NHS-led public involvement increased following the election of a 
Labour government in 1997.  The 1999 guidance Patient and public involvement in the 
new NHS encouraged NHS personnel to involve members of the public in decisions at all 
levels of the NHS (Department of Health, 1999).  This was followed by the creation of a 
new duty to consult the public on planned changes to services.  The duty placed on the 
NHS to consult the public replaced the right of Community Health Councils to be consulted 
on proposed changes.  The duty to consult was enshrined in Section 11 of the Health and 
Social Care Act 2001 and later reaffirmed in the National Health Service Act 2006 Section 
242.   The Department of Health published a two-part guide to the duty to involve patients 
and the public (2003a; 2003b).  In the introduction to the guide, the Parliamentary Under 
Secretary for Health, David Lammy, described NHS-led public involvement in terms of 
„strengthening accountability to local communities‟ and the guidance notes were entitled 
Strengthening accountability (Department of Health, 2003a: iii).  By contrast, publications 
on NHS-led public involvement written by NHS personnel describe involvement as a 
means to improve services, essentially taking a consumerist approach to involvement as 
feedback to refine service provision (as examples, Bate and Robert, 2007; Chambers, 
Drinkwater and Boath, 2003; Tritter et al., 2004).  Local public involvement through NHS 
institutions was encouraged as part of the creation of NHS Foundation Trusts, 
incorporated into their membership arrangements (Department of Health, 2002: 15).  This 
role in Foundation Trusts emphasises involvement of the public by the NHS as part of 
public accountability, although feedback from members also contributes towards service 
improvement.  At the national level, members of the public were involved in developing 
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guidelines and monitoring standards through the National Institute for Clinical Excellence 
and the Commission for Health Improvement (Davies, Wetherell and Barnett, 2006: 21).   
Interest groups and NHS-led engagement provide contrasting alternatives to 
statutory public involvement institutions as mechanisms for local participation.  The 
potential to encourage either of these forms of public involvement provided Ministers with 
options for involving the public in the NHS.  The repeated decision to invest in funding and 
reforming local statutory public involvement institutions suggests that the institutions 
fulfilled a role for Ministers that was not met either by self-generating interest groups or by 
NHS-led public involvement.  In this study, I examine potential roles the institutions may 
play in political management of the NHS, providing a potential rationale for the ongoing 
investment in statutory public involvement institutions. 
 
1.4 Focus of this study 
In this study, I aim to add to the existing perspectives on public involvement by 
exploring the roles statutory public involvement institutions may have played over time in 
Ministers‟ political management of the NHS.  This section summarises the elements in 
each of the chapters and the approaches taken to examining possible roles. 
This chapter introduced the statutory public involvement institutions as potentially 
playing a role in political management of the NHS.  The literature on public involvement in 
the NHS is discussed in Chapter Two.  The literature review considers the existing 
approaches to examining public involvement specifically.  It also reviews some of the 
broader issues in health service politics that are presented in the politics of health 
literature, but tend not to be drawn upon explicitly for studies of public involvement in the 
NHS.  The chapter includes existing approaches to understanding the successive 
abolitions and replacements of statutory institutions. 
Chapter Three presents the research framework.  This integrates the research 
questions, the theoretical background to the research questions and the methods selected 
for this study.  The principal research question for the study is: what role(s) have 
statutory public involvement institutions played in political management of the 
English NHS, 1974-2010?  Two potential roles are examined.  The first of these considers 
statutory public involvement institutions as a form of interest group intermediation, drawing 
upon a corporatist approach.  In these terms, a statutory public involvement institution is 
presented as a „sheepdog‟, rounding up participants.  This gives rise to the first sub-
question: do the institutions act as ‘sheepdogs’ rounding up participants and 
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managing potential opposition?  Alternatively, statutory public involvement institutions 
may act as „watchdogs‟, alerting national politicians to problems before they become 
disasters.  This takes an approach from the legislative oversight literature, in which alarms 
raised by groups of volunteers may provide an alternative or complement to a professional 
police-patrol-style regulator.  This is captured in the second sub-question: do the 
institutions act as ‘watchdogs’ preventing disasters in the NHS?  As the research 
question examines these roles over a long time-frame, a documentary analysis approach 
was selected for this study.  The first sub-question, or sheepdog role, is examined using 
policy documentation and materials from the archives of the statutory public involvement 
institutions themselves.  The watchdog role is reviewed through the archives of public 
inquiries into disasters in the NHS, to assess whether any expectation is expressed that 
statutory public involvement institutions could or should have alerted Ministers to the 
problems before they became disasters.  The selection of sources is discussed as part of 
the research framework in Chapter Three. 
Chapters Four, Five and Six present the core empirical material in the study.  The 
focus in Chapters Four and Five is on the potential of a sheepdog role.  Chapter Four 
considers the period from 1974, when Community Health Councils were first established, 
to 1997, which introduced the Labour government that abolished Community Health 
Councils.  The analysis of this period draws on policy documentation and archives from 
the statutory public involvement institutions to assess whether Community Health Councils 
acted as sheepdogs and rounded up interests in ways that could support political 
management of the NHS.  Chapter Five takes a similar approach, but reviews materials 
over the period from 1997 to 2010.  This period covers the successive changes between 
Community Health Councils, PPI Forums and Local Involvement Networks. 
The second potential role examined in this study is that of a watchdog alerting 
politicians to problems before they become disasters.  This is examined in Chapter Six 
using data from archives on public inquiries into disasters in the NHS.  Four public 
inquiries were selected to provide insights at different points in time: Ely Hospital, Cardiff, 
1969; Normansfield Hospital, Teddington, 1978; Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry, 2001; and 
Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust, inquiries from 2009 to 2012.  This selection of 
inquiries provides both a spread over time and, with the exception of the Normansfield 
inquiry, considers inquiries which of themselves triggered changes to public involvement 
mechanisms.  All of the public inquiries express expectations of the role to be played by 
statutory public involvement institutions.  The chapter considers the implications of these 
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expectations for any political role played by statutory public involvement institutions and 
whether they acted as watchdogs. 
The closing chapter, Chapter Seven, draws together the findings from the 
research.  It opens with a summary of the findings in the preceding chapters and then 
discusses the four main conclusions from this study. 
 
 
Chapter summary 
This chapter introduced the study.  It opened by considering the issue of political 
management of the NHS.  The main section of the chapter discussed the specific research 
area of the statutory public involvement institutions, providing a history of the institutions 
between 1974 and 2010 within the context of wider changes affecting the NHS.  The third 
section considered self-generating interest groups and NHS-led engagement as potential 
alternatives to statutory public involvement institutions.  The chapter closed with a preview 
of the forthcoming chapters, including the aim of the study as exploring the role(s) played 
by statutory public involvement institutions in political management of the NHS between 
1974 and 2010.  This chapter leads into a review of approaches to public involvement in 
the existing literature. 
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Chapter Two: Literature on public involvement in the NHS 
Changes to statutory public involvement institutions, and to public involvement 
more widely, have had an impact on research interests and what it has been possible for 
researchers to study over time.  This chapter considers the existing literature on public 
involvement in the National Health Service.  It opens with an introduction to key themes in 
the politics of health literature around the balance of state, professional and public 
interests in health services.  This leads into a chronological discussion of the way in which 
public involvement in the NHS has been studied, identifying where it is statutory public 
involvement institutions that are the research interest and where the main focus is on 
NHS-led and interest group alternatives.  The rationale for a chronological approach is to 
demonstrate how the research agenda has shifted over time.  The chronology falls into 
three parts.  It suggests that in the 1970s and 1980s there was a focus on the membership 
of statutory public involvement institutions and the way that they operated with NHS 
management.  The second part of the chronology proposes greater interest during the 
1990s in new forms of NHS-led public involvement and themes around consumerism, 
potential legitimation of decisions through involvement and a perceived democratic deficit 
in the NHS.  The third part of the chronology considers the literature from 2000 onwards, 
proposing that changes to the statutory public involvement institutions have been a focus 
of academic interest alongside the increased influence of interest groups and the impact of 
statutory requirements to consult on NHS-led forms of involvement.  The chapter closes 
with a discussion of the threads from within the literature that contribute to examining the 
distinctive features of statutory public involvement institutions as statutory bodies.  Two 
main themes emerge from this discussion: managing the input of issue-specific interest 
groups; and ensuring the quality of NHS services. 
 
2.1 Balance of interests in health services 
Public involvement activity takes place within the broader politics of structured 
interests within the health service.  This balance of interests frames the potential roles that 
may be played by public involvement within the NHS.  Alford identifies three structural 
interests: health professionals are the dominant interests; politicians and managers are 
„corporate rationalisers‟ who challenge the dominant interest; and the community 
population consists of „repressed interests‟ (1975: 192).  In this framework, politicians have 
difficulties managing the activity of health professionals and members of the public are in a 
very weak position.  This weak position means that public involvement activity is open to 
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being shaped by either politicians or health professionals.  Alford suggests that the 
problems are exacerbated for members of the public as community groups may conflict 
with each other, effectively vetoing each other‟s input (1975: 221).  Williamson draws upon 
Alford‟s framework and suggests that public involvement in the NHS needs to be 
understood in the context of the dynamics of dominant, challenging and repressed 
interests (1992: 2-3).  Whilst language may differ to describe the balance of interests in 
health services, the triangle of professional, political and public interests is a common 
theme in the literature on health politics (Salter, 2004: 7; Baggott, 2004: 49-54; Alaszewski 
and Brown, 2012: 89-113).  This section considers the health service politics literature 
from the perspective of political management of the NHS, starting with the dominant 
position of health professionals and then turning to lay involvement. 
 
Professional dominance 
Ministers are dependent upon health professionals to deliver services in the NHS.  
When professionals act together, they can be a very powerful force, as discussed in 
Eckstein‟s 1960 volume Pressure group politics: a case of the British Medical Association.  
Eckstein suggests that doctors work together through the British Medical Association as a 
pressure group actively pursuing „collectively common political aims‟ (1960: 9).  He 
proposes that pressure group politics are determined by a combination of the pattern of 
policy-making activity, the structure of decision making and political culture (1960: 38).  In 
his case study, Eckstein found that the British Medical Association had achieved 
dominance over the Royal Colleges for different specialists due in part to the size of its 
membership, but also the behaviour of civil servants in treating the association as a 
preferred partner for negotiation: 
„It is obviously a matter of great convenience for the Ministry to have available a 
single organisation which can deal with it in the name of the whole medical 
profession; everything is simplified thereby, from the problems of the size of formal 
negotiating committees to the all-important matter of day-to-day contact and 
consultations between public and voluntary officials.‟ (Eckstein, 1960: 52) 
Eckstein acknowledges that professional associations acting as pressure groups may 
distort democratic processes (1960: 157).  He suggests, however, that many discussions 
are confidential „not so much because of any anti-democratic collusion among the 
negotiators, but, much more important, because very few people really care about them‟ 
(1960: 158).  Where there are members of the public with an interest in influencing health 
services, Eckstein‟s classic account of the relationship in the 1950s between civil servants 
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and the British Medical Association gave no space for influence.  In a book review of 
Eckstein‟s volume, Kornhauser comments that one of the most interesting implications of 
the study is that the British Medical Association and the Ministry for Health had developed 
a stable relationship between highly interdependent interests that constituted a joint form 
of regulation of the NHS (1961: 645).  When Eckstein was gathering data for his case 
study in the late 1950s, his study suggests that there was a very close relationship at 
national level which helped civil servants and Ministers to implement policy as the British 
Medical Association could „generally make decisions binding‟ for their members (Eckstein, 
1960: 52). 
The stable relationship described in Eckstein‟s study facilitated implementation of 
policy where the British Medical Association agreed with politicians on changes to NHS 
services, but also placed the British Medical Association in a very powerful position in 
which it could block change.  More recent studies also demonstrate the power of health 
professionals to block reforms.  In their study of health service dynamics in the early 
1990s, Harrison and Pollitt identified that civil servants and managers had potential 
problems, to use the title of their volume, in „controlling health professionals‟.   Harrison 
and Pollitt were writing after the introduction of general management in the NHS, following 
the Griffiths report in 1983.  The authors suggest that health professionals‟ expectation 
that they will be managed through a clinical structure may pose difficulties for generalist 
managers of health services: 
„…we can say that health professionals constitute a potential problem for 
management, either because (as in medicine) of their claim to non-managed status 
or because (as in most of the other professions) of their claim to be managed 
exclusively by members of their own profession.‟ (Harrison and Pollitt, 1994: 6) 
Harrison and Pollitt make a distinction between the expectation of doctors that they would 
be self managing and the requirement by other health professional groups to be managed 
by professionals in their specific discipline.  In the context of Ministerial assumptions in the 
early 1990s that management authority would expand and professional authority would 
diminish, these underlying expectations had implications for the achievement of a 
managerial vision for the NHS (Harrison and Pollitt, 1994: 10).  Harrison and Pollitt identify 
a range of challenges to professional autonomy in the decade leading up to their research: 
the introduction of general management; the creation of a framework for performance 
information; challenges from the Conservative government to the power of trades unions 
and professional associations; and incorporating professionals into management activity 
(1994: 61-73).  In the context of the power of professional groups and their sense of being 
threatened by management changes, the authors suggest that public involvement is only 
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influential in areas in which professionals have little interest, such as waiting room 
facilities, or where managers have discretion, such as appointments processes (1994: 
125).  Harrison and Pollitt do not, therefore, see the public as shaping developments in the 
NHS: 
„It will be clear from our earlier analysis that we do not envisage the sudden 
transformation of the NHS into an organisation driven by expressed user needs or 
measured against standards or criteria the formulation of which has been largely 
shaped by the consumer‟s voice.‟ (Harrison and Pollitt, 1994: 146) 
This lack of a space for the consumer voice suggests that NHS-led public involvement 
does not provide opportunities for members of the public to have a significant influence 
over health service provision. 
These two seminal studies exemplify the issues for Ministers in managing health 
professionals as part of their political management of the NHS.  As discussed in Chapter 
One, a dimension to political management is avoiding disasters; if Ministers cannot 
manage the activity of health professionals, they can at least be alerted to potential 
problems before they become disasters (Alaszewski and Brown, 2012: 115-116).  In the 
context of Alford‟s classification of community groups as the „repressed interests‟, patient 
groups and members of the public may find it difficult to challenge the power of 
professionals or politicians when they are involved in decisions about health services 
(1975: 192).  Considered in the terms of professionalism as understood within the NHS, 
members of the public are “lay” people who do not share medical expertise.  This lay 
status means that their understanding of health services may be built on personal 
experience, rather than professional knowledge, and forms part of the politics of public 
involvement in the NHS. 
 
Lay involvement 
Patient groups and members of the public are in a weaker position than health 
professionals in the balance of health service politics.  At the level of individual 
interactions, people who are ill are rarely in a position to be able to challenge the authority 
of health professionals.  Users of health services may also perceive problems differently, 
drawing upon lay knowledge rather than professional expertise.  This section considers the 
issue of the lay challenge to scientific rationality. 
Barnes explores the ways in which the input of service users challenges the 
scientific rationality of service providers.  She suggests that there are three specific 
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challenges: affect, or the role of emotion within debate; anecdote and the nature of story 
telling; and diverse debates, which she presents as the „potential for deliberative spaces to 
engage with cultural difference‟ (Barnes, 2004: 122).  Barnes observes that much of the 
political science literature on participation considers processes to ensure representation or 
presence, which has „led to considerable attention being given to who was taking part in 
forums and how they were recruited‟ (2004: 130).  From her perspective, considering the 
challenge of lay experience within debates, Barnes posits that greater attention needs to 
be given to the ways in which processes for deliberation are shaped „to ensure that a 
diverse group of participants could bring to the table issues they wanted to talk about and 
could discuss those issues in a way which was genuinely inclusive‟ (2004: 130; italics in 
original).  Denying the value of personal experience and the role of affect, anecdote and 
diversity in debates provides a means to undermine the contribution of lay participants to 
deliberation.  Barnes proposes that the nature of dialogue within deliberation needs to be 
enhanced so that participation is genuine and does not provide another site for disputes 
between lay and scientific perspectives on evidence: 
„Our notions of dialogue need to be expanded if the challenge to scientific 
rationality from service users is to result in more creative ways of working, rather 
than to provide another site for conflict.‟ (Barnes, 2004: 131) 
The challenge to scientific rationality posed by service users, who interpret illness and the 
value of health services through their personal experience, is a theme from the broader 
literature on the politics of health services that complicates the willingness of professionals 
to work with service users on decisions relating to service development. 
Hogg suggests in her monograph Patients, power and politics: from patients to 
citizens that the assumptions underlying a model of scientific rationality need to be 
challenged.  She argues that it is assumed that medicine is based on science and that any 
new development will be an improvement, whereas „in reality most health care is about 
chronic conditions that people live with for years, and, in spite of greater scientific 
knowledge, diagnoses are uncertain and treatments unpredictable‟ (1999: 4).  Anderson et 
al. within their account of public involvement in primary care organisations indicate that lay 
voices provide a critical check on professional service providers and should be viewed as 
having their own form of expertise: 
„Lay voices should not be naïve voices, but voices of people who recognise the 
difference between professional interests and patient/public interests, people who 
can advocate for the user with an understanding of the priorities of the provider.‟ 
(Anderson et al., 2002: 66) 
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The sense of the value of the lay voice introduced by Anderson et al. expands beyond the 
notion of lay knowledge having a value in itself to a view that lay people should be in a 
position to challenge professional priorities. 
As discussed in Chapter One, the nature of statutory public involvement institutions 
changed significantly between 1974 and 2010.  The number of issue-specific interest 
groups increased during the same period and the emphasis on NHS-led forms of 
involvement has varied.  As the nature of involvement has changed, the research interests 
and options for study around public involvement in the NHS have also evolved.  The next 
three sections therefore take a chronological approach to discussing the literature on 
public involvement in the NHS, starting with research interests in public involvement 
immediately prior to the establishment of Community Health Councils in 1974.  
 
2.2 Public involvement and NHS management, 1970s-1980s 
During the 1970s and early 1980s, Ministers used reorganisations of the NHS as 
mechanisms to control costs.   From 1983 onwards, as outlined in Chapter One, new 
forms of general management were introduced into the NHS in order to increase the 
efficiency of NHS services.  This shift from structural changes to management changes 
had implications for the roles that public involvement might play.  This section considers 
research into both statutory and non-statutory public involvement during the 1970s and 
1980s, leading up to the announcement of the NHS internal market in 1989. 
Statutory public involvement institutions introduced a new form of public 
involvement when they were established in 1974.  There had, however, been a great deal 
of academic interest in public involvement in public services immediately prior to the 
development of Community Health Councils.  This account of the literature therefore 
opens with theoretical approaches to public involvement from the late 1960s and early 
1970s. 
 
Concepts of public involvement in late 1960s/early 1970s 
During the late 1960s, there was a great deal of interest in the United States in 
developing mechanisms to ensure „maximum feasible participation‟ in plans to involve 
communities in a „war on poverty‟ (Kramer, 1969: 1).  Arnstein worked on urban renewal 
aspects of the programme and published a model of the extent of public involvement in 
decisions about public services (Arnstein, 1969: 216).  Her typology is arranged in the form 
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of a ladder and was „designed to be provocative‟, with each rung on the ladder 
corresponding to the extent of citizens‟ power in determining the plan or programme (1969: 
216).  The two bottom rungs of the ladder, „manipulation‟ and „therapy‟, are categorised by 
Arnstein as non-participation; she sees the aim of these activities as being to educate or 
cure the participants.  As the next level up, Arnstein has three rungs that she regards as 
degrees of tokenism: placation, consultation and informing.  With this intermediate degree 
of involvement, participants will be seen and heard, but „they lack the power to ensure that 
their views will be heeded by the powerful‟ (1969: 217; italics in original).  At the top of the 
ladder, Arnstein presents three forms of participation that she regards as degrees of 
citizen power: partnership, delegated power and citizen control.   
Arnstein‟s work has since been widely applied to analyses of NHS-led forms of 
public involvement, particularly where authors are interested in the extent to which a 
transfer of power is needed for members of the public to be fully involved (Florin and 
Dixon, 2004: 160; Lupton, Peckham and Taylor, 1998: 48).  Writing at a similar time, 
Pateman explored power dynamics from a different perspective.  She considered the way 
in which participation through local groups might increase „a sense of political efficacy‟ and 
individuals‟ sense that it was worth engaging with politics as they could make change 
happen (Pateman, 1970: 46).  Later interpretations of the frameworks proposed by 
Arnstein and by Pateman have contributed to a strong sense within the public involvement 
literature that involvement should be valued of itself (Anderson et al., 2002: 1). 
The early 1970s also saw academic interest in collective involvement, or „voice‟, as 
a means to provide consumer feedback to improve the quality of services.  Within 
competitive market models, economists tend to assume that quality is maintained in the 
overall system as firms that do not provide adequate services go out of business.  
Hirschman, himself an economist, found in the case of the Nigerian railways that the 
presence of road transport mechanisms meant that customers used alternative transport, 
rather than voicing concerns, and the state-supported service had no incentive to improve 
(1970: 44-45).   In a competitive market model, Hirschman would have expected the loss 
of customers to have led „the railroad administration to correct some of its more glaring 
inefficiencies‟ (1970: 44).  This empirical puzzle inspired the development of the „exit, voice 
and loyalty‟ approach (Hirschman, 1970: vii).  It led Hirschman to think about what 
happens when there is a lapse in quality and the conditions under which either the exit of 
customers or consumers voicing concerns is likely to be effective as a feedback 
mechanism: 
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„In Nigeria, I had encountered a situation where the combination of exit and voice 
was particularly noxious for any recovery: exit did not have its usual attention-
focussing effect because the loss of revenue was not a matter of the utmost gravity 
for the management, whilst voice did not work as long as the most aroused and 
therefore the potentially most vocal customers were the first ones to abandon the 
railroads for the trucks.‟ (Hirschman, 1970: 45) 
The origination of Hirschman‟s work in this empirical puzzle means that his focus is on the 
very specific instance of how user responsiveness can assist management when services 
deteriorate (Klein, 1980: 419).  Given this genesis, the model assumes that the customers 
are discontented and acting in their own self-interest to ensure that they have access to 
better services.  Whilst Hirschman refers to voice as belonging to the political realm (1970: 
15), it is the voice of a discontented consumer making a complaint about a product, rather 
than that of a citizen interested in the balance of services available to people in their 
community.   
The lack of a realistic exit option for most users of the National Health Service 
means that Hirschman‟s model can be difficult to apply.  Klein suggests that losing 
customers can be seen by NHS managers as a bonus, as it relieves the burden on the 
service, rather than as an incentive to improve services (1984: 22).  Hogg argues that exit 
cannot be seen as a choice for users of the NHS, as most people do not have the option of 
accessing a service elsewhere (1999: 32).  Similarly, she proposes that „complaining 
patients do not fit into the medical model of the doctor-patient relationship‟, which deters 
patients from voicing their own complaints (1999: 32).  Within Hirschman‟s model, he 
suggests that loyalty to a particular firm increases the likelihood that a customer will voice 
concerns about a product in preference to seeking an alternative (1970: 77).  By contrast, 
Lupton Peckham and Taylor suggest that the extent of public loyalty to the NHS may 
„inhibit those who wish to voice an opinion, but who do not wish to appear disloyal to the 
service overall‟ (1998: 115).   
Arnstein‟s ladder of participation and Hirschman‟s model have been used explicitly 
within research into public involvement in the NHS to varying degrees.  Whilst individual 
researchers may not have been aware of the models, the works by Arnstein and 
Hirschman been a part of the literature throughout the period that statutory public 
involvement institutions have been in place.  As discussed in Section 2.5, neither of these 
well-known frameworks has been applied directly in this study, although Hirschman‟s work 
contributes to modelling how concerns raised by statutory public involvement institutions 
may help to identify problems in health services. 
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Representation within CHCs, 1970s-1980s 
Community Health Councils were created as a new form of involvement.  As new 
bodies, they attracted research attention, particularly in terms of their membership and the 
representative role of CHC members.  During their first year of operation, Klein and Lewis 
conducted what proved to be the most comprehensive survey of CHC members to be 
undertaken.  Klein and Lewis issued a questionnaire to CHC members, which was 
completed by nearly two thirds of the members (n = 3,796) (1976: 28).  They also 
examined the annual reports produced by CHCs at the end of their first year of operation.  
Klein and Lewis analysed the socio-economic profile of CHC members, on the basis that 
this provided a means of comparison with other representative organisations: 
„Here is a new institution designed to promote consumer representation in the 
National Health Service, with a uniquely eccentric system for choosing the 
membership.  So the most obvious question would seem to be how different CHC 
members are from representatives chosen by more conventional methods and in 
other contexts.‟ (Klein and Lewis, 1976: 27) 
The most distinctive feature of the members was that 18 percent came from the 
professional classes, whereas the professional classes make up 4.9 percent of the 
population as a whole (1976: 30).  Klein and Lewis suggest that part of the motivation 
behind the recruitment mechanisms for CHCs was to ensure membership by proxy of „the 
most vulnerable and perhaps least articulate members of the community‟ (1976: 38).  They 
found strong representation of groups for people with mental health problems, disabled 
people, older people, children and ethnic minority groups, with only 15 percent of members 
not associated with one or more voluntary organisations (1976: 38).  This representation of 
interest groups, particularly groups representing vulnerable members of society, was a 
distinctive feature of Community Health Councils and is discussed in more detail in this 
study, principally in Chapter Four.  Klein and Lewis also considered whether the 
recruitment processes for CHCs introduced members who had not previously been 
involved in public office roles, such as school governors or magistrates; they found that 
over a third of the members had not held any form of public office (1976: 52).  The authors 
conclude that CHC members are articulate representatives of the consumer: 
„If the accents in which CHCs speak are heavily middle-class this may – it is 
possible to argue – even be an advantage, since (to paraphrase Nye Bevan) 
generalising the best in the NHS probably can be safely translated to mean 
generalise the standards which the most demanding middle-class consumers 
expect for themselves.‟ (Klein and Lewis, 1976: 157) 
In addition to analysing the profile of CHC members, Klein and Lewis reviewed the 
institutions‟ activity as reflected in their first annual reports.  They found that CHCs had set 
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up programmes to visit NHS services and that CHC members drew upon local knowledge 
to make better use of resources (1976: 137, 139).  The authors suggest that visits by CHC 
members to local services enabled them to have „the time and the opportunity to inquire 
into, and form a judgement about, the state of the local health services‟ (1976: 122).  They 
suggested that where Community Health Councils did not receive access to or information 
about services, this could be indicative of problems in those health services; the specific 
instance they mention is the lack of information provided to Darlington CHC about 
Darlington Memorial Hospital, which was subsequently the subject of an inquiry by the 
Northern Regional Health Authority (1976: 130-131).  Klein and Lewis‟s study provides a 
baseline account of the nature of the membership and activity of Community Health 
Councils, including their observations on the politics that had led to the development of 
CHCs.  Their interest in the nature of representation and roles played by statutory public 
involvement institutions makes Klein and Lewis‟ study one of the closest precursors of this 
doctoral study and reanalysis of some of their data is included in Chapter Four.  Klein 
returned in a 1984 article to the role of Community Health Councils in representing 
vulnerable groups, suggesting that the constitution of CHCs „represents a deliberate 
attempt to rig the market in favour of those with the least resources for participation‟ (Klein, 
1984: 30).  This role in representing vulnerable groups and the interest expressed by Klein 
and Lewis in the significance of visiting rights for statutory public involvement institutions 
have informed the modelling of the theoretical framework in Chapter Three. 
Phillips examined the processes for setting up Community Health Councils, 
attending meetings organised by Regional Health Authorities to establish CHCs.  He 
frames his account as a comparison with the consumer councils in the nationalised 
industries, suggesting that CHCs would have needed their own national establishing body 
in order to be independent of the NHS (Phillips, 1980: 50).  Like Klein and Lewis, Phillips 
was interested in the representation of local voluntary groups within CHCs, but his concern 
was with the variability between Regional Health Authorities in their establishing 
arrangements (1980: 56).  The Regional Health Authorities, as discussed in Chapter Four, 
could determine the list of local voluntary organisations eligible to form part of discussions 
about which groups would be represented in the membership of a Community Health 
Council.  Phillips found that whilst some Regional Health Authorities were happy to let 
voluntary organisations determine which organisations could be included in the list, other 
RHAs „did some extensive pruning‟ of the organisations proposed (1980: 56).  Phillips‟ 
account of establishment in practice suggests that the design of Community Health 
Council membership allowed for local voluntary group participation in the selection of 
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members, but that the establishing role of the Regional Health Authority impeded this 
where it was unpalatable locally. 
 
NHS management and CHCs, 1980s 
In the early 1980s, Ministers tried initially to restrain costs by reducing the layers of 
NHS bureaucracy and then by introducing general managers to oversee the activity of 
clinical professionals.  During the period of this emphasis on health authority management 
of the NHS, Bates studied the relationship between CHCs and NHS administrators in order 
to establish the impact of Community Health Councils.  She examined the influence of 24 
CHCs in the four Thames regions, interviewing administrators at different levels in the 
NHS and the CHC Secretary in each case.  When asked whether the CHCs had an impact 
on their activity, 63 percent of District Administrators, the level of administration with which 
the CHCs worked most closely, indicated that the CHC had an impact; by contrast, only 16 
percent of the Family Practitioner Committee administrators concluded that the CHC had 
any impact (Bates, 1982: 93).  Bates found in her interviews with administrators that CHCs 
were valued for four roles: informed discussion; providing feedback about the local 
community; acting as an independent body that patients would approach; and their 
articulation of the needs of vulnerable groups (1982: 94-97).  Drawing explicitly on 
Hirschman, Bates concludes that CHCs „are performing successfully the function of giving 
a voice to groups for whom no exit is possible from the NHS‟ (1982: 98).  This voice for 
vulnerable groups continues a theme from the analysis of CHC members by Klein and 
Lewis.   
Mullen, Murray-Sykes and Kearns were also interested in the relationship between 
CHCs and administration in the NHS.  They published a pair of articles in 1982 and 1984, 
with a follow-up article by Mullen in 1987, in which they examined the role played by 
Community Health Councils in health care planning teams.  The papers were based 
predominantly on a survey of planning teams conducted between October 1978 and 
September 1980 (Kearns, Murray-Sykes and Mullen, 1982: 86).  The survey on which they 
were drawing therefore preceded the introduction of general management into the NHS.  
The authors indicate that the planning teams were established after the 1974 
reorganisation of the NHS and were variously known as health care planning teams or as 
district planning teams.  There was some controversy over whether CHC representatives 
should be included as members of planning teams, but about half the planning teams that 
responded to the authors‟ survey included a CHC representative (Kearns, Murray-Sykes 
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and Mullen, 1982: 91-92).  Where CHCs were represented on planning teams, the majority 
(79 percent) of planning teams felt that the CHC presence was beneficial, whilst only 9 
percent expressed the view that CHC representation was not beneficial (Mullen, Murray-
Sykes and Kearn, 1984: 147).  Where CHC presence was found to be beneficial, this 
tended to be associated with teams in which there was greater general satisfaction with 
team effectiveness (Mullen, Murray-Sykes and Kearn, 1984: 150).   
In her follow-up article in 1987, Mullen established that planning teams were still in 
place, in greater numbers than they had been in 1979.  There were still some misgivings 
expressed both by health authorities and by Community Health Councils about CHC 
representation on planning teams: 
„Some Districts consider it inappropriate for lay CHC members to participate in 
what they consider to be a managerial and professional activity.  Many CHCs, 
whilst wishing to influence planning, fear being incorporated into management 
through their membership of planning teams.  However, it can be argued that 
membership of planning teams can enable CHCs to play a pro-active role in 
planning, rather than the reactive role which often results when participation is 
conducted primarily via consultation.‟ (Mullen, 1987: 224-225) 
Mullen suggested in her findings that the apparent stability of ongoing planning teams with 
CHC members might be masking other changes that were taking place in the NHS.  In 
particular, she was informed by interviewees that the implementation of the Griffiths report 
would be likely to have a significant impact on planning structures and roles (1987: 226).  
The focus on representation of CHC members within planning teams in the work by Mullen 
and her colleagues reflects the policy emphasis on planning structures in the early 1980s, 
an approach that was being superseded by a greater emphasis on consumer feedback as 
part of general management. 
Also writing at the point of Griffiths report implementation, Winkler signs herself as 
Secretary of City and Hackney Community Health Council and uses her experience in the 
CHC to inform an opinion piece in Policy and Politics on consumerism and the NHS.  The 
Griffiths report included the recommendation that views should be sought from consumers 
on their experience of services, including the suggestion that Community Health Councils 
could gather the views of service users on behalf of NHS personnel (Department of Health 
and Social Security, 1983).  Winkler suggests that the emphasis on consumerism was very 
new to NHS managers and that NHS managers needed to expand their image of 
consumerism beyond a supermarket model: 
„The supermarket vision of customer relations extends to reducing waits at the 
check-out counter and exchanging faulty goods with the minimum of questions 
asked.  It does not extend, even at Marks and Spencer, to inviting the customers 
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on to the board, nor to consulting them about investment or even what should be 
on the shelves, let alone in their products.‟ (Winkler, 1987: 1) 
By implication, Winkler sees an increased emphasis on consumerism in the NHS as an 
opportunity to enable consumers to be involved in decisions rather than just acting as a 
source of information on consumer preference.  Winkler proposes that Community Health 
Councils have a role to play in increased consumerism in the NHS.  She notes that 
Community Health Councils had been producing consumer surveys in the 1970s and the 
early 1980s, but that the new policy direction provided CHCs with the opportunity to ask 
NHS managers to take note of their reports (1987: 2).  In order for this to happen, she 
suggests that there is a need for medical professionals to relinquish some of their power 
and for users to overcome some of their dependence, so that consumers become partners 
in the development of high quality services (1987: 3).  Winkler uses examples of activity by 
the City and Hackney CHC to demonstrate a different form of consumerism from a model 
in which local people receive a survey and are asked for their views, including the need for 
consumers to be involved in scrutiny of services. 
Taking a more theoretical slant, Richardson wrote about Community Health 
Councils in her monograph on participation in 1983.  She suggested that the welfare state 
had not been developed to include „consumer participation‟ and that public expectation of 
involvement had arisen in the late 1960s (Richardson, 1983: 2-3).  This later addition of 
public involvement meant that it was not embedded into welfare state decision-making 
structures.   Richardson proposed that participation should not be assessed purely 
according to the extent of any influence, as being involved may of itself improve the well-
being of participants (1983: 54).  She made a distinction between direct and indirect 
involvement: 
„Direct participation refers to all those means by which people take part in efforts to 
influence the course of public policy involving personal (face-to-face) interaction 
with official spokesmen.  Indirect participation refers to those means by which 
people take part in such efforts but not involving personal interaction with these 
spokesmen.‟ (Richardson, 1983: 11) 
Following the terms of this classification, Richardson views Community Health Councils as 
predominantly a mechanism for indirect participation.  She indicates that CHCs are 
„generally looked upon as the principal means of effecting consumer participation in the 
health service‟, but that they are not strictly composed of consumers and have little direct 
interaction with health service policy makers (1983: 32).  Instead of a form of consumer 
participation, Richardson characterises CHCs as „a kind of officially established pressure 
group, helping to mobilise consumer opinion and transmit it to those responsible for health 
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administration‟ (1983: 33).  Seen in the context of general management developments, 
she was describing CHCs as gathering the views of consumers to inform managers about 
the preferences and concerns of health service users. 
 
Interest groups and NHS-led involvement, 1970s-1980s 
Alongside the creation of Community Health Councils, there was a considerable 
growth in the number of self-generating interest groups from the 1970s onwards (Wood, 
2000: 39).  Haywood and Hunter suggested in 1982 that earlier studies of interest group 
involvement in NHS policy tended to focus on professional groups, understating other 
forms of interest group (1982: 144).  They expand the range of pressure groups in health 
to include consumer groups (Haywood and Hunter, 1982: 155).  Using the example of the 
policy community around services for older people, Haywood and Hunter identify Age 
Concern and Help the Aged as contributors to national policy (1982: 156).  They suggest 
that Community Health Councils are seen by Ministers as specifically local bodies and so 
they do not have a recognised role at national level (Haywood and Hunter, 1982: 160).  At 
the national level, Haywood and Hunter hypothesised that there would be an increase in 
activity by voluntary organisations, particularly as interest groups for consumers sought to 
get involved in consultative processes (1982: 161). 
At the local level, Green proposed in the 1980s that there were two forms of 
community participation in primary care: representation through Community Health 
Councils; and programmes of „self care‟ that committed vulnerable communities to take 
responsibility for their health (1987:136).  He suggested that where local input was sought 
from issue-specific interest groups, it was after the plans had been developed and at the 
instigation of health authority members: 
„the mechanism within the NHS for the involvement of such organisations (e.g. 
Mind - a pressure group relating to mental health needs) often involves a negative 
process - with such bodies being consulted after service plans have been drawn up 
rather than during the planning stages. Clearly there are exceptions to this, with 
particular pressure groups being involved early on; however, this is rarely seen as 
their right but rather as the prerogative of the health authority, and often only as the 
result of the interests of a particular authority member.‟ (Green, 1987: 132; italics in 
original) 
Unlike Community Health Councils, local voluntary interest groups did not have statutory 
rights to be consulted in the course of developing plans for service changes.  Interest 
groups for users of mental health and maternity services were some of the first groups to 
attempt to influence local service delivery.  Green‟s finding that Mind and other 
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organisations were dependent on individual health authority members to instigate 
opportunities for involvement suggests that interest groups in the 1980s had limited 
involvement in local decision-making processes. 
The earliest NHS-led involvement in the NHS took the form of patient participation 
groups established by General Practitioners.  Richardson and Bray published a study of 
the patient participation groups in 1987.  They found that three GPs (one in Wales, one in 
Oxford and one in Bristol) had independently developed the concept of patient 
participation groups in the early 1970s, prior to the establishment of Community Health 
Councils (Richardson and Bray, 1987: 12).  Richardson and Bray conducted a survey of 
the patient participation groups, to examine their membership and members‟ perception of 
their achievements.  Survey responses were received from 63 functioning patient 
participation groups, of which 53 had been founded by doctors and the remainder by other 
health practitioners or at the request of patients (Richardson and Bray, 1987: 16-19).  The 
researchers discovered that over half of the “patient” participants in the groups were 
current or former workers in either health or social care, giving them a general interest in 
how community health services operated (Richardson and Bray, 1987: 46).  Richardson 
and Bray comment that interest groups for people with a particular health condition are 
likely to attract greater commitment than NHS-led groups: 
„The commitment people feel to those with a common condition, especially where 
they have actively been given help, is not comparable to the commitment they feel 
for those whose job it is to serve their needs.  Successful self-help groups harness 
this very striking resource.  Successful patient participation groups, in contrast 
have to rely on a less strong form of commitment.‟ (Richardson and Bray, 1987: 68) 
The looser engagement of members of the public, as opposed to people with a particular 
health condition, was indicative of a problem that would be ongoing for state-led and NHS-
led forms of public involvement.  In terms of achievements, Richardson and Bray noted 
that 33 of the 63 groups had taken action that led to new services, such as health 
education and transport, and that 21 had negotiated „changes in the organisation of the 
practice‟ (1987: 48).  They concluded that there were noteworthy achievements made by 
the patient participation groups, but that there were ongoing problems in assessing which 
decisions the groups had contributed to and whether consumer-led decisions had given 
the best outcomes (Richardson and Bray, 1987: 70). 
During the 1970s and 1980s, statutory public involvement institutions received 
research attention as new bodies at a point when there was limited involvement of the 
public in NHS decision-making processes through either interest groups or NHS-led 
involvement mechanisms.  The requirement for consumer feedback as part of the general 
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management role in the NHS started to introduce consumerism as a research interest, but 
it was not until the 1990s and 2000s that consumerism became a major theme in the 
literature on public involvement in health.  As discussed in the next section, a new 
emphasis in the 1990s on NHS-led involvement mechanisms had an impact on academic 
approaches to studying public involvement. 
 
2.3 Consumerism and democratic deficit, 1990s 
The introduction of an internal market into the NHS, following the 1989 White 
Paper Working for patients, increased academic interest in how the views of consumers 
influenced services and whether, within the professionally-dominated NHS, gathering the 
views of consumers might be seen as a means to legitimate decisions.  The 1990s also 
saw the rise of an interest in whether public involvement could be seen as a democratic 
element in the NHS.  This section discusses the trends in the public involvement in health 
literature during the 1990s. 
 
Consumerism, 1990s 
As discussed in Chapter One, the internal market was introduced into the NHS 
following the 1989 White Paper Working for patients.  The White Paper encouraged 
purchasers of services to gather customer feedback on the services needed and 
suggested that Community Health Councils might act as „a channel for consumer views‟ 
(Secretaries of State for Health, Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland, 1989: 66).  This 
provided an opportunity for researchers to consider the extent to which Community Health 
Councils were channeling consumer views to health authorities.  Lupton, Buckland and 
Moon hypothesised that Community Health Councils that worked closely with health 
authorities were more likely to be able to influence purchasing decisions (1995: 215).   
They suggest that there was opposition from Regional General Managers to the prospect 
of Community Health Councils taking a greater role in purchasing decisions, so they 
propose that CHCs that were seen to be difficult or confrontational would less likely to be 
influential (1995: 218).  Lupton, Buckland and Moon identified differing relationships 
between health authorities and CHCs through survey findings, which they drew into a 
typology of five different types of CHC.  Ranging from those working most closely with 
health authorities to those that were most independent, they describe the following 
categories: health authority partners; consumer advocates; patient‟s friends (who 
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represented the concerns of individuals); independent arbiters; and independent 
challengers (1995: 220).  The research team found that the health authority partner, 
consumer advocate and patient‟s friend CHCs appeared to be given more opportunities for 
participation than the independent arbiters or the independent challengers (1995:220).  
The authors also discovered that Community Health Councils tended to be involved in the 
detail of service development, rather than broad direction: 
„Generally, across all the case studies, purchasers tended to view CHC influence 
as restricted largely to matters of detail rather than strategic direction.  As one HA 
[health authority] officer in the Partner case study explained: “They‟re a useful 
mechanism for fine-tuning the service”.‟ (Lupton, Buckland and Moon, 1995: 223; 
italics in original) 
Health authorities valued Community Health Councils where they felt that they had 
credible knowledge about the changes taking place within the NHS and provided a good 
source of information about local opinion and local community networks (1995: 224).  The 
authors conclude that „the window of opportunity for involvement in the NHS appears to be 
barely open‟ and that public involvement in the early 1990s was being driven by a 
managerialist agenda (1995: 225).  
Following her work with Buckland and Moon, Lupton collaborated with Peckham 
and Taylor on a more extensive consideration of the ways in which health authorities made 
sense of their responsibilities to involve the public in purchasing decisions.  The authors 
propose two pairs of dichotomies which they use as the basis of their analysis: a 
distinction between consumerist and democratic understandings of involvement and a 
distinction between policy and operational imperatives.  Lupton, Peckham and Taylor 
argue that Community Health Councils were created to address democratic problems of 
local accountability for health services, but they suggest that from the outset CHCs had 
problems representing the wider public as they were developed to support particular 
sectional interests (1998: 69).  As part of their consideration of the balance of democratic 
and consumer involvement, the authors suggest that the development of the internal 
market shifted involvement towards consumerism and changed the roles open to 
Community Health Councils.  With increased emphasis on gathering feedback, complaints 
management was improved within the NHS (1998: 103).  This reduced the role played by 
Community Health Councils in handling complaints.  The need to gather information from 
the public about their service preferences extended the role of CHCs initially (1998: 104).  
Nonetheless, the authors suggest that in the purchasing climate the role of CHCs was 
undermined in several ways: healthcare purchasers saw themselves as charged with 
responding directly to consumers; secondly, it was purchasers who acted as proxy 
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consumers on the behalf of patients, which reduced the opportunities for public 
involvement; and thirdly, concerns were expressed about the potentially political nature of 
CHCs, curtailing their remit (1998: 104). 
The studies by Lupton and her colleagues demonstrate that Community Health 
Councils continued to be studied as forms of consumerism during the 1990s.  The range of 
NHS-led forms of involvement, however, was also expanding at this time.  In the latter 
study, Lupton Peckham and Taylor observe that managers within NHS services wanted to 
contact „real‟ healthcare users and felt that they needed to create their own mechanisms to 
do this, rather than working either with interest groups or with statutory public involvement 
institutions (1998: 76).  New mechanisms included citizens‟ juries, surveys and health 
panels (McIver, 1998; Davis and Daly, 1999: 60).  As discussed below, in a professionally-
dominated NHS, there was a risk that consumer feedback might be used by professionals 
to bolster their position or by managers to counter professional dominance. 
 
NHS-led involvement and legitimisation, 1990s 
Harrison and Mort examined the practices of „public consultation‟ and „user 
involvement‟ in the context of the expectation within the internal market that purchasers 
would become „champions of the people‟ (1998: 60).  In the terminology of their title, the 
authors question „which champions, which people?‟  They found that constructions of the 
„people‟ who would participate ranged from an informed public, whose members are able 
to deliberate on issues, to isolated individuals responding to briefings on a pre-determined 
topic (1998: 64).  Within their study, Harrison and Mort found that the „champions‟ were 
often public relations or communications personnel who were leading consultation 
activities.  The authors studied health panels as examples of public consultation and found 
that „in most cases it is the commissioning authority which sets the agenda for the panel 
because it is commonly agreed that there would be little point in panels and juries 
spending time deliberating questions which are not of immediate concern to the 
purchasers of health care‟ (1998: 64).  Harrison and Mort investigated user involvement 
through a study of user groups, using six case studies over the period from 1994 to 1996.  
With user involvement, as opposed to public consultation, the authors suggested that the 
champions are „plentiful‟, but „unreliable‟ (1998: 66).  Harrison and Mort found that health 
professionals and managers used the feedback from user involvement to legitimise their 
viewpoints: 
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„Many respondents also described how they used such groups in both short-term 
tactics and longer-term strategies.  The former is neatly summed up in the phrase 
“[playing the] user card” spontaneously employed by several respondents; it refers 
to the use of user group opinion to buttress one or other manager‟s or 
professional‟s or their institution‟s preferred course of action as against that of a 
colleague‟s or other institution‟s.‟ (Harrison and Mort, 1998: 66; italics in original)    
From their empirical work, the authors suggest that user involvement and public 
consultation can be seen as „legitimation strategies‟ or „technologies of legitimation‟ (1998: 
67).  Harrison and Mort argue that the development of the quasi-market increased the 
need for local decisions that took into account local needs, increasing the requirement to 
„legitimise‟ decisions (1998: 68). 
From the perspective of this study of statutory public involvement institutions, one 
of the interesting features of the paper by Harrison and Mort is the placement of 
Community Health Councils within their distinction between public consultation and user 
involvement.  They include Community Health Councils as organisations that are likely to 
be seeking the view of the broader public as a form of public consultation (Harrison and 
Mort, 1998: 60).  Classifying Community Health Councils as a mechanism for public 
consultation could suggest that they may act as means to manage local engagement in 
the NHS, potentially contributing to the legitimation process. 
Harrison and Mort collaborated with Dowswell on a 1999 book chapter that 
expanded upon the health panel research from the „which champions, which people?‟ 
article.  Mort, Harrison and Dowswell identify that health panels take a range of forms and 
propose a matrix to help to classify consultation activities, presenting a two-by-two grid on 
which participation may be informed/uninformed and deliberative/undeliberative (1999: 
98).  The authors found that a problem in assessing the influence of health panels is that 
they represent just one aspect of a decision.  They contrast a legal jury, which makes the 
conclusive decision, with a citizens‟ jury that just provides input (1999: 104).  Mort, 
Harrison and Dowswell suggest that is it impossible to conclude that a panel has been 
influential where the results of a consultation do not challenge the authorities, yet 
authorities „accrue legitimacy from having undertaken (increasingly sophisticated) ways of 
consulting the public‟ (1999: 106).  The authors do not see legitimation as the sole function 
of consultation, as they conclude that consultations may be intended to gain knowledge, to 
establish consultees‟ values or to educate the public (1999: 106). 
The aspects of legitimation considered in these studies are at a local level with 
locally-led involvement activities.  Extending from Harrison and Mort‟s identification of 
Community Health Councils as a means to support public consultation, rather than user 
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involvement, part of the rationale for ongoing state funding of statutory public involvement 
institutions may be to legitimise decisions or actions that are difficult from a Ministerial 
perspective. 
 
Addressing a democratic deficit, 1990s 
Centralised accountability for the NHS through the Secretary of State for Health 
means that the only relationship that the electorate have with the health service is at the 
national level, whilst decisions about health services are made without direct electoral 
input at a local level.  In the 1990s this was described, notably by Cooper, Coote, Davies 
and Jackson in Voices off, as a „democratic deficit‟.  Cooper et al. consider the nature of 
accountability for NHS services, the role of public involvement in commissioning services, 
routes to public participation and the potential for greater involvement of local government 
in NHS services.  Their research was conducted in 1994, when processes for 
commissioning health services through health authorities were becoming embedded.  The 
researchers undertook interviews and attended meetings, including twelve visits to 
Community Health Councils (Cooper et al., 1995: 120).  Their research questioned the 
extent to which decisions about commissioning health services were taken democratically.  
The authors identified no democratic forum for involvement of citizens in decisions about 
rationing services.  They considered a wide range of involvement mechanisms, but found 
that these were limited in scope and that there was a lack of opportunity for public debate 
about difficult decisions to be made in health service provision (1995: 74).  The solution 
proposed by Cooper et al. is that accountability for NHS services is best achieved by 
making local government responsible for purchasing NHS services (1995: 119). 
Davis and Daly share the concerns about democratic accountability raised by 
Cooper et al. and suggest it is a „constitutional fiction to pretend that Ministers are either 
able or willing to take personal responsibility for every health service action in every 
locality‟ (1999: 59).  The authors report that an increase in the use of participatory 
techniques, such as citizens‟ juries, may have informed decision makers, but they suggest 
that this trend does not negate the need for local decision makers to be democratically 
accountable (1999: 60).  As one of the options for increasing democracy in the NHS, Davis 
and Daly consider increased democratisation of Community Health Councils, but they 
point out that this would democratise the „watchdog‟ rather than the commissioner of 
services; the authors suggest, instead, democratically elected health mayors (1999: 61-
61). 
Ruth Carlyle           Sheepdog or watchdog? Statutory public involvement in the NHS 53 
Academic accounts of public involvement in the NHS during the1990s were framed 
by the extant arrangements for involvement in purchasing as part of the internal market.  
The NHS plan in 2000 introduced statutory duties for the NHS to consult and changed the 
nature of statutory public involvement institutions.  This had a considerable impact on the 
area of study. 
 
2.4 Public involvement and change, 2000s-2010s 
Public involvement in health changed markedly following The NHS plan in 2000.  
The placement of a statutory duty on NHS organisations to consult about service changes 
renewed NHS-led activity and re-framed consumerist approaches to public involvement in 
the health literature.  Voluntary organisations had been involved in the development of The 
NHS plan, a process from which Community Health Councils were excluded, and the 
growth of interest groups became a focus of research interest.  The statutory public 
involvement institutions in England were subject to a series of changes.  As discussed 
below, studies of the statutory public involvement institutions in this period tend to consider 
the changes, rather than the continuity of ongoing investment in funding and reforming 
statutory institutions for public involvement. 
 
NHS-led involvement, 2000s 
The reforms following The NHS plan encouraged both the gathering of consumer 
views and greater patient choice.  Views gathered from consumers and monitoring of 
choices could both be used to inform service developments.  Writing immediately following 
The NHS plan, Anderson and Gillam are critical of a consumerist involvement that is 
based on learning from the choices that people make.  They suggest that the inclusion of 
private and NHS options takes health care back to a period before the creation of the 
NHS, when people received the care that they could afford to purchase (Anderson and 
Gillam, 2001: 14).  The authors suggest that the text within The NHS plan demonstrates a 
tension between promotion of consumerism and state interest (2001: 16).  Anderson and 
Gillam observe that The NHS plan „represented top-down consumerism: patients would be 
given more choice whether they wanted it or not‟ (2001: 16). 
The policy emphasis on choice-based consumerism alongside gathering consumer 
views renewed academic interest in Hirschman‟s „exit, voice and loyalty‟ framework 
(Hirschman, 1970).  As discussed below, some of the research interest in Hirschman‟s 
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framework took the form of comparisons between statutory public involvement institutions 
in England and Wales.  Within studies of NHS-led involvement, Primary Care Trusts were 
a major focus of attention, as they held the budgets for purchasing services.  Pickard 
found in a study of Primary Care Trusts that neither voice nor choice mechanisms acted 
effectively in a primary care-led health service.  She identified that the voices of lay board 
members were seldom heard and their role was sometimes „perceived to be to legitimate 
decisions in reality made by others‟ (Pickard, 2007: 79-80).  In practice, the choices 
available to patients were also limited, in the case of her study to a private physiotherapy 
service as an option provided by one of the Primary Care Trusts, which did not provide 
sufficient information on preferences to inform service developments (2007: 81).  
Anderson et al. also studied NHS-led involvement through primary care organisations and 
suggested that more attention was given to lay voices if they had the support of external 
organisations, whether interest groups or statutory public involvement institutions 
(Anderson et al., 2002: 28).  This observation suggests a relationship between different 
forms of public involvement in the NHS. 
Rowe and Shepherd considered NHS-led public involvement in the context of new 
public management.  They noted a distinction between consumerist and democratic 
ideologies of participation in the literature (2002: 278).  Understood in new public 
management terms, Rowe and Shepherd suggest that public involvement is to improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the health service by making it more responsive to 
consumer needs: 
„…the NPM [new public management] perspective sees participation as a means to 
increase organisational learning, with decision-making power retained by health 
care professionals and health service managers.‟ (Rowe and Shepherd, 2002: 279) 
The authors conducted a postal survey of 49 primary care organisations in April 2000, 
seeking views from members of their boards.  Respondents to the survey indicated that 
public involvement was to improve the quality of services, legitimise decisions and improve 
public health through education (2002: 281).  Rowe and Shepherd interpret this response 
from board members in the primary care organisations as indicating a bounded role for 
public involvement, as a means to gather information that informed decisions rather than 
being directly involved in the decision-making process (2002: 287).  Acting as a source of 
information rather than being involved in the decisions tends to be a distinction between 
the consumerist and democratic approaches as applied to public involvement in the NHS. 
Democratic interpretations of NHS-led public involvement were applied alongside 
consumerist approaches in the 2000s.  Weale described NHS-led developments following 
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the abolition of Community Health Councils - such as the NICE Citizens Council21, citizens‟ 
juries and focus groups - as demonstrating that democratic values were breaking out „like 
the darling buds of May‟ across the NHS (2003: 41).  He considers the relationship 
between these mechanisms and accountability for health services in the Westminster 
parliamentary model and the purposes or values that can be achieved through these 
mechanisms.  As plausible rationales for these forms of public involvement, he discusses 
identifying different moral judgements, addressing an imbalance in political influence, 
improving the quality of decisions, introducing a deliberative dimension, understanding 
public beliefs and increasing the legitimacy of decisions (Weale, 2003: 46-49).  Weale 
indicates that there is less likelihood of the mechanisms establishing public preferences or 
reaching a social consensus on hard choices (2003: 49-50).  In a later article, he suggests 
that there are benefits to a wider citizens‟ perspective alongside the voices of interest 
groups (Weale, 2006: 37).  He illustrates a „ripple of concern‟ from specific users as the 
central point, resonating out to general users, expert users, co-producers and wider 
interests (2006: 39).  Weale‟s distinctions between different participants in the „ripple of 
concern‟ demonstrate the complexity for NHS-led and other public involvement 
mechanisms in determining who is involved.  He revisits the rationales for public 
involvement from his earlier article, presenting the first reason as „planning services from 
the user point of view‟ (2006: 38).  Weale considers the example of the NICE Citizens 
Council as a means by which public involvement tests the transparency of decision 
making.  He indicates that the accountability of officials may be difficult to see in the 
„maelstrom of voice and choice‟, but that democratic society is broader than specific 
institutions and that the value of public involvement in the NHS lies in its expression of a 
democratic civic culture (Weale, 2006: 43). 
Duties to involve members of the public in decisions led to a growth in the literature 
for health professionals on how to involve members of the public.  Texts written by or for 
health professionals tend to take a consumerist approach, based on gathering information 
about patients‟ experiences of services, rather than gathering the wider views of citizens.  
Chambers, Drinkwater and Boath open their volume with a statement that „ordinary people‟ 
will not participate if they think that the exercise is „just a public relations sham‟ (2003: 1).  
The inclusion of the statement at the opening suggests that this was seen by the authors 
to be a noteworthy risk for NHS-led forms of involvement.  Tritter, Daykin, Evans and 
Sanidas produced a volume on improving cancer services through patient involvement.  
                                                 
21
 The NICE Citizens Council is written without an apostrophe, following the style used by NICE, as it is a 
proper noun (Davies, Wetherell and Barnett, 2006: vii) 
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They discuss a user involvement cycle, with ongoing identification of service users, leading 
to (re)defining the aims of user involvement, documenting users‟ experience of services, 
involving service users in service and development, leading back to the start of the cycle 
with identification of service users to participate (Tritter et al., 2004: 8).  They emphasise 
the importance of clinical teams working together to involve users, rather than depending 
on a sole champion, and the need to give staff incentives to involve users, such as 
additional resources that are dependent upon having involved service users (2004: 116).  
Whereas the incentives for product managers in Hirschman‟s model were increased sales 
of an improved product, health professionals may not see a direct benefit from involving 
their consumers and so may need to be encouraged to promote user involvement. 
 
Interest group influence, 2000s 
Signatories to The NHS plan included representatives of patients‟ associations and 
other lay health interest groups (Secretary of State for Health, 2000: 9-10).  This seems to 
be indicative of an increase in the profile of these interest groups – a topic that was 
receiving attention in the academic literature.  In 2000, Wood published what he described 
as „the first comparative study of patients‟ associations which relate to particular diseases 
or medical conditions that focuses on political power and influence‟ (2000: 4).  He based 
his study on an analysis of survey data and interview material from Britain and America.  
Wood suggests that it is a puzzle, given the impact of health on people‟s lives, that the 
consumer health movement is relatively weak (2000: 5).  He hypothesises that part of the 
reason why disease-specific voluntary organisations have been relatively weak is that until 
the 1990s they had a negative image amongst policy makers: 
„They have traditionally been viewed with some suspicion, as being partial 
organisations interested only in those detailed aspects of health care which affect 
“their” members.  This negative image, which in Britain has been changing as 
Governments of both parties in the 1990s have emphasised the importance of 
“patients‟ voice”, is important because it may restrict associations‟ access to 
wherever it is that general health policy is effectively determined and hence limit 
the scope for them to exert political influence beyond the level of activities they 
undertake on behalf of individual patients.‟ (Wood, 2000: 13) 
The increased scope for influence that Wood identified in the 1990s was matched by an 
increase in the number of disease-specific voluntary organisations.  Wood establishes that 
although there are some well-known patients‟ associations with „fairly long histories‟, there 
was a remarkable growth in the number of organisations in the last quarter of the twentieth 
century (2000: 39).  Despite the increase in influence in the 1990s, Wood concludes that 
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neither in America nor in Britain do patients‟ associations offer a strong political challenge 
to established interests, describing their involvement as „the politics of presence rather 
than of pressure‟ (2000: 113). 
Baggott, Allsop and Jones undertook research between 1999 and 2003 to uncover 
different perspectives on the influence of health consumer groups in the policy process in 
the United Kingdom.  They conducted surveys and interviews to examine condition-
specific groups in two arenas that were a policy priority (cancer; and heart and circulatory 
conditions) and two that were not a policy priority (arthritis and related conditions; and 
maternity and childbirth).  Baggott, Allsop and Jones found that individual organisations 
represented the needs of their members, but that they also collaborated within alliance 
organisations in order to increase their capacity to influence policy (2005: 136).  In 
interviews, representatives of the health consumer groups were asked why they joined 
alliances.  Interviewees from both large and small organisations indicated that they felt that 
they would have greater policy influence as part of an alliance, as it made it harder for 
other health care stakeholders to take advantage of differences between groups (2005: 
149, 151).  In addition to the increasing number of organisations identified by Wood, the 
researchers conclude that a health consumer movement had emerged in the decade 
leading up to their study, with a shared discourse, values and perceptions (Baggott, Allsop 
and Jones, 2005: 286). 
These studies indicate that there was an increase in the influence of issue-specific 
interest groups at the national level and that they were also working in broader alliances to 
increase opportunities for influence.  The focus of the research in each case is influence 
on national policy, rather than local service development.  Academic and policy interest in 
local involvement has continued to focus predominantly on NHS-led and statutory forms of 
public involvement. 
 
From CHCs to PPI Forums, 2000-2006 
The NHS plan in 2000 announced that Community Health Councils would be 
abolished and replaced.  This introduced the first in a series of changes to statutory public 
involvement institutions.  This sub-section considers the literature on the transition from 
Community Health Councils to PPI Forums, followed by a sub-section on the changes that 
followed the PPI Forums.  As outlined below, the changes have been a focus in their own 
right for academic interest.  The studies represent a mixture of approaches to analysing 
the changes, without a single dominant approach. 
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The abolition of CHCs attracted literary attention from people who had personal 
experience of working with them.  Gerrard‟s volume A stifled voice explores the history of 
the Community Health Councils and the abolition of Community Health Councils in 
England.  Gerrard was the first Secretary, a post later titled Director, of the Association of 
Community Health Councils for England and Wales (ACHCEW).  He therefore had access 
to the ACHCEW files and was able to use his contacts to interview or take statements from 
all the former health Ministers who were still living.  Gerrard describes difficulties from the 
outset for institutions that were designed by a Conservative administration and then 
implemented following the election of a Labour government in 1974, resulting in „the 
unloved offspring of two opposing political philosophies‟ (2006: vi-vii).   Gerrard does not 
take an explicitly theoretical stance in his history, although he considers the abolition of the 
English CHCs in the context of what he sees as the two key elements in a New Labour 
approach: conviction politics and modernisation.  He suggests that „the essence of 
conviction politics is that it is utterly certain of what is proposes and does not tolerate any 
alternative‟ (2006: 28).  Gerrard generously includes extensive direct quotations from his 
sources, which have been drawn upon as sources for this study.  His volume provides a 
source for further studies of statutory public involvement institutions as much as it provides 
a personal account of the history of Community Health Councils.  
Hughes, Mullen and Vincent-Jones examined the contrast between the retention of 
Community Health Councils in Wales and the abolition of Community Health Councils in 
England.  Whilst they do not explicitly cite Hirschman, they draw upon a potential contrast 
between the introduction of „choice‟ in England (or „exit‟ in Hirschman‟s terms) and a 
stronger „voice‟ model in Wales.  The authors analysed policy documents for both nations 
and undertook interviews (n = 16) with NHS managers in Wales (Hughes, Mullen and 
Vincent-Jones, 2009: 241).  They reviewed Welsh and English policies, considering the 
perspectives taken on voice, or democratic, and choice, or market, determinants for policy.  
They argue that Wales has taken „voice‟ and integrated it into a clear hierarchical model, 
drawing on a „small scale‟ that allows for better joining up with local government (2009: 
246).  Hughes, Mullen and Vincent-Jones suggest that the reforms to patient and public 
involvement in England have placed „voice‟ in the shadow of „choice‟.  They propose that 
the ensuing transition from PPI Forums to Local Involvement Networks was to ensure a 
better match with a „choice‟ agenda: if the statutory public involvement institutions were no 
longer attached to a particular service provider, the feedback they provided on the quality 
of services was more likely to be seen by funders and providers of services as impartial.   
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Moving on from the abolition of the CHCs themselves, Klein produced an analysis 
of the changes in the wake of the abolition.  He describes the developments as a „layer-
cake of initiatives, with no necessary logical link between the component parts‟ (2004: 
207).  The layers identified by Klein are the institutions mentioned in The NHS plan itself 
(PPI Forums, Patient Advocacy [later Advice] Liaison Services and the local authority 
Overview and Scrutiny Committees) and the parallel development of patient choice 
mechanisms and membership schemes for Foundation Trusts.  Klein speculates that there 
are two assumptions underlying The NHS plan: that public involvement enables members 
of the public to influence decisions; and that NHS providers will seek the views of service 
users in order to tailor their services (2004: 208).  Klein questions both of these 
assumptions and doubts there is an appetite amongst members of the public to become 
members of Foundation Trusts and to be elected to participate in Foundation Trust boards 
(2004: 208-209).   
Milewa also considered the range of initiatives and institutions that emerged 
following the abolition of Community Health Councils.  Unlike Klein, he does not present 
the new arrangements as disconnected, but sees them from a discourse perspective as a 
„fusion of normative exhortation and structural reform‟ (2004: 240).  Milewa‟s analysis 
suggests that there are two normative emphases in the reforms leading to PPI Forums: the 
first is an established discourse of a democratic deficit; and the second is an emergent 
„quasi-communitarian rhetoric‟ that links health service entitlements to participatory 
responsibilities (2004: 249-250).  He proposes that the new arenas created by Patient and 
Public Involvement Forums, Overview and Scrutiny Committees and membership 
arrangements for Foundation Trusts „constitute, at least tentatively, a significant extension 
of the arenas within which citizens can explore and debate issues pertaining to the NHS‟ 
(2004: 250). 
Whilst the abolition of Community Health Councils had proved difficult for Ministers, 
Baggott proposes that the introduction of PPI Forums represented an implementation 
problem.  He suggests that Community Health Councils had been „outflanked‟ by newer 
forms of participation, such as citizens‟ juries, and that CHCs had difficulty maintaining 
their legitimacy with the growth in the number and activity of patients‟ associations (2005: 
538).  Considered in terms of PPI Forum implementation, the Government failed to ensure 
that other initiatives, such as the development of Foundation Trusts, did not undermine the 
new PPI Forums (2005: 547).  Baggott indicates that the PPI Forums were open to 
criticism for their lack of independence, which did not help them to establish themselves.  
He also maintains that the Government and authorities had failed to take into account the 
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low political leverage of patients that restricted their ability to influence decisions in the 
NHS (2005: 548).  Fundamentally, even if implemented effectively, statutory public 
involvement institutions cannot operate in isolation to empower the public: 
„Institutional changes may be insufficient to promote genuine empowerment of 
citizens.‟ (Baggott, 2005: 548) 
When viewed in implementation terms, the transitions between the statutory public 
involvement institutions combine implementation problems with issues around what 
members of the public or patients can achieve in the face of professional dominance. 
This summary of studies on the transition from Community Health Councils to PPI 
Forums demonstrates a focus in the literature on the impact of abolition and the issues 
around implementation of a new system.  At the stage of this first change, it was the 
abolition of CHCs and the shape of the bodies that replaced them that attracted research 
attention, rather than why Ministers had continued to fund statutory public involvement 
institutions, given the opportunity not to do so.  In terms of their statutory powers, PPI 
Forums were the successors to Community Health Councils, but the literature describes a 
confusion of concurrent changes to public involvement. 
 
Local Involvement Networks and beyond, 2006-2012 
A stronger local voice announced the replacement of PPI Forums with Local 
Involvement Networks (Department of Health, 2006b).  This second abolition and 
replacement presented researchers with new opportunities to consider patterns in the 
transitions over time.  
Hogg reviewed the transitions in a 2007 article and extended her work into a 
monograph in 2009.  In the initial article, Hogg provides an overview of research into the 
effectiveness of Community Health Councils and PPI Forums, identifying learning to be 
applied in the establishment of Local Involvement Networks.  She reviews the research in 
the context of debates about accountability, service improvement and the wider agenda of 
democratic renewal.  Hogg suggests that debates from the 1970s about public 
involvement in health services remain current and that learning needs to be gathered on 
where Community Health Councils and PPI Forums are considered to have failed (2007: 
130).  She proposes that governments‟ reasons for promoting patient and public 
involvement in health services have changed over time: in the 1970s, the institutions were 
seen as a means to overcome professionals‟ opposition to change and through their 
membership structure bridged relationships with local authorities and the voluntary sector; 
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Hogg interprets the role of PPI Forums as representing a shift to Government interest in 
participation by patients in decisions within the NHS; and she suggests that the rhetoric 
around the transition to Local Involvement Networks could be interpreted either as 
contributing to local democracy across health and social care, or as assisting in setting 
priorities (2007: 131-132).  On the matter of setting priorities, she indicates that 
governments may be unwilling to involve issue-specific voluntary organisations in 
decisions about budgets for treatments, as the input of issue-specific groups may be 
skewed by funding from pharmaceutical companies:  
„If LINks are to advise on local priorities, they will need to operate in the public 
interest rather than the „patient‟ or consumer interest.  They may be reluctant to do 
this as it might lead to conflict as the major pressures for new drugs and new 
services come from patients and patient groups, often funded by the 
pharmaceutical industry.‟ (Hogg, 2007: 132)  
Hogg considers lessons from the previous state-sponsored organisations, indicating that 
there needs to be clarity about accountability to local communities, the form of 
representation, requirements of members, independence and standards (2007: 134-136).  
In her discussion of independence, she indicates that statutory public involvement 
institutions can be interpreted as meeting management needs: 
„State sponsored participation is always open to the accusation that it is 
manipulation – a cynical attempt to get support for management rather than 
enhance participatory democracy.‟ (Hogg, 2007: 135)   
Her principal message, however, is that there are lessons that need to be learned from 
past forms of statutory public involvement, to avoid the risk of systems that lack credibility 
and are seen as a waste of resources (2007: 137). 
Hogg extended her research into the changes between statutory public 
involvement institutions as part of a broader review of public involvement in her 2009 
volume Citizens, consumers and the NHS: capturing voices.  She identifies differing views 
on patient and public involvement in the NHS, analysing debates within the framework of 
civil renewal and active citizenship, public participation and community engagement (2009: 
xiii).  She suggests that part of the difficulty for public involvement has been „a persistent 
confusion about whether Government wants to involve people in order to provide better 
health services or to involve them as citizens as part of the democratic process‟ (2009: 1).  
Hogg‟s account is an analytical history of statutory public involvement institutions from the 
establishment of Community Health Councils to the implementation of Local Involvement 
Networks, based on documentary evidence and interviews.  In her discussions of 
consumerist and democratic involvement, Hogg suggests that consumerist models of 
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choice of service are complex in the context of rationing, as a real choice depends on an 
oversupply in the market to ensure that the option requested is available (2009: 185).  
Given the finite resources in the NHS and the varying capacity of individuals to make 
choices, a consumerist approach may increase inequalities in access to health services 
(2009: 186).   She identifies that with the confusions between democratic and consumerist 
models of participation and a succession of changes to statutory public involvement 
institutions, there is skepticism about public involvement in the NHS.  To overcome this, 
Hogg recommends that statutory public involvement institutions need to be more closely 
aligned with citizen engagement rather than consumerism (2009: 187). 
A theme in the literature on statutory public involvement from Klein and Lewis‟ 
1976 report onwards is the membership of the institutions and who they are representing.   
Hogg suggests that having people with experience is important, as alluded to in her 
dedication of her 2009 book to „the usual suspects‟.  Learmonth, Martin and Warwick use 
the analogy of  the bureaucratic irrationality in Joseph Heller‟s novel Catch-22 to present 
the conflicting requirement that „you have to be ordinary to represent the community 
effectively, but, if you are ordinary, you cannot effectively represent your community‟ 
(2009: 106).  The authors discuss the changes between Community Health Councils, PPI 
Forums and Local Involvement Networks.  They suggest that CHCs „were intended to 
consist of ordinary people who lived in the locality‟ (2009: 106).  In the documentation to 
describe members of PPI Forums and Local Involvement Networks, the authors determine 
that „ordinary people only‟ is a rhetorical device that is used to describe an ideal of 
membership, but which conflicts with expectations of what the members will be able to 
achieve (2009: 108, 110).  Learmonth, Martin and Warwick consider four vignettes based 
on the practical experiences that Learmonth and Warwick had had of Community Health 
Councils and PPI Forums respectively.  On the basis of the vignettes, the authors propose: 
„…that to search for people who are ordinary and who have the ability to be 
committed to the level required for what Government hold to constitute 
“effectiveness” inevitably presents a Catch-22.  Lay people are, by definition, not 
experts in health care; and as non-experts, especially in the professionalised and 
evidence-based culture of today‟s NHS, they lack the prestige and credibility 
enjoyed by many other voices in health care.‟ (Learmonth, Martin and Warwick, 
2009: 113; italics in original) 
In order to get away from this Catch-22, the authors recommend shifting away from a 
managerial sense of „effectiveness‟ and giving statutory public involvement institutions the 
space and the time „to pursue their agendas‟ (2009: 113-114).  Whether such a move from 
managerial effectiveness is possible depends upon the expectations of Ministers as the 
funders of statutory public involvement institutions. 
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Vincent-Jones, Hughes and Mullen also explore the issue of who is involved in 
statutory public involvement institutions, examined through an analysis of public policy 
documents during the period from 2001 to 2008.  They observe that the discourse has 
moved from an inclusive integration of „patient and public‟ involvement to a more exclusive 
focus on the role of patients in consumer choice (Vincent-Jones, Hughes and Mullen, 
2009; italics in original).  Vincent-Jones et al. point out that the Local Government and 
Public Involvement in Health Act 2007 refers to consultation of „users of services‟, rather 
than the broader reference to consulting „persons to whom … services are or might be 
provided‟ in the earlier Health and Social Care Act 2001 (2009: 259).  The authors 
conclude that replacing PPI Forums with Local Involvement Networks made sense within 
the „changing organisational landscape of health and social care provision‟ (2009: 270).  
The research team suggests that the role of the patient as consumer has taken over from 
the involvement of citizens in the discourse of policy documents in England: 
„We have suggested that the tension that exists between the different “patient” and 
“public” dimensions of PPI [Patient and Public Involvement] policy is being resolved 
by the strengthening of the former aspect at the expense of the latter.  The 
traditional concern with patient and public involvement in healthcare governance is 
being displaced in contemporary political discourse by a focus on consumer choice 
and economic regulation.‟ (Vincent-Jones, Hughes and Mullen, 2009: 271; italics in 
original) 
As in the Hughes et al. (2009) paper on the contrast between retention of CHCs in Wales 
and their abolition in England, the research team use an implicitly Hirschmanian model of 
exit and voice, but do not cite Hirschman explicitly.   
The same research team, this time in the sequence Mullen, Hughes and Vincent-
Jones (2011), consider the democratic potential of public participation in healthcare 
governance in England.  Their research formed part of a broader study of the necessary 
conditions for reflexive governance.  The authors suggest that if democratic potential is 
judged by the extent to which people are able to have a say, the revisions between 2001 
and 2007 weaken this democratic role (Mullen, Hughes and Vincent-Jones, 2011: 32).  
They speculate that the democratic potential of local Healthwatch as a successor to Local 
Involvement Networks may depend on the ability of local Healthwatch to attract people 
from a diverse range of backgrounds (2011: 35). 
The research agenda for statutory public involvement institutions has shifted over 
time with the wider context: NHS reorganisations and management changes in the 1970s-
1980s; internal market consumerism and potential legitimation tactics in the 1990s; and as 
institutions subject to change alongside the growth of both NHS-led involvement and 
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interest groups in the 2000s-2010s.  Mullen, Hughes and Vincent-Jones close their 2011 
paper with speculation about the value of statutory public involvement institutions in 
today‟s environment (2011: 35).  It is this speculation about the role(s) played by statutory 
forms of involvement that forms the springboard from the existing literature into this study. 
 
2.5 Examining statutory public involvement 
As illustrated in the history in Chapter One and the literature review in this chapter, 
there has been a growth in both interest group activity and NHS-led involvement in the 
NHS, providing alternatives to statutory public involvement institutions as means to involve 
members of the public in NHS decision-making processes.  Given the growth of alternative 
mechanisms, ongoing Ministerial investment in funding and reforming statutory public 
involvement institutions suggests these bodies fulfil a role that is not met either by working 
with interest groups or by depending upon NHS-led involvement mechanisms. 
Ongoing investment where there are alternatives available could be taken to 
suggest that Ministers have political incentives for retaining statutory public involvement 
institutions.  Hogg mentioned that state-sponsored forms of involvement are open to the 
accusation that they are a form of manipulation and „a cynical attempt to get support for 
management‟ (2007: 135).  There is a strong theme of legitimation within the public 
involvement literature.  Harrison and Mort suggested that information from service users 
might be used to legitimate decisions (1998: 66-67).  Subsequent authors cited in this 
literature review also referred to lay representation or consultation as means to legitimate 
decisions (Rowe and Shepherd, 2002: 281; Pickard, 2007: 79-80).  As state-funded 
bodies, there is the possibility that Ministers may be able to legitimate decisions or 
processes through statutory public involvement institutions.  If the institutions provide a 
means to support political management of the NHS, including legitimising decisions or 
enabling Ministers to avoid blame, the clue to the areas of activity is likely to be found in 
the statutory powers of the institutions.  These statutory powers receive little direct 
discussion within the public involvement literature; as discussed below, however, the 
powers are an implicit element in the literature as the powers determine the activities that 
are then the subject of research. 
The statutory powers fall into two main areas: consultation rights; and inspection 
rights.  For most of their history, statutory public involvement institutions have had 
privileged rights to be consulted on proposed changes to local services, a right that was 
replaced following The NHS plan with a duty of NHS institutions to consult on proposed 
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changes.  Throughout their history, the institutions have had rights to enter and inspect 
NHS premises (a right broadened to include social care settings for Local Involvement 
Networks and local Healthwatch), to request information from service providers and to 
refer unresolved issues or problems to higher authorities.  Viewed from the perspective of 
the institutions‟ statutory powers, two key threads emerge from within the literature 
discussed in this chapter: managing local representation in consultation exercises; and 
monitoring the quality of services. 
 
Managing local representation 
The balance of interests between the state, professionals and the public, as 
outlined in Section 2.1, is a central part of understanding the political management of the 
NHS.  Within the wider politics of health literature, management of professional groups 
receives a great deal of attention (Salter, 2004: 7; Baggott, 2004: 49-54).  Studies within 
the public involvement in health literature discussed in this chapter indicated that patients‟ 
associations and other lay interest groups are in a weaker position than professional 
groups and risk reducing their influence further through conflict between interest groups, 
so vetoing each other‟s input (Williamson, 1992: 2-3; Alford, 1975: 221).  Green found that 
issue-specific groups were excluded until after decisions had been made (1987: 132).  
Hogg also suggests that NHS organisations may exclude issue-specific groups from 
discussions if they think that their input could be influenced by receipt of funding from the 
pharmaceutical industry (2007: 132). 
Statutory public involvement institutions gather the views of interest groups and 
include interest groups within their membership.  When Klein and Lewis examined the 
appointments processes for Community Health Councils, they found that groups for 
vulnerable people were particularly well represented in CHC membership.  They proposed 
that this was a representation by proxy of „the most vulnerable and perhaps least articulate 
members of the community‟ (Klein and Lewis, 1976: 38).  Bates found that health 
administrators valued CHCs for their role in articulating the needs of vulnerable groups 
(1982: 97).  Winkler reported that Community Health Councils gathered the views of local 
service users and interest groups, which she viewed as an extended form of consumerism 
(Winkler, 1987). 
Representation of local communities, particularly local interest groups, is therefore 
a thread within the public involvement literature that warrants further examination in the 
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light of the role that coordinating representation might play in political management of the 
NHS. 
 
Monitoring service quality 
Monitoring the quality of services is a complex process for Ministers.  Ministers are 
dependent upon health professionals to deliver health services and it is difficult to manage 
the activity of this highly-skilled professional group (Harrison and Pollitt 1994: 10). 
The activities of statutory public involvement institutions described in the literature 
include activities that could be regarded as monitoring services, although they are not 
described in those terms.  Klein and Lewis describe the importance of the rights to visit 
services as they provide „the time and opportunity to inquire into, and form a judgement 
about, the state of the local health services‟ (1976: 122).  They also refer to problems 
experienced by Darlington CHC, which had had difficulties gaining access to or information 
about local services and it later transpired that there were significant problems at the 
Darlington Memorial Hospital, giving rise to an inquiry by the Northern Regional Health 
Authority (Klein and Lewis, 1976: 130-131).  The ability to visit and report on services 
suggests that statutory public involvement institutions may play a role in political 
management of the NHS by identifying and reporting problems. 
Statutory public involvement institutions have also identified problems through 
concerns raised by health service users.  Whilst they did not have a statutory role in 
complaints management, Community Health Councils provided support to complainants 
and all of the successive institutions have gathered feedback from service users.  
Hirschman‟s notion of voice was that consumers „express their dissatisfaction directly to 
management or to some other authority to which management is subordinate or through 
general protest to anyone who cares to listen‟ (1970: 4).  It is difficult for patients who are 
dependent on the NHS to make complaints, as they may fear that it will jeopardise the 
doctor-patient relationship (Hogg, 1999: 32).  Statutory public involvement institutions 
provide a means for people to voice concerns, particularly those for whom private 
healthcare is not an option (Bates, 1982: 98).  The public involvement in health literature 
demonstrates that statutory public involvement institutions play an active role in gathering 
feedback about local health services. 
The combination of statutory rights (to visit services and to request information 
about them) and gathering feedback enables statutory public involvement institutions to 
play roles in monitoring service quality.  This role may be an important one for Ministers 
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seeking to identify and act on problems before they become disasters (Alaszewski and 
Brown, 2012: 115-116). 
 
Statutory public involvement institutions have tended to be discussed in the same 
terms as NHS-led involvement and interest group engagement.  As statutory bodies, 
however, they are an alternative to these other forms of public involvement and need to be 
considered in terms of their statutory powers, as the statutory powers are their distinctive 
feature.  Rather than considering statutory public involvement institutions in terms of 
consumerism or democratic engagement, this study draws on strands in the current 
literature that relate to the statutory powers of the institutions: managing local 
representation; and monitoring service quality.  These elements are considered in terms of 
approaches to interest group management and public service oversight from the wider 
political science literature to form the basis of the theoretical framework for this study. 
 
 
Chapter summary 
This chapter reviewed the literature on public involvement in health services.  It 
opened with an introduction to the underlying theme of the balance between state, 
professional and public interests in the politics of health services literature.  The discussion 
of the literature on public involvement in the NHS took a chronological form, demonstrating 
how research interests have shifted over time.  During the 1970s and 1980s there was an 
interest in statutory public involvement institutions as new organisations, with studies of 
their membership profile and the way in which they related to health authorities.  In the 
1990s, the literature reflected the creation of new NHS-led mechanisms for public 
involvement, such as citizens‟ juries, with research interests in consumerism and whether 
public involvement activities might address a perceived democratic deficit in the NHS.  
Since 2000, there have been several changes to statutory public involvement institutions, 
which have been the focus of academic interest.  Alongside the changes to statutory public 
involvement institutions, there has been an increase in interest group influence and NHS-
led activity, which have also been the focus of academic study.  The chapter concludes by 
suggesting that statutory public involvement institutions are an alternative to the other 
forms of engagement and need to be considered in terms of their statutory powers.  Whilst 
there is little explicit discussion of the statutory powers in the current literature, two key 
themes emerge that relate to those powers: managing local representation; and monitoring 
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service quality.  These themes are reflected in the next chapter within the theoretical 
framework for this study. 
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Chapter Three: Research framework 
This chapter presents the research design for this study, beginning with the 
research question, then the theoretical approaches and closing with the methods for the 
study.  This research draws upon the indications in the existing literature of a potential role 
for statutory public involvement institutions in managing local representation or monitoring 
service quality.  It questions the roles that the institutions may have played in political 
management of the NHS between 1974 and 2010.  Two theoretically-derived approaches 
to examining the roles of the institutions are framed broadly as a „sheepdog‟ and a 
„watchdog‟.  A „sheepdog‟ rounds up local representation, including potential opponents to 
change, and a „watchdog‟ alerts actors to problems before they become disasters.  This 
chapter discusses the theoretical background and operationalisation of each of these 
models.  The final section discusses the methods selected to research the question using 
the two theoretically-derived approaches and the implications of the methods and sources 
used.  This includes a review of the issues involved in analysing documents that were not 
created for research into statutory public involvement institutions, such as evidence 
presented to public inquiries. 
 
3.1     Research question 
Each time Secretaries of State have abolished statutory public involvement 
institutions, they have had the opportunity not to replace them.  The abolitions, however, 
have been followed in each case by state funding of new institutions.  In the light of the 
growth of alternatives to the statutory public involvement institutions as mechanisms to 
engage the public in decisions about health services, this ongoing investment can be seen 
as a puzzle.  This puzzle provides the starting point for engaging with the current literature 
and developing the research question (Hancké, 2009: 15).  Ongoing state funding and 
investment in redesign of the institutions suggests that national politicians responsible for 
the NHS have seen statutory public involvement institutions as playing a role, or roles, 
beyond that provided by either self-generating interest groups or NHS-led involvement.  
The existing literature on the broader politics of health, as discussed in Chapter Two, 
includes indications that the institutions may play roles in managing local representation 
and monitoring the quality of services.  Managing interest groups, particularly where the 
groups oppose reforms, presents a major challenge to politicians (Pierson, 1994: 19).  
Ministers also find it difficult to manage the activities of expert health professionals and 
need timely intelligence on locally-delivered health services to help them to avoid disasters 
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(Alaszewski and Brown, 2012: 39, 115).  The suggestions of managing local 
representation and monitoring services within the existing literature may be indications of 
roles played by statutory public involvement institutions in political management of the 
NHS. 
Statutory public involvement institutions may be seen as a distinctive form of public 
involvement owing to their statutory powers.  The powers granted to statutory public 
involvement institutions have included privileged consultation rights, such as the ability to 
reach local agreement on hospital closures, rights to enter and inspect NHS premises and 
the ability to refer issues directly to the Secretary of State responsible for health services.  
These powers could be seen as a puzzle in the context of public involvement if such 
involvement is understood purely in the terms of some of the themes within the public 
involvement in health literature, such as consumerism or addressing a democratic deficit.  
The powers also highlight that the institutions are a very particular form of public 
involvement, distinct from self-generating groups or consultation led by NHS personnel.  
This suggests that the growth of self-generating interest groups and NHS-led forms of 
involvement has not provided a direct alternative to statutory public involvement 
institutions.   
The nature of the statutory powers could indicate that statutory public involvement 
institutions play a more formalised role in Ministerial management of the NHS than that 
described in the existing literature on public involvement in health services.  One 
dimension to disentangling the puzzle of ongoing investment is therefore to consider 
whether the statutory powers granted to the institutions are indicative of roles Ministers 
wish them to fulfil.  This study takes concepts from the broader political science literature 
and considers whether statutory public involvement institutions have played a role in 
Ministerial management of health service politics.  Framed as a research question: what 
role(s) have statutory public involvement institutions played in political 
management of the English NHS, 1974-2010? 
This research question is specific to the institutions within the National Health 
Service, but it also links to the broader issues of the role played by citizens in public 
service governance and the tools available to political actors overseeing complex services.  
The research question can be broken down into several parts.  The first part is the 
potential role or roles; as discussed below, the potential roles explored in this study draw 
upon issues of managing interests and managing expertise within the political science 
literature.  The second element in the question, the statutory public involvement 
institutions, refers to the succession of institutions in the NHS in England: Community 
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Health Councils; Patient and Public Involvement Forums; and Local Involvement 
Networks.  For the purposes of this study, political management of the NHS refers to the 
nationally coordinated processes that enable Ministers and other nationally-elected 
politicians to oversee the health service and to facilitate reforms.  The focus of this 
research is on the NHS in England during the period 1974 to 2010.  The timeframe from 
1974 covers the period from the establishment of Community Health Councils to the 
consultation in 2010 on the replacement of Local Involvement Networks with local 
Healthwatch. 
Two theoretically-informed approaches form the basis of potential roles and the 
sub-questions in this study.  The first considers the role that statutory public involvement 
institutions may have played in managing interests.  It uses a „sheepdog‟ analogy: a 
sheepdog may round up sheep to ensure that they are all accounted for, but it may also 
keep the sheep penned in to enable the farmer to manage them, such as by shearing the 
stock or undertaking medical procedures.  Drawing on the public involvement in health 
literature, a sheepdog may ensure that vulnerable groups are represented (Klein and 
Lewis, 1976: 38; Klein, 1984: 30).  Considered from a welfare state retrenchment 
perspective, a sheepdog may manage the involvement of more dominant groups to 
prevent mobilisation of opposition to reforms (Pierson, 1994: 19).  The first sub-question 
considers the two dimensions to the sheepdog role: do the institutions act as 
‘sheepdogs’ rounding up participants and managing potential opposition?  The 
second sub-question uses a „watchdog‟ analogy in the context of managing expertise in 
health services.  Participants in statutory public involvement institutions have often referred 
to themselves as „watchdogs‟ (as an example, see Gerrard, 2006: 79), but have not 
provided a theoretical basis for the „watchdog‟ role.  Considered from the perspective of 
the legislative oversight literature, statutory public involvement institutions may gather 
intelligence about local services and alert political actors to problems before they become 
disasters.  This provides the second sub-question: do the institutions act as 
‘watchdogs’ preventing disasters in the NHS? 
The canine analogies in the two sub-questions are based on the theoretical 
frameworks described below, but also draw upon the language used by statutory public 
involvement institutions to describe their role: 
„Community health councils are the watchdogs of the National Health Service.  
Haringey CHC liked the image and chose a dog‟s head for badges and publicity 
material when they meet people at Wood Green Shopping Centre during the 
[awareness] Week.  What sort of dog?  Alsatian. – too fierce.  Poodle? – well… 
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Compromise?  “A sort of labrador” with a CHC telephone number on its collar.‟  
(Association of CHCs for England and Wales, 1983c: [unpaginated]) 
The volunteers who had given their time wanted to be seen to have a definite role, rather 
than being a „poodle‟.  An interpretation of this third dog could be to see statutory public 
involvement as a form of symbolic politics (Harrison and McDonald, 2008: 122).  Edelman 
suggests that participation mechanisms, such as voting, may be ritual acts that come to 
symbolise involvement even when the general public have limited influence over policy 
(1985: 2-3).  Considered from this perspective, Ministers may wish to be seen to provide a 
mechanism that symbolises participation without giving a more definite role.  This study 
considers the potential of the sheepdog and watchdog roles, but with the underlying 
possibility that statutory public involvement institutions may prove to be poodles. 
The next two sections of this chapter consider the theoretical underpinnings and 
operationalisation of the sheepdog and watchdog roles for statutory public involvement 
institutions in political management of the NHS.  This leads into a discussion of the 
research design and methods. 
 
3.2     Sheepdog and watchdog: theoretical framework 
The theoretical approaches underlying the sheepdog and watchdog roles are 
drawn from within the political science literature.  This section presents the concepts 
underlying the sheepdog and watchdog roles in turn.  It then discusses the potential 
reasons why Ministers might choose to work with statutory public involvement institutions, 
including the risks a Secretary of State would need to consider in working with groups of 
volunteers to support political management of the NHS.  It also considers whether the 
sheepdog and watchdog can be combined and issues around the activity of sheepdogs 
and watchdogs that could lead to the decision to abolish and replace statutory public 
involvement institutions. 
 
Sheepdog theoretical framework 
Issue-specific interest groups have grown up alongside the development of the 
National Health Service, with a growth in the number of patients‟ organisations particularly 
since the 1970s (Wood, 2000: 39).  For the purposes of this study, „interest groups‟ refers 
to patient associations, community groups and other groups with an interest in health 
services, such as Leagues of Friends for NHS institutions.  Interest groups supporting 
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particular aspects of the NHS have become prominent social actors (Pierson, 1994: 29).  
These groups are supportive of developments at times of welfare state expansion.  The 
combination of ageing populations and the development of more sophisticated medical 
technologies, however, increase health service costs and mean that mature welfare states 
face austerity rather than the expansion of public services (Pierson, 2001: 103).  In a 
climate in which resources are tight, difficult decisions have to be made about the 
allocation of resources.  With changes to health services, there is the risk that better-
resourced groups will be heard to voice opposition, whereas the views of less dominant 
groups, often representing vulnerable communities, may not be heard.  Changes to health 
services may include the closure of services.  Closures are unpopular with existing interest 
groups and, in the case of hospital closures, may lead to the development of new groups 
specifically to oppose the changes.  Pierson suggests that whilst voters may resent paying 
taxes, they respond more strongly to perceived service losses than they do to reductions 
in the tax burden (1994: 2).  Organised opposition to reform can slow down proposed 
changes (Korpi and Palme, 2003).  To reduce delays to changes, therefore, one of the 
political tactics that has been identified in the welfare state retrenchment literature is to 
reduce the mobilisation of opposition to reform (Pierson, 1994: 19).  Whilst Pierson was 
writing specifically about welfare state retrenchment, his discussion of tactics can be 
applied to management of potential opposition to reforms more generally.  Rounding up 
interest groups may moderate their participation, or it may rig the system so that 
vulnerable groups are represented and the issues raised are only those that are of 
concern to the wider population rather than well-resourced groups (Klein, 1984: 30). 
One of the problems for political actors seeking reforms is that major social policy 
programmes, such as delivery of health services, affect large numbers of people who 
either participate in or are represented by well-organised groups (Kitschelt, 2001: 267).  
Wood‟s research into patient groups in Britain suggests that politicians may see issue-
specific interest groups as only being concerned with the needs of “their” members, rather 
than taking a broader approach to the services needed across the community or the 
broader health service (2000:13).  When it comes to implementation of health services 
policy, it is often the activity of local groups than can help or hinder developments, as NHS 
services are delivered locally and attract the support of local groups.  The local services 
tend to be very tangible, such as the presence of a local hospital or a service for people 
with a particular health problem, making local mobilisation more likely if services are 
perceived to be at risk.  Ministers at points of reform may have therefore seen local issue-
specific interest groups as a threat to policy implementation and so sought mechanisms to 
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manage participation by issue-specific groups in local health service consultation 
processes.  As discussed in Chapter Two, Klein and Lewis found that the appointment 
processes for Community Health Councils were designed to ensure that representatives of 
groups for vulnerable people were included as members, alongside representatives of 
well-resourced groups (1976: 38).  This may have been part of a sheepdog structure to 
moderate the input of groups that have more powerful voices.  Statutory public 
involvement institutions were designed to have privileged consultation rights, so the 
structured representation of interest groups in their membership may have created a 
means for intermediation between interest groups and local health services.  In this sense, 
they may be understood as a form of corporatism at a local level to manage representation 
of interests and prevent potential mobilisation of opposition by issue-specific interest 
groups.  
Schmitter distinguishes between self-generating corporatism as „societal 
corporatism‟ and collaborations developed by the state as „state corporatism‟ (1974: 103).  
A form of societal corporatism would be a cartel to protect the trade interests of a group of 
producers.  State corporatism would be an association for interest intermediation created 
by the state to shape the relationship between member organisations and the state.  
Schmitter initially described the activity of corporatist associations as a form of „interest 
representation‟, but he later revised this to „interest intermediation‟: 
„By switching to the more awkward and less frequently used expression “interest 
intermediation”, I mean to emphasise that these associations not only may express 
interests of their members, and/or play an important role in teaching their members 
what their interest “should be”, but also often assume or are forced to acquire 
governmental functions of resource allocation and social control.  Representation 
(or misrepresentation), hence, may be only one of the activities of these 
associations, occasionally not even the most important one.‟ (Schmitter, 1977: 36). 
Schmitter‟s assertion that corporatist associations play an „important role in teaching their 
members what their interest “should be”‟ suggests that a corporatist interpretation of 
statutory public involvement institutions could be that they would direct their issue-specific 
member organisations away from mobilising opposition to changes.  The extension of 
Schmitter‟s justification for the shift in terminology to encompass the expectation that 
corporatist associations would „acquire governmental functions of resource allocation and 
social control‟ sits with a desire of national elected politicians to avoid taking blame for 
unpopular decisions about health service allocation.  Strategies for blame avoidance are 
discussed below and incorporated into the operationalisation of statutory public 
involvement institutions as a sheepdog rounding up potential opposition to reforms. 
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Schmitter proposes nine characteristics of corporatism, which he states can be 
applied both to state corporatism and to societal corporatism (1974: 103-104).  Three of 
these characteristics relate to an interest intermediation role: the corporatist associations 
are singular bodies (in the case of statutory public involvement institutions, a single 
representative of issue-specific groups at a local level); they are non-competitive, as they 
hold singular rights; and they are hierarchically ordered.  Corporatist associations are also 
described by Schmitter in terms that reflect their role in structured consultation: they have 
a limited number of members; there is compulsory representation of particular 
communities; the state grants monopoly consultation rights in return for intermediation; 
and there are controls set by the state on leadership selection and interests articulation.  
The remaining two characteristics reflect a state-determined remit: corporatist associations 
are functionally differentiated, having a remit that covers a particular function; and they are 
recognised by the state for the purposes of intermediation in relation to that function.  This 
grouping of the elements in Schmitter‟s model produces three characteristics when applied 
to local corporatist bodies: mediating between local interests; structuring consultation on 
local services; and considering issues within a state-determined remit.  These three 
characteristics are incorporated into the operationalisation of the sheepdog role in Section 
3.3 and Figure 3.1 below. 
Associations that have these corporatist characteristics may be able to manage 
opposition to reforms.  Discussions of corporatism tend to focus on national peak 
organisations, with a national intermediation role.  Cawson suggests that corporatism is a 
political structure associated with the centre, whereas competitive politics are more 
significant at the local level (1985: 134).  The local activity of statutory public involvement 
institutions could be interpreted as placing difficult decisions about health service reforms 
at a convenient distance from Ministers.  Schmitter‟s statement on the change from 
interest representation to interest intermediation mentioned that corporatist associations 
may be „forced to acquire governmental functions of resource allocation‟ (1977: 36).  
Involving interest groups in the difficult decisions may make it harder for the interest 
groups to oppose changes in which they have been involved. Transferring responsibility 
for local resource allocation decisions to local corporatist structures could also be a way to 
shift blame from national politicians to local groups. 
Blame avoidance is described by Weaver as the primary motivator for elected 
politicians, as voters are more likely to respond negatively to losses than they are to 
respond positively to gains (1986: 317).  There is a parallel here with the use Harrison and 
Mort identified of public involvement as a means to legitimise decisions, a tactic which 
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could be transferred into avoiding blame for a decision if it proved to be unpopular (1998: 
66).  If opposing a measure has little chance of success, a politician may feel that they are 
less likely to be blamed by voters if they portray themselves as powerless to influence the 
decision (Weaver, 1986: 379).  Weaver identifies eight blame-avoiding strategies, ranging 
from keeping the issue off the agenda to seeking consensus, so that all participants cover 
for colleagues (1986: 384-389).  One of these strategies is „passing the buck‟: if a blame-
generating decision has to be made, politicians are likely to delegate that decision to 
someone else (Weaver, 1986: 392).  Weaver draws on work by Fiorina for his „passing the 
buck‟ strategy.  Fiorina suggested in a 1982 paper that delegation to regulatory authorities 
is a deliberate attempt to shift the political costs of decisions and he later proposed that 
rational actors may choose the uncertainty of a delegated decision over the certainty of 
retaining responsibility for an unpopular decision (1982: 46; 1986: 38).  The creation of 
state-funded local institutions provided national politicians with the opportunity to delegate 
local decisions that were likely to have an unpopular outcome. 
Considered from the perspective of managing interest group involvement, do 
statutory public involvement institutions act as „sheepdogs‟ rounding up participants and 
managing potential opposition to NHS reforms?   The theoretical basis for this question is 
taken from the need expressed in the welfare state retrenchment literature for national 
politicians to manage opposition to reforms, modelled through the characteristics of state 
corporatism and the strategy of blame avoidance.  It also draws upon elements in the 
literature on public involvement in health literature that refer to representation of less well-
resourced groups through statutory public involvement institutions (Klein, 1984: 30).  On 
the basis of the corporatist association characteristics, if statutory public involvement 
institutions managed opposition they would mediate between local interests, structure 
consultation on local services and consider only a state-determined range of issues.  
Adding an explicit role to enable national politicians to avoid blame for unpopular 
decisions, the statutory public involvement institutions would be granted delegated 
responsibility for unpopular local decisions.   
 
Watchdog theoretical framework 
The second sub-question considers whether statutory public involvement 
institutions may alert national politicians to problems before they become disasters.  This 
theoretical approach comes from the legislative oversight literature, which treats political 
actors as principals facing the challenge of managing agents who may hold greater 
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expertise than the principals on their specific areas of work.  To manage expert agents, 
political principals need information on the agents‟ activities.  The need for feedback to 
improve services is a core element in the consumerist literature, but in this case the theory 
is drawn from the literature on preventing disasters.  Ministers seek to avoid disasters in 
the NHS as the electorate and the media may criticise the Government for not having 
acted to prevent the problem (Alaszewski and Brown, 2012: 139).  If disasters cannot be 
avoided entirely, Ministers need to receive information quickly, so that they can be seen to 
act without being forced into a position in which there is little scope for a rational policy 
response (Alaszewski and Brown, 2012: 138).  The legislative oversight literature 
examines mechanisms for gathering information, or „the “watchdog” function of legislatures 
which monitors the implementation and administration of laws and policies by state 
agencies‟ (Hagens, 1974: 170).   The language and examples used in much of the 
legislative oversight literature reflect the systems in the United States and the role of 
Congress.  For the purpose of this study, these are the political oversight mechanisms 
used by elected politicians to oversee the NHS in England.  
Considering Ministers as principals overseeing the work of agents with high levels 
of expertise, the Ministers need independent intelligence on the agents‟ activity.  Principal-
agent models of the relationship between politicians and expert agents tend to suggest 
that oversight may be most effective when it is least apparent (Ogul and Rockman, 1990: 
6).  McCubbins and Schwartz challenge the notion that Congress may be neglecting 
oversight responsibility if it does not develop overt oversight mechanisms (1984: 165).  
They nominate a distinction between overt „police-patrol oversight‟ and less apparent „fire-
alarm oversight‟.  In the form of a police patrol, oversight would be a comparatively 
centralised process, with samples of activity assessed to discourage violations and 
mechanisms to identify problems through surveillance (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984: 
166).  With a fire-alarm oversight system, the principal would create „rules, procedures and 
informal practices‟ to enable citizens and interest groups to alert the principal to any 
problems (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984: 166).  Thus, the police patrol is a 
professionalised process, whilst fire alarms depend upon third parties to gather 
information.   
McCubbins and Schwartz suggest that police patrols tend to be the assumed 
legislative oversight mechanism in much of the literature (1984: 170).  On the analogy of 
actual police patrols, this form of oversight consists of surveillance that will either detect 
and remedy problems or discourage violations (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984: 166).  
Personnel within police patrols are not directly involved in managing services, so do not 
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have the same incentive to shirk or to provide misinformation as expert agents would do.  
McCubbins and Schwartz indicate that information collection methods would include: 
reading documents; commissioning scientific studies; conducting field observations; and 
holding hearings to question officials and affected citizens (1984: 166). 
Engagement with police-patrol oversight takes a great deal of time for political 
principals, including detecting and remedying violations that do not cause harm to potential 
supporters or voters and so are unnoticed by them (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984: 168).  
A second downside of police-patrol oversight is that it is impossible to create a system that 
is comprehensive, so violations will still slip through (1984: 168).  Thirdly, many of the 
costs of a police patrol, whether time or financial cost, are borne by political principals, 
whereas the major costs of fire-alarm oversight are borne by voluntary third parties 
(McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984: 168). 
Effective fire-alarm oversight depends upon mechanisms that enable citizens and 
interest groups to notify principals of problems.  Fire-alarm oversight does not suggest a 
lack of activity by the political principal, but an investment in the statutory provisions that 
enable a fire alarm to be effective – extending the analogy, Bawn proposes that the 
principals are „dispensing fire extinguishers and establishing guidelines for a fireproof 
environment‟ (1997: 104).  A fire alarm may be a preferred mechanism from an elected 
politician‟s perspective as: firstly, issues that cause harm are more likely to be raised, 
rather than procedural violations, so the time costs to politicians are low; secondly, the 
costs of monitoring are borne by interest groups, so the resource costs are lower for the 
politician than maintaining a regulator to provide a police patrol; and, thirdly, a political 
actor can receive credit from potential supporters if the politician is seen to intervene in 
response to a public concern, gaining a beneficial response from any adverse publicity 
about the failing service that has been generated by the interest group  (McCubbins and 
Schwartz, 1984: 167).   This third dimension is attractive from the perspective of 
relationships with the electorate, as it means that the politician could be seen to act to 
prevent a problem from becoming a disaster. 
In their model of fire-alarm oversight, McCubbins and Schwartz propose that fire 
alarms are local rather than centralised bodies.  McCubbins and Schwartz identify specific 
rights that would be needed by citizens and interest groups to enable them to act as fire 
alarms: firstly, access to information; secondly, access to decision-making processes; 
thirdly, standing to challenge administrative decisions or to bring alleged violations to the 
legislature‟s attention; and finally, the ability to facilitate „collective action by comparatively 
disorganised interest groups‟ (1984: 166).  Most fire-alarm oversight mechanisms depend 
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upon feedback from independent pressure groups, which may cause bias as problems that 
are a concern for well-organised groups may be more likely to be voiced (Hopenhayn and 
Lohmann, 1996: 209).  Whilst McCubbins and Schwartz refer to facilitating „collective 
action‟ within their model, the collective action is a form of moderation or filtering, 
assessing the issues that are of greatest general concern and focussing on these rather 
than those issues that are of concern to well-resourced groups (McCubbins and Schwartz, 
1984: 166).   By funding statutory public involvement institutions in the NHS, political 
principals may have created mechanisms that would voice the concerns of less-organised 
groups and extend their interests beyond an issue-specific approach. 
If principals are to learn from fire-alarm oversight, they have to be sure that citizens 
or interest groups that voice concern are telling the truth (Bawn, 1994: 139).  The 
legislative oversight literature uses descriptors such as „false alarms‟ and „lying‟ (Lupia and 
McCubbins, 1994: 100).  In essence, when applying the model to the NHS, elected 
politicians need to be sure that they are not being misinformed by their sources.  Lupia and 
McCubbins identify two conditions under which principals can trust fire alarms: firstly, 
where there are penalties for lying; and secondly, where the legislators perceive the citizen 
or interest group to have similar preferences to their own (1994: 111).   
McCubbins and Schwartz suggested in their original paper that political principals 
can choose between three general options for oversight mechanisms:  police-patrol 
oversight alone; fire-alarm oversight alone; or a combination of both police-patrol and fire-
alarm methods (1984: 167).  When Lupia and McCubbins revisited the model, they 
indicated from a review of the literature that police patrols may never be comprehensive 
enough to enable political principals to manage the expertise of agents (1994: 97-98).  A 
combined model may therefore be attractive to Ministers overseeing the National Health 
Service.  This use of a combined model could contribute to explaining the ongoing 
investment in re-shaping and funding statutory public involvement institutions if they are 
acting as fire alarms alongside changing systems of police-patrol oversight.   
Considered from the perspective of politicians‟ need to be alerted to problems 
before they become disasters, do statutory public involvement institutions act, to use the 
phrase current in descriptions used by members of the institutions, as „watchdogs‟ alerting 
Ministers to problems in the NHS before they become disasters?  In this context, the term 
„watchdog‟ is used to refer to fire-alarm-style oversight rather than regulators, or the 
professional police patrol.  McCubbins and Schwartz identified four institutional roles that 
interest groups need to be able to fulfil if they are to act as what they refer to as „fire 
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alarms‟ (1984: 166).  These are used here as the basis for the operationalisation of a role 
for statutory public involvement institutions as watchdogs helping to prevent disasters.   
 
Political choice of sheepdog and watchdog functions 
Systems to round up participants (sheepdogs) or to provide alerts (watchdogs) can 
be kept separate, or they can be combined.  When overseeing participation and 
minimising opposition to reforms, a Secretary of State can choose from a range of options: 
working directly with interest groups; encouraging NHS personnel to involve members of 
the public in decision-making processes; or creating a state-funded structure for 
involvement.  Each of these forms of involvement is associated with risks.  Working with 
interest groups may bias activity in favour of better-resourced groups, potentially leading to 
punishment from the wider electorate if a particular group is seen to be favoured.  When 
NHS personnel lead on involvement activity, whether as specific consultations or more 
recently through membership of NHS Foundation Trusts, they may use it to legitimise 
plans that do not match national policy (Harrison and Mort, 1998: 67).  Given the 
alternative of NHS-led consultation or working with issue-specific interest groups, creating 
a statutory public involvement institution (or sheepdog) could provide Ministers with a 
means to structure participation whilst continuing to keep difficult decisions at the local 
level.  In terms of avoiding disasters in the NHS, a Secretary of State can choose between: 
greater regulation; alerts provided by independent interest groups; or a combination of 
regulation and local voluntary intelligence.  By combining an alert mechanism (or 
watchdog) with a structured form of public involvement (or sheepdog), a national politician 
has the potential of a more vigilant watchdog, drawing on expertise from members in a 
range of local interest groups and only raising issues that are a broad concern. 
Statutory public involvement institutions provide an opportunity for national 
politicians.  Depending upon particular political preferences, they can be utilised as a 
sheepdog or as a watchdog.  As a sheepdog, they ensure that no one interest group 
becomes the dominant voice and they may potentially take the blame for unpopular local 
decisions.  At times when interest groups are regarded with some suspicion, the sheepdog 
is a valuable tool to moderate influence and to ensure that less well-resourced groups are 
represented.  When governments are encouraging direct participation by interest groups, 
the sheepdog role is of less value to Ministers. 
As part of a watchdog, local volunteers who have a passionate interest in services 
can observe the local NHS over time in a way that would not be affordable with a 
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professional oversight mechanism.  The extent to which a watchdog is valued will depend 
upon whether Ministers feel that problems are likely to be visible (such as cultural 
behaviours or cleanliness) or whether Ministers take the view that a problem will only 
become apparent through statistical comparison between services.  At times when 
governments believe that problems with health services could be observed by volunteers, 
statutory public involvement institutions may provide a structured means to learn from the 
volunteers‟ insights.  When police-patrol oversight is the predominant model, watchdogs 
may have less value.   
The value of statutory public involvement institutions to Ministers also depends 
upon the extent to which they are prepared to take the risk of being dependent upon 
volunteer-led organisations.  Unlike contracted members of staff, volunteers have choices 
about the priority they give to different aspects of their role.  Including volunteers in 
processes that form part of a Secretary of State‟s political management of the NHS 
requires the Secretary of State to trust that they will fulfil the role expected, or that there 
will be no backlash from the outcome if they do not do so.  If a national politician wants to 
avoid blame for an issue delegated to a statutory public involvement institution, they have 
to be sure that the institution will be taken sufficiently seriously to take the blame and to be 
confident that most of the delegated decisions would not put other plans at risk (Weaver, 
1986: 379).  If a group of volunteers is to have the authority to take the blame for 
unpopular decisions, it needs to be seen to have related powers.   
Once volunteer-led organisations have been established, they can be hard to 
abolish in a meaningful sense.  As individuals, volunteers give time, passion, commitment 
and, subject to the recruitment criteria, expertise.  This commitment means that statutory 
public involvement institutions may achieve a great deal with limited financial resources, 
but it also means that the institutions are hard to abolish in a true sense, as individuals 
who care about NHS services will volunteer to be part of the next institution, or use their 
skills within other voluntary organisations.  The ongoing investment in statutory public 
involvement institutions may therefore include an element of path dependency, or self-
reinforcing direction, as the volunteers who commit their time cannot be abolished 
(Pierson, 2004: 10-11). 
The creation of statutory public involvement institutions provides Ministers with 
organisations that are dependent on state funding and subject to top-down reform.  In this 
sense, they differ from the self-generating interest groups and NHS-led involvement 
mechanisms.  If the statutory public involvement institutions fail to operate as Ministers 
expect them to do, a Secretary of State can reform the institutions.  Considered from the 
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perspective of sheepdog and watchdog roles, a sheepdog would cease to be valued by 
Ministers if it used its ability to round up interests in a rogue fashion, rounding up 
opposition rather than intermediating.  In the case of the watchdog, there may be a political 
preference for police-patrol oversight, such as improved technologies for gathering and 
analysing statistical data, which would reduce the value of a watchdog.  If statutory public 
involvement institutions undertake roles in political management of the NHS, then shifts in 
the value placed by Ministers on those roles are likely to form part of any changes to the 
institutions.  This may include separating the sheepdog and watchdog roles, or giving 
differing emphasis to each role.   Political actors have choices in the extent to which they 
utilise either the sheepdog or the watchdog role, including the choice of whether to fund 
them at all. 
 
 
3.3     Operationalisation of sheepdog and watchdog roles 
This section discusses the operationalisation of the theories underlying the 
sheepdog and watchdog roles.  The process of operationalising theory converts aspects of 
a theoretical approach into the operational findings that would be expected to provide 
evidence to support the theory (Manheim and Rich, 1986: 7).  In each case, the 
institutional role suggested from the theory is considered in terms of the elements a state 
would determine, the likely statutory documentation or powers that would show that this is 
the case and operational findings, such as reports, which would provide evidence of a 
political role as a sheepdog or as a watchdog. 
 
Operationalisation of sheepdog role 
Four institutional roles were identified in the discussion of theory to explore whether 
statutory public involvement institutions act as tools to round up participants and manage 
potential opposition, the sheepdog role in political management of the NHS.  The first three 
of these came from a corporatist approach to interest group management and the fourth 
from the notion in the blame-avoidance literature that politicians seek to delegate 
unpopular decisions.  These institutional roles form the starting point for Figure 3.1. 
Each of the potential institutional roles is operationalised in Figure 3.1.  The 
institutional roles are listed in the left-hand column.  These are taken from the discussion 
of the theoretical basis for the possibility that statutory public involvement institutions round 
up participants and manage potential opposition.  The second column outlines what it is 
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that the state would determine for each of the institutional roles in the sheepdog model.  
This relates closely to the third column, summarising the statutory evidence that the 
institutions have the relevant powers to undertake each of the institutional roles.  The right-
hand column is headed „operationalisation‟ and summarises the likely evidence that 
statutory public involvement institutions fulfilled these institutional roles in practice. 
Figure 3.1: Sheepdog – roles in rounding up participants and managing potential 
opposition 
Institutional role State determines Statutory evidence Operationalisation 
Mediate between 
local interests, 
including vulnerable 
groups 
Intermediation role to 
be undertaken by 
statutory public 
involvement 
institutions 
Statutory membership 
requirements, 
processes to involve 
vulnerable groups 
and consultation 
responsibilities 
Reports of interests 
being referred to 
institutions to mediate 
on issues; Accounts 
of institutions forming 
consensus views 
Structure consultation 
on local services 
Consultation rights 
and responsibilities 
Statutory consultation 
rights or guidance to 
NHS personnel on 
consultation 
Reports of 
consultation role 
undertaken or state 
expectation of role 
Consider only state-
determined range of 
issues 
Remit (e.g. single 
hospital or health and 
social care) 
Institutional design 
and breadth of 
statutory rights 
Reports of institutions 
being prevented from 
taking broader or 
alternative remit 
Take responsibility for 
unpopular local 
decisions 
Decision-making 
powers or rights to 
agree proposals 
Statutory powers or 
guidance on taking 
politically difficult 
decisions 
Accounts of 
institutions blamed for 
delegated decisions; 
Ministerial comments 
on role 
 
Taking each of the institutional roles in turn, if the institutions mediated between 
interests and ensured representation of vulnerable groups, the state would determine the 
intermediation role to be undertaken by statutory public involvement institutions.  This 
would include determining the types of interest groups for whom the institutions would act 
as mediators and the issues on which they would mediate.  The statutory powers to enable 
this would be statutory membership requirements, processes that ensured the 
representation of vulnerable groups and consultation responsibilities.  Evidence of 
statutory public involvement institutions mediating between interests would come from 
reports of activities, including reports from issue-specific interest groups.  Expected 
operationalisation of mediating between interests would include reports of interest groups 
being referred to statutory public involvement institutions, rather than approaching those 
involved in decision-making processes directly, or of statutory public involvement 
institutions working with local interest groups in order either to reach a consensus or to 
implement the output of a consensus that has been reached elsewhere. 
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The second of the institutional roles is to structure consultation on local issues.  
The state would determine the consultation rights and responsibilities of statutory public 
involvement institutions.  This might take the form of statutory consultation rights or 
guidance to NHS personnel on how to consult.  If the institutions structured consultation in 
ways that manage public opposition, this would be apparent in reports of the role that the 
institutions had undertaken or in comments from Ministers or other state representatives 
about their expectation of the institutions and whether that expectation has been fulfilled in 
particular cases. 
If statutory public involvement institutions were expected to manage opposition by 
considering only a state-determined range of issues, this would be apparent in the state-
determined remit.  In the context of managing opposition to local changes in health 
services, the breadth of the remit would be significant, such as whether particular NHS 
services are included and whether the range of issues on which the organisations have a 
statutory right to be consulted extend to social care.  The statutory evidence for this would 
be the institutional design and breadth of statutory rights.  At an operational level, if the 
statutory public involvement institutions were expected to manage opposition by keeping 
to a narrow agenda, evidence of state expectations of this role could be found in reports of 
the institutions being prevented from taking a broader remit, or blamed for having done so. 
The fourth of the institutional roles is taken from the literature on political blame 
avoidance.  Considered from this perspective, statutory public involvement institutions take 
responsibility for unpopular decisions that are delegated to them.  If this were the case, the 
state would determine decision-making powers or delegate powers to agree proposals.  
The statutory evidence of this would be statutory powers or guidance from Ministers on 
taking politically difficult decisions.  In practice, this would lead to accounts of the statutory 
public involvement institutions being blamed for taking the decisions delegated to them, or 
there would be evidence of the deliberate delegation of difficult decisions in Ministerial 
comments on the role. 
This operationalisation of the sheepdog role is used as the basis of the empirical 
study of the successive statutory public involvement institutions in Chapters Four and Five.  
 
Operationalisation of watchdog role 
On a similar model to the discussion of the sheepdog, the operationalisation of 
preventing disasters, or the watchdog role, commences in the left-hand column of Figure 
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3.2 with institutional roles, extending into what the state determines in relation to each role, 
the statutory evidence for the state-determined role and potential operational findings. 
Figure 3.2: Watchdog – roles in preventing disasters 
Institutional role State determines Statutory evidence Operationalisation 
Gather intelligence 
about local services 
Access to information, 
including complaints; 
Access to enter and 
inspect services 
Statutory rights to 
access information 
and to inspect 
services 
Reported state 
expectation of 
inspection and 
gathering information 
Influence decisions 
about local services 
Consultation rights Statutory consultation 
rights or guidance to 
NHS personnel on 
consultation 
Reports of 
involvement or state 
expectation of 
involvement 
Challenge local 
decisions and refer 
problems 
Rights to refer 
unresolved issues to 
higher authority 
Statutory rights to 
challenge local 
decisions or practice 
and to refer 
unresolved issues 
Report of state 
expectation that 
would challenge 
decisions and refer 
issues  
Filter significant 
issues from problems 
raised by interest 
groups 
Mediation role in 
working with interest 
groups 
Statutory rights to 
work with interest 
groups or include 
them as members 
Reports of interests 
referred to institutions 
to mediate on issues; 
Accounts of support 
for vulnerable groups‟ 
interests 
 
The first of the institutional roles, as outlined in Figure 3.2, is to gather intelligence 
on local services.  In order to do this, the state determines the rights that statutory public 
involvement institutions have to receive information from complaints and other sources 
and to enter and inspect services.  Evidence for this from a statutory perspective would be 
the rights to receive information and to inspect services.  If statutory public involvement 
institutions either use these tools to prevent disasters or are expected to do so, this should 
be evident operationally in examples either of Ministers expressing the expectation that the 
institutions should gather information in order to report problems before they become 
disasters. 
The second aspect of the watchdog role is access to decision-making processes 
(McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984: 166).  In the context of statutory public involvement 
institutions, this is expressed in Figure 3.2 as a role in influencing decisions about local 
services.  In order to ensure that local groups of voluntary members of the public are able 
to influence decisions about local services, the state would need to grant consultation 
rights, which would be included in statutory rights or guidance to NHS personnel on 
consultation.  Operational evidence of influence on decisions about local services would 
be apparent from reports on involvement (particularly reports that have not been written by 
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the statutory public involvement institutions themselves) and expectations of influence and 
involvement expressed by Ministers or other representatives of the state. 
The third institutional role in preventing disasters is the ability to challenge local 
decisions or practice in the interests of the local community.  In order to do this, institutions 
need to have state-determined rights to refer unresolved issues to a higher authority.  This 
would be reflected in statutory rights to challenge local decisions or practice and to refer 
unresolved issues to a higher authority.  Examples of challenging local decisions or 
practice would be apparent in reports of specific cases; if Ministers responsible for health 
services expect statutory local involvement institutions to challenge local decisions and 
refer issues, this would be apparent in comments made either when issues have been 
referred or when local institutions have failed to report unresolved issues. 
Fourthly, institutions involved in preventing disasters would mediate between local 
issue-specific groups, filtering issues to ensure that significant issues and the concerns of 
less powerful interest groups were raised, rather than the concerns of the most vocal 
groups.  If the state expected such a mediation and filtering role to be taken, this would be 
seen in statutory membership requirements and responsibilities to involve and consult 
other issue-specific groups.  Operational evidence of mediation would include reports of 
issue-specific groups being referred to statutory public involvement institutions to mediate 
on issues and accounts of statutory public involvement institutions promoting the concerns 
of less powerful groups or issues relevant across the local population. 
In McCubbins‟ later work with Lupia, he tackled the issue of ensuring that interest 
groups who raise alarms are not deliberately providing misinformation.  As outlined above, 
Lupia and McCubbins found that to prevent misinformation, politicians need to ensure that 
there are penalties for providing misinformation or the politicians need to be confident that 
the interest groups have similar preferences to their own (1994: 111).  This element has 
not been incorporated directly into the operationalisation of a watchdog, or fire-alarm 
oversight, but forms one of the elements to be considered in accounts of public 
involvement and rationales given for changes to statutory public involvement institutions. 
This operationalisation of the watchdog role is incorporated with the sheepdog 
within the research design discussed below. 
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3.4     Research methods  
This section reviews the methodological choices made in developing the research.  
It opens by discussing the process of refining methods, followed by the selection of 
archival sources and the methods chosen for data analysis. 
 
Refining methods 
The research question and sub-questions were refined initially on the basis of elite 
interviews.  Six potential interviewees were identified, selected on the basis of their 
knowledge of the successive statutory public involvement institutions.  In each case, the 
potential interviewees held positions at a national level where they were interacting 
between local statutory public involvement institutions, the Department of Health and 
Ministers.  Five of the six individuals identified agreed to be interviewed.  As these were 
elite interviews, the questions asked varied slightly, on the basis of the particular 
experience of the interviewees.  The interviewees were asked about their experience of 
the relationship between local statutory public involvement institutions, the Department of 
Health and Ministers.  They were also asked about their views on the changes to statutory 
public involvement institutions and to provide any suggestions for data sources. 
The elite interviews confirmed that the broader question of the role played by 
statutory public involvement institutions in political management of the NHS was a 
valuable topic and not a question that those heavily involved in the institutions had 
considered previously in any detail.  As these were exploratory interviews, they were not 
intended to act as data sources; where material from the interviews has been used in the 
dissertation, this is acknowledged and attributed. 
Operationalisation of the sheepdog and watchdog models indicated that 
documentary sources would provide the materials needed to examine each dimension of 
the two potential roles played by statutory public involvement institutions.  Documentary 
sources also had the advantage in a study covering the period from 1974 to 2010 of 
providing data that were not dependent upon interviewees‟ distant memories.  The sources 
relevant to operationalisation of the sheepdog model are largely found in the archives of 
the statutory public involvement institutions themselves and contemporary records in 
accounts by other organisations of the institutions‟ activities.  The watchdog model is 
slightly different, as it is assessing Ministerial expectations of whether the statutory public 
involvement institutions provided intelligence in time to prevent a disaster or were 
expected to have done so.  Lewis and Klein mentioned in their study that a lack of 
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information provided to Darlington Community Health Council was of interest as Darlington 
Memorial Hospital was later the subject of an inquiry by the Northern Regional Health 
Authority (1976: 131).  This reflection on the regional inquiry suggested that public 
inquiries, which only arise when there has been a serious failure, would be likely to 
indicate if statutory public involvement institutions had either raised an alarm or failed to do 
so. 
 
Archival sources 
Archival sources tend to be associated with research by historians.  Early 
researchers in the social sciences, however, made extensive use of documentary 
archives: Marx analysed reports from factory inspectors, Weber appraised religious 
pamphlets and Durkheim reviewed official statistics on suicide (Scott, 1990: 1).  The extent 
of material available in archives varies.  Researchers are dependent upon materials 
having been deposited in the first instance and then retained.  Not all official documents 
are published and those that are retained in open archives may be a small selection of the 
original material (Scott, 1990: 63).  Survival of material also depends upon it taking on a 
non-transient form.  Back in 1990, Scott warned that the development of electronic 
sources could reduce the amount of material available in archives, as the content might 
not be printed out or stored in a form in which it would remain accessible (1990: 196).  As 
discussed below, two of the electronic archives used for this research were taken offline 
during the course of the study, reducing opportunities for replication and future research. 
The state-determined rights of statutory public involvement institutions were 
examined through legislative documentation and guidance notes.  Acts of Parliament can 
be accessed online.  Statutes are also available online whilst they are in force22; once they 
are no longer in force, printed copies have to be tracked down through paper archives.  
Health service circulars and other guidance notes have been issued online since 1997 and 
can be traced either through the Department of Health website23 or through the National 
Archives24.  Prior to 1997, guidance notes were not stored electronically and need to be 
traced through paper archives.  The Patients‟ Association archive at the Wellcome Trust 
proved to be a particularly valuable source for copies of guidance notes relevant to 
Community Health Councils.  Secondary source accounts of public involvement, 
                                                 
22
 http://www.legislation.gov.uk [Accessed June 2012] 
23
 http://www.dh.gov.uk [Accessed June 2012] 
24
 http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk [Accessed June 2012] 
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particularly those by Gerrard and Hogg, were used to identify guidance notes and 
legislative materials to be traced.  A list of the archives used is presented in the Appendix. 
The archives and documents selected to examine the potential role of statutory 
public involvement institutions as sheepdogs were resources that would contain 
contemporary accounts of activities.  These included newsletters and reports produced by 
the statutory public involvement institutions, but also comments from Ministers recorded 
either in their own publications, such as diaries, or in Parliamentary sources including 
Hansard and inquiries by Select Committees.   Materials on or by Community Health 
Councils during the period 1974 to 2003 were predominantly printed publications, in some 
instances produced as typescript rather than formally published.  Copies of the journal 
CHC News are held at the Wellcome Trust.  One of the elite interviewees25 for this study 
indicated that an archive of material from the Association of CHCs for England and Wales 
had been deposited at the Wellcome Trust and at Oxford Brookes university library.  Initial 
enquiries at the Wellcome Trust suggested that they did not hold the archive; close 
examination of the catalogue, however, revealed that the archive had been deposited as a 
set of image files on a CD-ROM which had been mis-catalogued as an audio compact 
disc26.  The materials in the Association of CHCs for England and Wales archive are 
images of newsletters and reports published by the Association.  The Patients‟ Association 
archives for 1974 to 1982 included some early publications that were missing from the 
formal archive of the Association of CHCs for England and Wales, the combined archives 
providing what seems to be a comprehensive set of newsletters throughout the period 
from 1974 to 2003 as well as a substantial body of reports produced through the life of the 
Community Health Councils.  To complement the national perspective provided by the 
Association of CHCs for England and Wales, annual reports and other publications from 
individual Community Health Councils were traced through the King‟s Fund library, the 
Wellcome Trust, local authority archives and hospital archives (notably the Tower Hamlets 
CHC archive held at the Royal London Hospital). 
Materials from Patient and Public Involvement Forums were initially collated on a 
knowledge management system held by the Commission for Patient and Public 
Involvement in Health27.  This system was shut down once the Commission was closed in 
2008 and the digital archive transferred to the website for Local Involvement Networks (the 
                                                 
25
 Malcolm Alexander, formerly Director of the Association of CHCs for England and Wales 
26
 This has since been re-catalogued as an electronic resource at my request, reference: Wellcome Trust 
library Closed Stores Computer Media 55 
27
 Source: interview with Sharon Grant, formerly Chair of the Commission for Patient and Public 
Involvement in Health 
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LINks Exchange)28.  There was no operational search function for the archive within the 
LINks Exchange website and the documents tended to have been uploaded with generic 
titles, such as „report‟, which did not indicate the nature of the document, the source or the 
date.  The archive was withdrawn without notice in January 2011; on enquiry, the 
contractor operating the site for the Department of Health indicated that the material was 
over three years old and did not fulfil the criteria for the current site29.  All of the materials 
collected by the Commission for Patient and Public Involvement in Health from individual 
PPI Forums had been included in the archive on the LINks Exchange.  For the purposes of 
this study, documents had been downloaded prior to the closure of the archive, but the 
resource is no longer available to researchers.  Some websites maintained by NHS 
organisations and local authorities have retained reports from the PPI Forums in their 
area.  The Commission for Patient and Public Involvement in Health website was archived 
by the National Archive.  The most complete snapshot of the Commission‟s website was 
taken on March 13 200830.  The archived website includes copies of Forum Focus, the 
magazine for PPI Forums, and reports produced by the Commission.  The materials from 
the Commission‟s archived website provide a national overview of activity, including the 
national summaries produced by the Commission of annual reports from PPI Forums. 
Local Involvement Networks, unlike their predecessor organisations, did not have a 
national association or commission to act as a coordinating body.  Until August 2009, the 
Local Involvement Networks received guidance and support for the NHS Centre for 
Involvement.  The NHS Centre for Involvement had been established on the basis of a 
three-year grant at the point of the decision to close PPI Forums.  It was set up 
predominantly to collect evidence and encourage best practice for NHS-led public 
involvement.  Guidance materials and electronic newsletters were produced for LINks by 
the NHS Centre for Involvement, which were available centrally on the centre‟s website 
until July 201131.  The website closed in July 2011, two years after the closure of the NHS 
Centre for Involvement, and was not copied for inclusion in the National Archives.  Copies 
of the materials from the NHS Centre for Involvement had been downloaded from the 
website for the purposes of this study and are available as attachments on websites for 
some of the individual Local Involvement Networks.  Annual reports and newsletters from 
individual Local Involvement Networks were deposited on the LINks Exchange website32.  
An email newsletter for LINks was also issued by the Department of Health after the 
                                                 
28
 http://www.lx.nhs.uk [Accessed June 2012] 
29
 Email correspondence, January 2011 
30
 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20080313140813/http://www.cppih.org/ [Accessed June 2012] 
31
 http://www.nhscentreforinvolvement.nhs.uk/ [Accessed July 2011 – no longer available] 
32
 http://www.lx.nhs.uk [Accessed June 2012] 
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closure of the NHS Centre for Involvement, with copies stored on the LINks Exchange 
website. 
The archives available for the successive statutory public involvement institutions 
reflect the transience of the material.  By contrast, the material gathered for public inquiries 
is managed carefully and the issue is one of researcher access rather than the archival 
retention of material.  Four public inquiries were selected to examine activities and 
expectations of statutory public involvement institutions as watchdogs alerting political 
actors to problems before they become disasters.  The inquiries were selected to reflect 
the institutions over time, but also as three of the four inquiries could be seen as turning 
points in public involvement. 
The first public inquiry selected was the inquiry into the Ely Hospital, Cardiff, in 
1969.  This inquiry preceded the creation of the first statutory public involvement 
institutions, but has been credited with inspiring the need to have Community Health 
Councils as independent bodies that could enter and inspect hospitals (Hogg, 2009: 16; 
Klein and Lewis, 1976: 15; Klein, 2006: 70).  The Ely Hospital Inquiry was one of the first 
public inquiries to be published in full.  The report itself is therefore available as a 
publication.  Transcripts of hearings and evidence relating to the Ely Hospital are held at 
the National Archives in Kew, but a fifty-year closure was placed on the documents in 
1974, so the evidence and transcripts will not be made available to the public until January 
202533.  The sources used for this study were the report of the committee of inquiry, 
responses to the report in Hansard and the published diaries of Richard Crossman, the 
Secretary of State when the Ely Hospital Inquiry was concluded. 
Following the establishment of Community Health Councils, the first major public 
inquiry examined problems at Normansfield Hospital in Teddington, Surrey.  This was 
selected to examine the role played by the local Community Health Council and comments 
on that role made by Ministers at the time, including the Secretary of State David Ennals.  
The main source is the published report by the Committee of Inquiry.  The archived 
transcripts from the hearings and evidence presented to the inquiry are housed at the 
London Metropolitan Archive34.  The hard-copy materials became open to the public in 
                                                 
33
National Archives piece reference BD 18/2527 
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/catalogue/displaycataloguedetails.asp?CATLN=6&CATID=5006654&j=
1 [Accessed June 2012] 
34
 Files at the London Metropolitan Archive relating to the involvement of the local Community Health 
Council in inspecting Normansfield Hospital, Teddington: H29/NF/F/06/008; H29/NF/F/07/007; 
H29/NF/F/07/008 [Accessed May 2009] 
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2009 and were used alongside the published report to examine the role played and any 
expectations expressed of the Community Health Council. 
The third public inquiry selected for examination was that into the Bristol Royal 
Infirmary.  This was selected as the Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry was later cited by Alan 
Milburn in his rationale for the transition from Community Health Councils to PPI Forums 
(Gerrard, 2006: 270-271).  Unlike the earlier public inquiries, the report into the Bristol 
Royal Infirmary was published online with the evidence and transcripts from the hearings35.  
The online materials and comments from Ministers were used as the sources to consider 
the role played by Community Health Councils and how this was interpreted for the future 
of public involvement. 
The last of the public inquiries was selected as it included evidence on the role of 
both PPI Forums and Local Involvement Networks, with the expectations of Ministers and 
others in relation to their role.  This was the public inquiry into events at the Mid 
Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust.  As the public inquiry was the culmination of a series 
of inquiries, including a Healthcare Commission investigation, an independent inquiry by 
Robert Francis and several specialist inquiries (including an inquiry into the role played by 
the Staffordshire Local Involvement Network), the documents from the earlier series of 
investigations were included in this study.  Documentation for the Mid Staffordshire NHS 
Foundation Trust public inquiry was published online, including evidence presented to the 
inquiry and transcripts of the hearings36. 
 
Data analysis 
The selected archival materials formed the primary sources for this study, but were 
not created specifically for this research programme.  The analysis of the sources was 
therefore a form of secondary analysis, pulling together materials from a range of sources 
into one collection and then analysing the materials in the terms of this study.  The writers 
of newsletters and reports for the statutory public involvement institutions would have been 
aware that they were writing for an audience that might have an academic interest in their 
activities, but witnesses called by public inquiries would be unlikely to have thought of their 
contributions as being used as a source for research into public involvement.  There are 
ethical issues involved in secondary analysis, as a secondary analyst may not be aware of 
the conditions under which subjects gave their original consent (Homan, 1991: 90).  
                                                 
35
 http://www.bristol-inquiry.org.uk/index.htm [Accessed June 2012] 
36
 http://www.midstaffspublicinquiry.com/ [Accessed June 2012] 
Ruth Carlyle           Sheepdog or watchdog? Statutory public involvement in the NHS 93 
Contributors to public inquiries in the era of transcripts being placed online could be 
reasonably expected to be aware that their evidence is public and may be reanalysed.  In 
the case of a single transcript and original evidence being held in a paper archive, 
however, witnesses may not consider it likely that their contributions would be reanalysed 
outside the context of the particular inquiry.  In terms of moral principles, the participants 
have not been granted autonomy in the case of secondary analysis, but a researcher can 
ensure that no harm or injustice results from the reanalysis of their input (Beauchamp et 
al., 1982: 18-19).  Where witnesses might not reasonably have expected their words to 
reach the public domain, in the case of the transcripts and written evidence for the 
Normansfield Hospital inquiry, person-identifiable information has been excluded from the 
account in this study on ethical grounds. 
Documentary sources were assessed to ensure that they were authentic and 
credible before being analysed (Scott, 1990: 6).  In common with other data sources, 
documentary material needs to be reliable and valid if it is to be used in a research study.  
The reliability of data when using documentary sources depends upon the findings being 
independent of the particular documentary account; and the documentary sources can be 
considered valid if they provide appropriate evidence to support the claims made (Prior, 
2003: 149).  To support reliability of the analysis, accounts of the same event in different 
sources were cross-referenced.  In the case of the public inquiries, the formality of the 
legal hearings should mean that the participants aim to be reliable witnesses.  Documents 
used to validate the claims made are cited in the text and included in the bibliography. 
In qualitative research, King, Keohane and Verba  suggest that the aim of the 
research is to make inferences about the world on the basis of empirical information and 
that the conclusions, whilst uncertain, need to be based on a method that is open to 
scrutiny (1994: 7-9).  The examination of archival sources for this study was based on 
operationalisation of two theoretically-driven perspectives, as presented in Figures 3.1 and 
3.2.   With both perspectives and both sets of archival resources, materials were read and 
coded manually.  Throughout the process, the materials were appraised for examples of 
instances that did not fit the theoretical approaches (Prior, 2003: 154).  Elements in the 
text that either supported or did not match the theoretical approaches were constructed 
into chronological narratives, to establish any changes in Ministerial expectations or the 
activities performed in each role over time.  The historical narratives are presented as 
Chapters Four, Five and Six, with the narrative of the history of the institutions focussed on 
the sheepdog role spanning Chapters Four and Five and the public inquiries as a separate 
sequence in Chapter Six.  These narratives explore whether it can be inferred that the 
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statutory public involvement institutions undertook either a sheepdog or a watchdog role or 
whether they were expected to do so by Ministers. 
The research design for this study framed an empirical puzzle as a research 
question and drew upon alternative theoretical approaches in the sub-questions to 
consider roles that statutory public involvement institutions might have played in political 
management of the NHS between 1974 and 2010.  The analysis of archival materials 
constantly referred back to the main question and contributed to reflections on the precise 
question and sub-questions.  As sources were identified that covered the full timeframe of 
the question, shifts over time could be explored.  In particular, the data were analysed to 
assess whether sheepdog or watchdog roles were apparent at different points in time.  
The question and approaches build on the existing public involvement literature by 
considering the potential roles that statutory public involvement institutions may have 
played in political management of the NHS. 
 
Chapter summary 
This chapter presented the research framework for the study.  It opened with the 
research question: what role(s) have statutory public involvement institutions played in 
political management of the English NHS, 1974-2010?  Two possible roles were identified 
as: a „sheepdog‟ rounding up interests and managing potential opposition; or a „watchdog‟ 
providing intelligence to prevent disasters.  The theoretical basis for each of these 
approaches was discussed and operationalised in terms of the materials that might be 
found if either approach were supported empirically.  The closing section discusses the 
research methods, including the issues around the usage of archival material and the 
process used for qualitative analysis of the sources. 
The next three chapters present the historical narratives that emerge from the 
archival sources.  This sequence opens in Chapter Four with the role that Community 
Health Councils may have played as „sheepdogs‟ between 1974 and 1997. 
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Chapter Four: Sheepdog?  Rounding up participants, 1974-1997 
 
The sheepdog role in political management of the NHS, as outlined in Chapter 
Three, consists of four main attributes: mediating between local interests, including 
ensuring representation of vulnerable groups; structuring consultation on local services; 
considering issues within a state-determined remit; and taking responsibility for unpopular 
local decisions.  A sheepdog both rounds up participants and pens them to manage their 
activity.  This chapter takes the form of a historical narrative, discussing whether the CHCs 
undertook a sheepdog role in political management of the NHS during the period from 
1974 to 1997 and any changes to that role over time. 
The chapter opens with the establishment of CHCs in 1974, including a detailed 
account of the policies and processes surrounding the appointment of members, to 
establish the relationship between CHCs and local interest groups.  The first section 
considers the period to 1979 and includes the Ministerial allocation to CHCs of rights to 
agree the closure of local hospitals.  The second section reviews CHCs during the first 
decade of Conservative governments, up to the creation of the internal market in the NHS.  
The third historical section considers CHCs as potential sheepdogs in the period from 
1989 to 1997.  The chapter closes with a review of the extent to which Community Health 
Councils either had the powers to act as sheepdogs or undertook a sheepdog role in 
political management of the NHS during the period from 1974 to 1997. 
 
4.1     Development of Community Health Councils, 1974-1979 
Community Health Councils first emerged as a concept in plans for NHS 
reorganisation by Keith Joseph, Secretary of State for Social Services within Edward 
Heath‟s Conservative government of 1970.  Joseph initially proposed that each Area 
Health Authority should establish a Community Health Council, with members appointed 
„after consultation with a wide range of interested local organisations‟ (Secretary of State 
for Social Services, 1971a: §17).  When Community Health Councils were formally 
introduced in legislation in the NHS Reorganisation Act 1973, the responsibility for 
establishing, staffing and funding the councils was placed with the Secretary of State (NHS 
Reorganisation Act 1973, Part I Section 9).  This centralised accountability emerged in the 
course of debate on the NHS Reorganisation Act 1973 (Gerrard, 2006: 44).  The ability of 
the Secretary of State to modify statutory public involvement institutions may not have 
formed part of Keith Joseph‟s original concept, but provided a tool for his successors. 
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Membership of Community Health Councils 
The NHS Reorganisation Act 1973 introduced the most significant restructuring of 
the NHS since it was founded in 1948.  A Labour government came into office in the 
month before the new structure was due to take effect.  The incoming Secretary of State 
for Social Services, Barbara Castle, and the Minister for Health, David Owen, took the 
decision to retain the reorganised structure, incorporating Community Health Councils: 
„When the Labour government took office in 1974, three weeks before the 
appointed day for reorganisation, a basic decision was taken to strengthen and 
enhance the role of the Community Health Council.  The reorganised structure of 
the health service had never seemed to be satisfactory and the Labour Party in 
opposition had been very critical of it during its lengthy passage.  Yet it was felt, 
and subsequent events wholly vindicated the judgement, that to tamper with the 
reorganisation only three weeks from the appointed day would have run a very 
severe risk of damaging patient care.‟ (Owen, 1976: 18) 
The Labour government retained the appointment system for Community Health Council 
members that had been outlined in the NHS Reorganisation Act 1973.  This has been 
described by Klein and Lewis as a „uniquely eccentric system for choosing the 
membership‟ (1976: 27).  The NHS Reorganisation Act 1973 stipulated that half of the 
members of Community Health Councils should be appointed by local authorities, a third 
by local voluntary organisations and the remaining sixth by Regional Health Authorities.  
Each of these three appointment mechanisms seems to meet a slightly different political 
need in ensuring collective participation by different elements in the local community.  The 
local authority appointees represented the local electorate; albeit, as Klein and Lewis point 
out, „in some undefined way‟ (1976: 19).  The Act required voluntary organisations to 
collaborate on the selection of their nominees, creating a mechanism that involved interest 
groups directly in the appointment process.  Regional Health Authorities were expected to 
use their sixth of appointments „to honour the Secretary of State‟s obligation to allocate 
places on CHCs to certain organisations in order to ensure continued representation of 
special interests in particular institutions, such as miners‟ rehabilitation centres, 
denominational hospitals and seamen‟s hospitals‟ (Department of Health and Social 
Security, 1974a: §15). 
Regional Health Authorities acted as the establishing bodies for Community Health 
Councils, initiating arrangements to set up a CHC for each Area Health Authority in their 
region.  The Community Health Councils had a remit to be consulted on and to inspect the 
NHS services across the geographical patch covered by an Area Health Authority.  As 
most of the consultations on local service developments would take place between the 
Community Health Council and the Area Health Authority, the establishing role of the 
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Regional Health Authority placed the selection of members at a slight distance from day-
to-day activities.   Instructions outlining the Regional Health Authorities‟ role in establishing 
Community Health Councils were included in health circular HRC (74) 4, issued in January 
1974.  The circular clarified details within the NHS Reorganisation Act 1973, such as the 
number of members in a Community Health Council, as „the Secretary of State expects 
that the great majority of Councils will have between 18 and 30 members‟ (Department of 
Health and Social Security, 1974a: §7).  Much of the detail in the circular is concerned with 
the process by which voluntary organisations should be selected to participate in the 
nomination of Community Health Council members:   
„§12 Any voluntary organisation active in a CHC‟s district (whether or not its office 
is situated in that district) or with a particular interest in a health service institution 
within that district can apply to take part in appointing members to the CHC. … To 
this end RHAs [Regional Health Authorities] should draw up, with the primary 
assistance of the AHA [Area Health Authority], and in consultation with such co-
ordinating bodies as local Councils of Social Service, Age Concern or Old People‟s 
Welfare Committees and local authorities‟ Voluntary Bodies Liaison Committees, a 
provisional list of voluntary organisations which might be invited to take part.  … 
§13 In addition to these consultations the RHA must advertise in the local press 
inviting voluntary organisations to apply.‟ (Department of Health and Social 
Security, 1974a) 
Making the Regional Health Authorities responsible for collating and updating a list of 
voluntary organisations meant that the detail of which voluntary organisations could 
participate was devolved from a national level, but that there was the potential that a 
Secretary of State could intervene if there were difficulties with the selected list of 
organisations.  The inclusion of local Councils of Social Service and local authorities‟ 
Voluntary Bodies Liaison Committees in the consultation on the initial list ensured that 
organisations concerned with broader welfare issues, not just health services, would be 
considered as part of the process of drawing up the list. 
Only by being on the list could voluntary organisations participate in the selection, 
from their number, of organisations that would be represented on the Community Health 
Council.  An appendix to circular HRC (74) 4 provides a model advert to be placed in the 
local press to invite voluntary organisations to apply to be included on the list.  The model 
advert underlines that the participants in the list are organisations with local interests, 
rather than national interests, in health services: „Voluntary organisations active in these 
districts with a strong active interest in health matters, or which provide a service for NHS 
patients, or which have a special interest in a particular NHS institution or institutions in 
these districts, are invited to apply for inclusion in the list of voluntary organisations which 
are to be asked to appoint members to the appropriate Community Health Councils‟ 
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(Department of Health and Social Security, 1974a: Appendix 4).  The requirement that the 
voluntary organisations should be „active in these districts‟ barred most national voluntary 
organisations, as few national organisations in the 1970s were sufficiently established to 
have local branches across the country.  It also effectively barred disease-specific groups, 
which tend to be national organisations as for most medical conditions there are 
insufficient numbers of people affected in any given locality to set up a specific local 
organisation (Hatch, 1984: 106). 
On the behalf of the Department of Health and Social Security, the National 
Council of Social Service drew up guidance on how Councils of Social Service or other 
coordinating bodies could develop the list of voluntary organisations for their Regional 
Health Authority (National Council of Social Service, 1974).  The National Council of Social 
Service advised that it was important for voluntary organisations to be as closely involved 
as possible in the development of the list.  The rationale given for this was to ensure that 
the organisations selected were representative of the full range of health-related needs of 
the local community.  Involving voluntary organisations in the compilation of the list would 
also, however, have given a degree of legitimacy to the selection process and mean that 
organisations that had been involved would be more likely to support the selection.  To 
ensure breadth of organisations involved in the Community Health Councils, the National 
Council of Social Service suggested that „categories of interest‟ could be used as a basis 
on which to discuss allocation of places (National Council of Social Services, 1974: §9).  
The categories given as examples in the guidance notes were: children; the old; mentally 
ill or handicapped; physically handicapped; and a general category.  Whilst the guidance 
from the National Council of Social Service was not a statutory document, the proposed 
„categories of interest‟ were widely used by Regional Health Authorities (Klein and Lewis, 
1976: 38). 
Once the list had been completed, the Regional Health Authority was responsible 
for inviting the organisations on the list „to agree amongst themselves how the places to be 
filled by them should be allocated‟ (Department of Health and Social Security, 1974a: §14).  
In the event that the voluntary organisations could not reach a unanimous agreement on 
the allocation of places, the Regional Health Authority was empowered to „select the 
organisations which individually or jointly are to appoint members‟ (Department of Health 
and Social Security, 1974a: §15).  Requiring the organisations to agree representation, 
with the threat of the choice being made for them, ensured a degree of collaboration 
between the voluntary organisations that could form the basis of an intermediation role by 
the Community Health Council. 
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The extent to which the appointment process resulted in representation of a range 
of local interests can be seen in the 1975 survey by Klein and Lewis of Community Health 
Council members.  Their study was the only attempt to undertake a comprehensive survey 
of CHC members and they received 3,796 completed questionnaires, representing nearly 
two thirds of Community Health Council members (Klein and Lewis, 1976: 28).  As 
discussed in Chapter Two, Klein and Lewis found that the CHCs were predominantly from 
middle class, professional backgrounds (1976: 157).  The researchers used the five 
categories suggested by the National Council of Social Service to analyse the 
representation within CHC membership.  They found that the efforts to represent more 
vulnerable groups within CHC membership seemed to have been effective: 
„In the outcome, the system of fancy franchises invented to choose voluntary sector 
representatives, appears to have worked.  The special care groups like the 
mentally handicapped and the physically disabled are well represented.  One-tenth 
of CHC councillors are members of organisations concerned with mental health, 
while one-quarter of them are members of organisations concerned with the 
elderly.  Mere membership does not imply active involvement and interest.  The 
high proportion of voluntary organisation members on CHCs who hold some 
position in those organisations is therefore particularly noteworthy, since this 
implies a more than average degree of commitment.  For instance, in the case of 
members of organisations concerned with the physically disabled, almost two-
thirds hold some office.‟ (Klein and Lewis, 1976: 38-39) 
As Klein and Lewis found, the categories proposed by the National Council of Social 
Service (notably, mental health, physical disability and old age) were well-represented as 
interest groups within Community Health Councils.  The proportion of members who held 
office in voluntary organisations also suggested not only that they were actively engaged, 
but that they were likely to have the knowledge and skills to be able to challenge NHS 
officials.  Whilst a third of the members had been appointed by voluntary organisations, 85 
percent of the CHC members were connected to a voluntary organisation and 20 percent 
of the CHC members were linked to four or more such groups (Klein and Lewis, 1976: 38).  
This suggests that the local authorities and Regional Health Authorities had also been 
using their places to appoint people with voluntary sector experience.  Klein and Lewis 
suggested on the basis of their survey data that the role of the Regional Health Authority in 
ensuring appointees for vulnerable groups was largely redundant, as such groups were 
represented in the nominations made by voluntary organisations (1976: 162). 
Having inherited a system that managed local interest group representation, David 
Owen suggested to Community Health Councils that they might act as a catalyst for action 
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with the voluntary sector, where a CHC identified problems (CHC News37, 1976a: 8).  He 
also advised MPs that when voluntary organisations in their constituencies wanted to raise 
issues with local NHS services, they should do so through the Community Health Council 
(Malin, 1978).  The complex appointment processes for CHC members remained largely 
unchanged throughout the life of the Community Health Councils.  The selection 
processes ensured that vulnerable groups were represented and relationships were 
established that provided the basis for intermediation – and the example of David Owen, 
as Minister for Health, referring groups to the CHC demonstrates that at this early stage 
Community Health Councils were expected to take an intermediary role.  The issue on 
which the early CHCs undertook their most complex intermediary role was the closure of 
hospitals. 
 
Community Health Councils and hospital closure rights 
In 1974, the incoming Labour government had to contend with the immediate fiscal 
austerity of the oil crisis, combined with the implementation of two national strategies that 
had implications for the number and location of hospitals.  The first of these national 
strategies was Enoch Powell‟s 1962 hospital plan, which created large District General 
Hospitals in place of small community hospitals (Webster, 2002: 45).  Additional funding 
for the District General Hospitals had come to an end in 1972 (Ham, 2009: 17).  The 
programme was still in progress, however, and unpopular decisions needed to be made on 
the closure of local hospitals, with the transfer of patients to the new District General 
Hospitals.  The second national strategy arose from a Green Paper issued for consultation 
by Richard Crossman in 1970, which proposed „that the basic determinant of area health 
authority budgets will be the population served by the area, modified to take into account 
relevant demographic variables‟ (Department of Health and Social Security, 1970: §79).  
Whilst the calculations had not been completed at the point when Labour came into power, 
it would have been apparent to civil servants and members of the incoming Government 
that the latter strategy would result in more hospital closures.  When the Resource 
Allocation Working Party (RAWP) reported on a needs-based distribution of NHS services 
in 1975, it concluded that there were disproportionately high numbers of hospitals in 
                                                 
37
 CHC News had an editorial team that was initially hosted by the King’s Fund and then transferred to the 
Association of Community Health Councils for England and Wales (ACHCEW) once ACHCEW had been 
established.  The editorial team always retained a degree of independence from ACHCEW; where there is no 
named author for an item in CHC News, therefore, the author is given as CHC News. 
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London and Oxfordshire, so services would need to be closed in these areas and new 
hospitals opened in less well-served parts of the country (Webster, 2002: 84-87). 
The Labour government needed to find a way to facilitate the hospital closures 
without blame for loss of local hospitals being apportioned to the Secretary of State.  As 
discussed in Chapter One, the 1974 reorganisation of the NHS reduced the independence 
of prestigious teaching hospitals and accountability for the nationalised hospitals was held 
by the Secretary of State.  Under the initial Statutory Instruments for Community Health 
Councils, Area Health Authorities had a statutory duty to consult the local CHC „on the 
proposals which the authority may have under consideration for any substantial 
development of the health service in the Council‟s district and on any such proposals to 
make any substantial variation in the provision of such services‟ (National Health Service 
(Community Health Councils) Regulations 1973).  This duty required Area Health 
Authorities to consult Community Health Councils on major changes, but it did not provide 
strong incentives for Area Health Authorities to consult in a meaningful way.   
The consultation arrangements in relation to hospitals changed as part of 
Democracy in the National Health Service, launched by Barbara Castle and David Owen in 
May 1974.  This was largely a consultation document, but it included a strengthening of 
the role of Community Health Councils in relation to hospital closures that was explicitly 
not a matter for consultation: 
„CHCs should have a special responsibility in relation to hospital closures.  The 
Government is currently reviewing the procedures for consultation on proposed 
closures.  But the establishment of CHCs enables it to make one change in the 
present arrangements without further delay.  Guidance already issued to health 
authorities makes it clear that CHCs should be consulted about all hospital 
closures.  At present all closures are subject to specific authorisation by the 
Secretary of State.  In future where the CHC accepts the proposed closure this 
authorisation will not be required.  If a CHC wishes to object to closure then it will 
be expected to make a detailed and constructive counter-proposal, with full regard 
to the factors, including restraints on resources, which have led the health authority 
to propose the closure.‟ (Department of Health and Social Security, 1974b: §23e) 
This section is quoted in full, as the text gives an interesting placement of responsibility.  
Community Health Councils are described as having a „special responsibility‟ in relation to 
hospital closures, whereas the Secretary of State is described as just having had a role in 
the „specific authorisation‟ of the closure.  Whilst the Secretary of State is purely an 
authority figure, the Community Health Council takes a responsibility, and by implication 
part of the blame, for agreeing to the closure of a hospital within its district.  The 
requirement to make „a detailed and constructive counter-proposal‟ that took account, 
explicitly, of resource issues, was a stringent requirement to make of a group of volunteers 
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supported by a couple of members of staff.   In practice, authors have suggested that the 
powers may have meant that the Community Health Councils were unlikely to be able to 
do more than delay closures in most instances (Hogg, 2009: 61; Klein, 2006: 84).  As a 
mechanism that changed decision-making processes, however, the power granted to 
CHCs enabled Ministers to avoid blame for hospital closures.   
David Owen described Community Health Councils as „very realistic about lack of 
money‟ and „a way of bringing voluntary bodies to a closer relationship with the NHS‟ 
(CHC News, 1976a: 1).  He assured Community Health Councils that Ministers would read 
their counter-proposals to hospital closures carefully, provided that CHCs developed a 
reasoned case with an alternative proposal that included the costs involved (David Owen, 
in: CHC News, 1976b: 1).  In his book In sickness and in health, Owen wrote positively 
about the extent to which Community Health Councils were agreeing to hospital closures:  
„The decision to allow closures of hospitals to take place if Community Health 
Councils and the Area Health Authority and the Regional Health Authority all 
agreed was much criticised.  It was said the councils would never agree to any 
closures.  Yet, up and down the country, Community Health Councils are agreeing.  
And what is interesting, though not surprising, is that they tend to agree in those 
districts which have the fullest exchange of information. It is when a closure can be 
put into its wider context – that, by making the change, services can be improved, 
or, by making a saving, a cut-back can be stopped – that people will understand 
and recognise the case for rationalisation.  They will oppose if just told a hospital is 
to close, if they do not feel part of the process of decision-making and if it is not 
explained.  If they are not led to see the problems of the health service in the round 
then the local instinctive reaction, which is to keep what one has, will become the 
dominant voice.  Community Health Councils have the opportunity to work 
constructively towards transforming the relationship between the health service and 
the people living in the district.‟ (Owen, 1976: 24) 
Whilst David Owen presented the opportunity for local consultation as being of benefit to 
the local community, it was also a benefit to the Minister just to be the final arbiter in 
difficult cases, rather than having to take personal responsibility for agreeing to the closure 
of each hospital.  His statement that Community Health Councils „will oppose if just told 
that a hospital is to close‟ reflects the mood of public opinion, as protecting existing 
services is „the local instinctive reaction‟.  He was not alone amongst Ministers in advising 
CHCs to balance economic realism with local deliberation.  David Ennals, successor to 
Barbara Castle as Secretary of State, advised Community Health Councils that they 
needed to be realistic, but that he felt that the economic restraint might lead to „a new spirit 
of cooperation‟ (CHC News, 1976c: 1).  David Ennals also advised health authority 
personnel that he would not act as an alternative to agreeing closures with the relevant 
Community Health Council (CHC News, 1977d: 6-7). 
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The Ministerial emphasis on resource constraints and the need to follow due 
process suggests that granting Community Health Councils the power to approve or 
contest hospital closures was a valuable mechanism from a Ministerial perspective.  The 
involvement of the public through Community Health Councils may have been seen as 
legitimising the difficult choices that needed to be made over local resource allocation.  
The process placed opposition to hospital closures within a consultation framework with 
the Community Health Councils, which was easier for NHS managers to contain than a 
public demonstration.  Considered in terms of the sheepdog role, transferring authorisation 
to groups of local volunteers decentralised the decision-making, potentially shifting blame 
for hospital closures away from the Secretary of State.   
Whether or not the power provided a means for Ministerial blame avoidance in 
practice depended upon the activities undertaken both by health authorities and by 
Community Health Councils.  In the mid-1970s, Community Health Councils focused a 
great deal of energy on responding to, re-shaping or opposing proposals to close local 
health services.  During the period January 1976 to March 1978, there were 191 proposals 
for closures or part-closures of NHS services.  Of these, 164 were agreed locally and 27 
went to the Secretary of State, who approved all but one closure, that of St Nicholas‟ 
Hospital in South East London (CHC News, 1978a; 1978f).  Most of the closures approved 
by the Secretary of State were small maternity hospitals (CHC News, 1978d: 11).  The 
requirement to produce detailed counter-proposals demanded time and effort; some CHC 
members questioned how they could be expected to produce counter-proposals when they 
had to depend upon information that had been supplied to them by the Area Health 
Authority – the body proposing the closure (Gordon, 1978: 10). 
Much of the discussion within CHC News focuses on successes in changing local 
plans, such as intervening to save a village surgery in West Cumbria and negotiating to 
retain a GP-led hospital in Dartford in return for losing 32 beds in an acute hospital in the 
district (1977a: 5; 1978e: 5).  One of the most significant counter-proposals to be accepted 
at a local level was a rejection by North Kensington, Chelsea and Westminster CHC of 
plans to expand St Mary‟s Hospital, Paddington, at the expense of local services.  The 
CHC agreed to some of the closures, but in return for a reduction in the plans for St Mary‟s 
reached agreement with the health authority on the creation of a new community hospital 
within existing premises.  This was a successful outcome for the CHC, but „the CHC has 
made it plain that the whole exercise has stretched its own resources to the limit, with staff 
and members working flat-out for the three-month period‟ (CHC News, 1979a: 12). 
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Rather than writing in CHC News about successful opposition to a hospital closure, 
Ross and McCarthy from North West Herts CHC reported on the consultation process that 
they went through to determine whether St Albans or Hemel Hempstead should be the site 
of a District General Hospital.  Both towns had been promised a District General Hospital 
following the 1962 hospital plan, but the funds were no longer available to provide two 
large hospitals.  North West Herts CHC placed advertisements in local papers requesting 
views on whether there should be a medium-sized hospital in each town or a District 
General Hospital in one town and a supporting service in the other.  The results of the 
consultation were inconclusive, so the CHC members took a vote and recommended a 
District General Hospital in one town and a supporting service in the other, an outcome 
that was similar to the recommendation later made by the Area Health Authority.  This 
recommendation did not make the Community Health Council popular, and the CHC was 
„roundly condemned by opponents of the recommendation for having ignored public views‟ 
(Ross and McCarthy, 1978: 4).  As such, the Community Health Council bore the brunt of 
the opposition, rather than the opposition being directed towards the Secretary of State or 
the health authority.  This suggests that the powers allocated to the CHC had enabled 
Ministers to avoid blame. 
 
Development of a national association 
The NHS Reorganisation Act 1973 granted powers to the Secretary of State to 
establish a national body for Community Health Councils.  Considered from a corporatist 
perspective, a classic model is that a national peak organisation would represent the 
interests of local members to national politicians.  In the case of statutory public 
involvement institutions, the focus was on the development of the powers of the local 
bodies to coordinate interest intermediation.  In a health circular issued in January 1974, 
the Secretary of State, Keith Joseph is described as considering „that it is for the Councils 
themselves to decide, when they have settled down, whether they want a national 
association and to propose, in the light of their own experience, what should be its form 
and functions‟ (Department of Health and Social Security, 1974a: §41).  Such an approach 
suggests that a national organisation was not an assumed part of the structure for local 
statutory public involvement institutions.   
In February 1975, the Nuffield Centre for Health Service Studies hosted a meeting 
in London for Community Health Councils.  David Owen announced at the meeting that he 
intended to form a steering group to prepare proposals for a national association for 
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Community Health Councils (Hogg, 2009: 32).  The Government also provided initial 
funding for a publication for Community Health Councils, CHC News, and an information 
service to be hosted by the King‟s Fund (Gerrard, 2006: 41-42).  David Ennals, as 
Secretary of State, announced in May 1977 that the Department of Health and Social 
Security would fund CHC News and the information service on an ongoing basis.  He also 
agreed to provide funding to cover the operation of a national association in the first year, 
after which he would expect the organisation to be funded through subscriptions from 
Community Health Councils.  By contrast with this active support from Labour Ministers, 
key Conservative Members of Parliament were opposed to the establishment of a national 
association.  Most notably, Patrick Jenkin and Gerard Vaughan, future Secretary of State 
and future Minister for Health respectively, were amongst six signatories to a motion 
calling for the annulment of regulations for the establishment of a national association of 
Community Health Councils (CHC News, 1977f:1). 
The first Annual General Meeting of the Association of Community Health Councils 
for England and Wales (ACHCEW) took place on 15 June 1977.  From the outset, the 
association strived to be as democratic as possible, with all decisions going to a full 
Standing Committee, consisting of representatives from each region.  Policy issues were 
discussed as resolutions at the Annual General Meeting, with special meetings called 
when there were key matters to be debated.  It was, therefore, very much a membership 
organisation rather than a corporatist-style national peak organisation that would ensure 
local implementation of national decisions. 
Community Health Councils had the right to be consulted individually and 
ACHCEW did not compile responses to consultations on their behalf.  There is evidence in 
ACHCEW‟s annual reports that Ministers in the Labour government expected the 
Association to act as an intermediary and that ACHCEW declined to undertake this role.  
The first annual report, for 1977 to 1978, states that: 
„certain questions have been brought to the attention of the Association by the 
Department of Health.  In every case it has been made plain the individual CHCs 
have the right to be consulted and the Association is not an intermediary, and that 
remains policy.‟ (ACHCEW, 1978a: unpaginated [2]) 
The autonomy and rights of individual Community Health Councils were important to 
members; ACHCEW, as an organisation dependent upon the fees of CHCs who chose to 
join, was not in a position to act as an intermediary.  In the 1978 to 1979 annual report, 
ACHCEW clarified its role as „an information gatherer, a test-bed for new ideas, and an 
advocate of CHCs to Government and to national bodies of every kind‟ (ACHCEW, 1979a: 
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2).  Taking on the role of an advocate to Government was not quite the style of mediation 
that Ministers seemed to have in mind.  CHC News carried a report in 1978 of an interview 
with David Ennals on Radio Medway. As reported by CHC News:  
„David Ennals said that while he is unable to see deputations from individual CHCs, 
he is willing to see representatives of the national body speaking on their behalf.  
The Secretary of State has thus proposed a role for ACHCEW interposing it 
between CHCs and the Government, as if it were a kind of national CHC.‟ (CHC 
News, 1978g) 
 Retaining its editorial independence from ACHCEW, the reporting style is representative 
of the approach taken in CHC News, as is the editorial team‟s action in asking Mike 
Gerrard, Secretary of ACHCEW, to respond to the report.  Gerrard‟s response was that 
ACHCEW had not undertaken the role of an intermediary and that „if performance of their 
statutory duties necessitates CHCs making direct representations to him, and the issues 
merit his personal involvement, Mr Ennals has a clear obligation to put himself at their 
disposal‟ (CHC News, 1978g: 10).  This interchange seems to epitomise differences in 
perspective between Ministers and ACHCEW personnel on the role that ACHCEW played 
in relation to Governmental relationships with Community Health Councils. 
 
From mediation to mobilisation 
By the late 1970s, many members and staff of Community Health Councils were 
disenchanted with the role that they had played in consultations on the closure of services.  
Tom Heller, a member of Norwich CHC, felt that Community Health Councils had 
deliberately been placed in a difficult position, as „the administration can legitimise 
unpopular decisions by claiming that they have been considered by the CHC while on 
other occasions dismissing the protests of CHCs because “they do not properly represent 
the population at large” ‟(Heller, 1977: 6).  Jeanette Mitchell was Secretary of Brent CHC, 
which had had a particularly difficult experience with the consultation on the Willesden 
General Hospital.  She suggested that the right to be consulted on hospital closures might 
be a step backwards in public participation in the NHS: 
„While prior to reorganisation NHS users had not been particularly known for their 
militancy, it was not difficult for the Government to predict in the early seventies 
that its plans to close hospitals on an unprecedented scale over the coming decade 
would be met with resistance.  The introduction of the formal consultation 
procedure has ensured that these battles take place on ground that is familiar to 
health service managers but also alien to most local people – including CHC 
members.‟ (Mitchell, 1979: 5) 
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Jeanette Mitchell‟s comments suggest that the consultation rights granted to Community 
Health Councils had turned the CHCs into a tool for blame avoidance.  As she indicated, 
the incoming Labour government had faced the prospect of having to close hospitals „on 
an unprecedented scale‟ and the consultation process ensured that „battles‟ could be 
managed as they took place on terms that were familiar to NHS administrators. 
Some Community Health Councils started to mobilise opposition to reforms.  
Oxfordshire CHC spent £1,000 on publicity in three local papers to alert local people to the 
threatened closure of Cowley Road Geriatric Hospital in Oxford.  The Community Health 
Council had referred the proposed closure to the Secretary of State and decided „to make 
as big a stir as possible, so that the final decision will at any rate be made in the context of 
public debate‟ (CHC News, 1979a: 12).   
In terms of a sheepdog role in political management of the NHS, CHCs during the 
1970s had the powers to mediate between local interests, with representatives of 
vulnerable communities included in their membership, had local consultation rights and 
were granted a remit to consider health service issues across an allocated geographical 
area.  They were also taking some of the blame for local hospital closures.  At this early 
stage, they had the full set of sheepdog characteristics and seem to have been valued by 
Ministers for their sheepdog role.  Some of the CHCs, however, suspected that they were 
being treated as tools to legitimise unpopular decisions and had started to mobilise 
opposition.  It was in this context of increasing opposition to national government policy 
and ongoing austerity, resulting in contentious hospital closures, that Margaret Thatcher‟s 
Conservative government took office in 1979. 
 
4.2      Changes to Community Health Councils, 1979-1989 
As the new Secretary of State for Social Service and Minister of Health, Patrick 
Jenkin and Gerard Vaughan inherited a situation of industrial unrest in the NHS and 
ongoing public concerns about hospital closures.  Whilst Community Health Councils had 
been invented by the Conservative party, the implementation and extension of powers to 
include consultation on hospital closures had taken place under Labour.  As Jenkin and 
Vaughan had both signed a motion calling for Community Health Councils not to be 
granted the right to create their own association, there was some anxiety amongst 
Community Health Councils about the new working relationship. 
The first few years of the Conservative government saw a series of challenges to 
the Community Health Councils.  At a local level, the consultation rights were challenged 
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by health authorities.  This was followed by a national challenge, as discussed in Chapter 
One, that CHCs could be abolished as part of a reduction in the layers of bureaucracy 
outlined in Patients first.  Once the ongoing existence of CHCs had been assured, the 
Association of Community Health Councils for England and Wales came under threat and 
CHC News lost its grant.  Hogg suggests that after 1985 the Community Health Councils 
were „ignored, not worth the effort required to abolish them‟ (2009: 44).  This section 
considers CHCs in terms of their sheepdog role in the period from the election of a 
Conservative government in 1979 to the announcement of the internal market in the NHS. 
 
Local challenges to hospital closure rights 
With the change of Government, Community Health Councils found that Area 
Health Authorities tried to avoid going through formal consultation on hospital closures, by 
claiming that the changes were temporary or necessitated by financial crises in the district.   
Concerns about the erosion of consultation rights generated an emergency debate at the 
Association of CHCs for England and Wales 1979 Annual General Meeting.  The Standing 
Committee of ACHCEW sought a meeting with the Secretary of State to discuss the issue, 
but were referred instead to Gerard Vaughan.   Dr Vaughan agreed that a „temporary‟ 
variation in health services could be „substantial‟, which therefore meant that it was subject 
to agreement with the Community Health Council (ACHCEW, 1979b: 1).  Following the 
meeting, a letter was issued from the Department of Health and Social Security advising 
health authorities that „consultation should take place other than where emergencies (such 
as the outbreak of infection) cause a hospital, ward or department to be closed without 
delay‟ (ACHCEW, 1980: unpaginated [1]). 
In practice, Patrick Jenkin rejected a higher proportion of disputed closure 
proposals than his predecessor David Ennals had done, effectively agreeing with 
Community Health Councils‟ opposition to the closures.  In the first eighteen months of the 
Conservative government, six disputed closures were approved by the Secretary of State, 
three rejected and one converted into a „change of use‟ of the premises; by comparison, in 
the last twenty months of the Labour government, twenty closures were approved, two 
rejected and one converted to a change of use (CHC News, 1981b).  In a survey of CHCs‟ 
activity in 1980, Farrell and Adams found that 43 percent of Community Health Councils 
had opposed closures during the year, a sixth of whom had put forward counter-proposals 
(Farrell and Adams, 1981: 9). 
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When the Conservative government took office in 1979, the contentious nature of 
existing proposals for hospital closures may have meant that approval of closures by 
Community Health Councils was a valuable tactic that shifted blame away from Ministers.  
The new Ministerial team was unsure about the value of Community Health Councils, 
however, and used the Patients first consultation exercise as an opportunity to gather 
views on the CHCs.  Prior to the outcome of the Patients first consultation, the Department 
of Health and Social Security announced its intention of moving away from a policy of 
developing large District General Hospitals, so retaining more of the local hospitals that 
had been at risk (CHC News, 1980c: 11; Webster, 2002: 122).  Regardless of the outcome 
of Patients first, therefore, the right to agree or dispute a hospital closure was less 
valuable. 
 
National consultations on CHCs 
At the end of 1979, Ministers launched the Patients first consultation.  Patients first 
proposed the removal of Area Health Authorities as a layer in the NHS structure, to be 
replaced by an upgrading of the more localised District Management Teams into District 
Health Authorities.  This formed part of an attempt to reduce bureaucracy and devolve 
authority in the NHS (Klein, 1984: 18).  Respondents to Patients first were asked to 
consider whether Community Health Councils would still be needed with a more localised 
health authority structure: 
„In future authority members will be less remote from local services than many 
necessarily are today, and will be more closely in touch with the needs of the 
community.  The need for separate consumer representation in these 
circumstances is less clear; next year the councils will cost over £4 million.  The 
Government will welcome views on whether Community Health Councils should be 
retained when the new District Health Authority structure has been implemented.‟ 
(Department of Health and Social Security and Welsh Office, 1979: 14 §26) 
The Patients first consultation was effectively the Conservatives‟ response to the Royal 
Commission on the NHS, which had been set up by the preceding Labour government.  
The Royal Commission had supported the „experiment‟ of CHCs, but also identified 
confusion within the NHS about the role CHCs played both in consultation and in 
representation of the public (Royal Commission on the NHS, 1979: §11.11).  As members 
of Community Health Councils commented, the issue of the future of CHCs was the only 
truly consultative part of Patients first (CHC News, 1980a: 3). 
Patrick Jenkin, Secretary of State, came to speak to a special meeting of the 
Association of CHCs for England and Wales at the mid-point of the Patients first 
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consultation.  He indicated that it was a genuine consultation and that the Department had 
not pre-determined whether Community Health Councils would continue.  He presented 
the reasons why CHCs might be retained as the roles that they played in making „a 
sensible reconciliation of consumer viewpoints‟, providing a critical voice that was 
independent of professionals and monitoring services (CHC News, 1980b: 1).  In effect, he 
suggested to the CHCs that their value lay in the statutory roles that form the basis of the 
sheepdog and watchdog analogies.  After Mr Jenkin left the meeting, the CHC 
representatives agreed that „the fight for the survival CHCs should be seen as part of the 
struggle for more democracy and accountability in the NHS‟ (CHC News, 1980b:1).  The 
Secretary of State had not described the Community Health Councils in terms of their role 
in increasing democratic input into the NHS, however, which suggests a disconnect 
between the role of CHCs as seen by the Ministerial team and the activity in which CHC 
members felt that they were engaged. 
The question left hanging over the future of Community Health Councils generated 
a great deal of support for CHCs.  The future of CHCs generated more responses than 
any other issue in Patients first.  Members of the public and all political parties registered 
their support for CHCs; of nearly 5000 comments relating to Community Health Councils, 
over half were from members of the public, many of whom felt that their views carried 
more weight when expressed through their local CHC (Hogg, 2009: 42-43).  The Patients 
first consultation therefore confirmed the popularity of Community Health Councils.  In 
response to the findings, the Department of Health and Social Security announced that 
Community Health Councils would be retained, with one council in each District Health 
Authority area, but that there would be a further consultation on the membership and roles 
of CHCs (Department of Health and Social Security, 1980: §21). 
Ministers launched the consultation on CHCs specifically in January 1981.  
Community Health Councils in England, alongside a companion document Community 
Health Councils in Wales, proposed reforms to Community Health Councils and queried 
the need for the Association of Community Health Councils for England and Wales 
(Department of Health and Social Security, 1981a).  The consultation document stated that 
„Ministers see CHCs as local bodies, representing the interests of their local population in 
the health services, and not as having a role in the formation of policies at a national level‟ 
(1981a: §3).  Continuing on the theme of a local role, Community Health Councils in 
England supported the right of local CHCs to approve hospital closures, as „Ministers 
support this role of CHCs as a valuable aid to local decision-making‟ (1981a: §12).  
Community Health Councils were therefore valued by Ministers when they managed 
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consultation locally, but not as a means to raise issues nationally.  Responding to the 
consultation, individual CHCs objected to being seen as having a specifically local role.  
CHC News proclaimed optimistically, on the basis of the objections of CHCs to being 
restricted to a local role, that „we won‟t be muzzled‟ (CHC News, 1981c: 1). 
If Community Health Councils were not to have influence at a national level, this 
placed a questionmark over the value of a national association.  As stated in the 
consultation document: 
„The Association has now been in existence for several years, though not all CHCs 
are members.  The need for the CHCs to have a national association at all is still 
sometimes questioned.  Ministers suggest that CHCs take the opportunity to 
consider whether the Association should continue.‟ (Department of Health and 
Social Security, 1981a: §43) 
ACHCEW had actively refused to provide an intermediary role between Ministers and 
individual Community Health Councils, which may have contributed to questioning 
ACHCEW‟s future.   
By the time that feedback on the consultation was received, Norman Fowler had 
replaced Patrick Jenkin as Secretary of State and alternative mechanisms to reduce the 
mobilisation of Community Health Councils were being put in place with threats to remove 
the Departmental funding for CHC News.  The response to the consultation, health circular 
HC (81) 15, reduced the number of members of a Community Health Council from 
between 24 and 30 members to the range of 18 to 24 members, stating that „the Secretary 
of State expects most CHCs to be at or near the lower end of this range‟ (Department of 
Health and Social Security, 1981b: §3).  The appointment processes (with half of members 
appointed by local authorities, a third by voluntary organisations and a sixth by Regional 
Health Authorities) remained unchanged „for the time being‟ (1981b: §4).  A new 
membership criterion excluded former NHS employees who had been dismissed for 
„reasons other than redundancy‟ (1981b: §6).  At a first glance, this may appear to be an 
attempt to prevent NHS personnel dismissed as whistleblowers from colluding with 
Community Health Councils.  Correspondence in CHC News, however, suggests that the 
clause was included at the request of the North Western Association of CHCs, who had 
protested to the Secretary of State that a sacked Secretary of Rochdale CHC (who, as 
Secretary, was employed through the NHS) had been returned to the same CHC as a 
member by the local authority (CHC News, 1982a).  Other than restricting numbers of 
members and confirming that there would be no increase in funding, the formal response 
to the consultation left CHCs and the Association of Community Health Councils for 
England and Wales intact (Department of Health and Social Security, 1981b: §13).  If 
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Ministers aimed to reduce the ability of Community Health Councils to be involved in 
national issues, the tactic they chose was a less formal reduction in national roles. 
 
Lessening national roles 
The description of CHCs in Community Health Councils in England as „local 
bodies‟ and „not having a role in the formation of policies at a national level‟ provided a 
strong indicator that Ministers did not welcome activity that might mobilise national 
influence (Department of Health and Social Security, 1981a: §3).  During the protracted 
consultation on Community Health Councils in England, the Community Health Councils 
continued to raise issues that Ministers might wish to see buried.  In particular, individual 
Community Health Councils and ACHCEW drew attention to The Black report.  Sir 
Douglas Black had been commissioned by the previous Labour government to chair a 
committee reviewing inequalities in health.  The committee found that, despite the NHS 
being accessible to all, the gap between the health of the wealthier classes and the health 
of the poorer classes was widening (Black et al., 1980: 198).  This did not fit with the 
Conservative administration‟s emphasis on personal responsibility for health.  In his 
introduction to The Black report, Patrick Jenkin indicated that the costs involved in 
increasing equality of health were „quite unrealistic‟, so he could not endorse the report‟s 
recommendations; instead, he was „making the report available for discussion, but without 
any commitment by the Government to its proposals‟ (Black et al., 1980: 31).  The extent 
to which the report was made available was exceptionally limited: the report was issued on 
the Friday before the August Bank Holiday and just 260 copies of the duplicated typescript 
were produced (Townsend, Whitehead and Davidson, 1992: 3). 
Over time, medical journals and trades unions began to spread information about 
the content of The Black report.  One of the first journals to summarise the report was 
CHC News.  Individual Community Health Councils began to take action to campaign for 
the report to be recognised: eleven CHCs from the ten areas identified in The Black report 
as having the poorest levels of health coordinated a campaign, working with voluntary 
organisations and their local Members of Parliament (CHC News, 1981a: 1).  The 
Association of Community Health Councils for England and Wales organised a national 
conference on the report, including one of the authors, Peter Townsend, as a speaker.  As 
an action arising from the conference, the participants passed a resolution deploring the 
response of the Government to The Black report and calling for a Parliamentary debate on 
the report‟s findings (CHC News, 1981d).  As an activity during a period when the national 
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role of CHCs and the existence of ACHCEW were matters of public consultation, these 
were brave stances to take on as contentious an issue as the Conservative government‟s 
near-suppression of The Black report.  
Ministers started to reduce the ability of CHCs to mobilise opposition before the 
formal response had been made to Community Health Councils in England.  At the 1981 
Annual General Meeting of ACHCEW, civil servants informed the officers of the 
association that Ministers were considering ending the grant that was provided to fund 
CHC News and the information service for Community Health Councils.  Having received 
positive responses to the role of Community Health Councils in the responses both to 
Patients first and the subsequent consultation on CHCs, Ministers shut off the funding at a 
vulnerable point: „In this way, Ministers were able to terminate a commitment made by 
their predecessors, silence a persistent critic, and reduce the operational capacity of CHCs 
by removing their information and communication mechanism at a stroke‟ (Gerrard, 2006: 
118).  The tactic of removing communications weakened the CHCs‟ ability to mobilise 
activity.  Whilst the membership structure stipulated for Community Health Councils had 
created CHCs as bodies that could round up interests, their statutory dependence meant 
that if they proved to be rogue dogs rounding up opposition their activity could be curtailed. 
Initially, ACHCEW continued to produce CHC News on a subscription basis, but 
Community Health Councils‟ budgets were determined by their relevant Regional Health 
Authority, so resources for the CHCs were tight and the plans to expand other activities, 
such as training, did not yield sufficient income to cover the costs of the newsletter and the 
associated information service.  By January 1984, the shortfall in funding was putting 
ACHCEW at risk (ACHCEW, 1984a).  CHC News was closed, but ACHCEW was still 
financially vulnerable (Gerrard, 2006: 143).  Kenneth Clarke, the new Minister for Health, 
agreed, after much discussion, to pay up to £27,500 to clear ACHCEW‟s projected deficit 
for the financial year (ACHCEW, 1984b:1).  During the discussions about ACHCEW‟s 
financial position,  Kenneth Clarke expressed a desire for the association to take on a 
„postbox‟ function, transferring communications between the Department of Health and 
Social Security and the Community Health Councils; he also „indicated to the ACHCEW 
deputation that the DHSS saw no reason to fund another “campaign”‟ (ACHCEW, 1984b: 
1).  Kenneth Clarke had been heckled at a conference organised by ACHCEW and 
presented with a pair of rose-tinted spectacles to demonstrate that Ministers were not 
seeing the real effects of cuts to the NHS, so he would have been personally aware of 
ACHCEW‟s ability to mobilise opposition (CHC News, 1983d).  The terms he offered for 
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supporting ACHCEW were that it would act as a modest intermediary and not a 
campaigning body. 
Cutting CHC News and reducing the power of ACHCEW limited the means for co-
ordination between Community Health Councils and reduced the risk of national 
mobilisation, but meant that political actors still had the tools for local management of 
interest groups.  In the meantime, management techniques were being explored by the 
Conservative government as a means to manage the ever-increasing costs of the National 
Health Service. 
 
General management and changes to consultation 
Roy Griffiths, managing director of the supermarket chain Sainsbury‟s, was invited 
by the Thatcher government to conduct a review of the National Health Service.  The 
review took the form of a rapid and informal collection of information, used as the basis for 
general observations and specific recommendations (Klein, 2006: 117).  The Griffiths 
report, as discussed in Chapter One, presents the problem in the NHS as lack of clarity 
about who is in charge.  The fundamental direction behind the recommendations was that 
general management of the NHS should be improved at all levels.   
Community Health Councils receive brief, but explicit, comment in the Griffiths 
report.  It states that feedback is needed from users of health services, in order to judge 
the quality of the service that is being delivered, and that user feedback „can be derived 
from CHCs and other methods, including market research and from experiences of 
general practice and the community health services‟ (Department of Health and Social 
Security, 1983: Recommendation 13.1).  Within the new managerial approach in the NHS, 
Community Health Councils were treated in Griffiths‟ plans as one of a range of 
information sources rather than having a unique contribution to make.  The Griffiths report 
states specifically that judgements about Community Health Councils had not formed part 
of the review, but that the inquiry team „have been impressed with the grass-roots work of 
some of the CHCs‟ (Department of Health and Social Security, 1983: General observation 
30). 
With the general management model of consumerism, feedback on the quality of 
services was interpreted by NHS personnel.  Whereas the previous Labour government 
had decentralised the difficult decisions on closure of hospitals, attempts to reduce the 
costs of health services were coordinated through a new management structure.  Ministers 
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could avoid blame for local decisions through the management structure and did not need 
to use Community Health Councils to take the blame for hospital closures. 
The role of Community Health Councils in agreeing local hospital closures was 
eroded after the introduction of general management into the NHS.  The Richmond and 
Twickenham CHC reported in 1984 that the consultation processes in Greater London 
were being progressively squeezed, with health authorities expecting to be able to conduct 
a consultation exercise in six weeks rather than three months (ACHCEW, 1984c: 14).  The 
Community Health Councils continued to view preventing the closure of a hospital as a 
success.  Between May 1979 and the end of June 1985, 50 hospital closures were 
opposed by CHCs, of which the Minister approved 45 for closure (HC Deb (1985-86) 84 
col. 570/571). 
In 1985, Community Health Councils lost the right to approve a hospital closure 
(Hogg: 2009: 62).  Whilst the Community Health Councils retained their statutory rights to 
be consulted on significant changes, District Health Authorities could approve closures that 
they could justify as being in the interests of the local community.  The health authorities 
still had a statutory duty to consult Community Health Councils on substantive changes to 
services, including proposals to close hospitals.  In its annual report for 1986/87, Tower 
Hamlets CHC reported that in practice many Community Health Councils were unable to 
develop alternative proposals when faced with a proposed hospital closure, „however, it is 
this CHC‟s intention to submit alternative proposals whenever appropriate‟ (Tower Hamlets 
CHC, 1987). 
Alongside the reduction in CHC consultation rights and the growth of consumerism, 
the 1980s saw a growth in the direct involvement of voluntary organisations, including 
disease-specific associations.  The most significant statutory change was the development 
of joint consultative committees, which were the main forum to enable local authorities and 
health services to plan services jointly.  Voluntary organisations were given the right to 
elect three members for each local committee.  In the establishing guidance, Ministers 
welcomed the contribution that voluntary organisations could make directly: 
‟Voluntary organisations have a valuable contribution to make to the development 
of health and personal social services and related services in the housing and 
education fields.  Ministers wish to encourage the participation by voluntary 
organisations in the planning and operation of these services.‟ (Department of 
Health and Social Security, 1984: §1) 
The „valuable contribution‟ to be made by voluntary organisations included acting as 
providers of services.  Unlike Community Health Councils, individual voluntary 
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organisations were not seeking to represent views across the community, but might be 
able to make direct contributions to the range of services planned locally.  The specific 
reference to Ministers encouraging voluntary organisations to participate „in the planning 
and operation‟ of local services suggests that this is a different form of involvement.  With 
the development of the internal market in the 1990s, the involvement of voluntary 
organisations as potential providers rather than as interest groups became more 
significant. 
During the 1980s, Community Health Councils overcame the formal challenges of 
the Patients first and Community Health Councils in England consultations.  Cuts to CHC 
News and the information service meant that the national support available to local CHCs 
was reduced.  In terms of their sheepdog role, they retained the appointment mechanisms 
that ensured representation of local groups for vulnerable communities, but their 
consultation rights were eroded, so that CHCs lost the right to agree hospital closures and 
they became a means to gather consumer views rather than the representatives of the 
local community.  They also demonstrated their ability to round up opposition to national 
policy, potentially making them less valuable to Ministers as sheepdogs. 
 
4.3     CHCs in the NHS internal market, 1989-1997 
On coming to power in 1979, the Conservative government attempted initially to cut 
costs in the NHS by reducing the tiers of bureaucracy and then by introducing general 
management.  It was clear by the late 1980s that a more radical approach was needed to 
curtail costs (Pierson, 1994: 134).  This took the form of an internal market, in which roles 
of providing and purchasing services were split so that providers could compete for 
funding. 
 
Introduction of internal market 
The NHS internal market was introduced in the White Paper Working for patients 
(Secretaries of State for Health, Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland, 1989).  The White 
Paper continued to recognise managers as responsible for the effective use of NHS 
resources (1989: 40).  Community Health Councils in England are mentioned briefly: „The 
interests of the local community will continue to be represented by Community Health 
Councils, which act as a channel for consumer views to health authorities and FPCs 
[Family Practitioner Committees]‟ (1989: 66).  Acting as a channel for „consumer views‟ did 
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not present Community Health Councils with a very powerful role in the new internal 
market.  As fund-holding General Practitioners were able to choose the specialist services 
that they purchased on behalf of patients, the relationship with Family Practitioner 
Committees was important.  It meant that Community Health Councils would be able to 
advise on services to purchase.  The Community Health Councils retained their statutory 
rights to be consulted on service change and to visit health services, but they seem to 
have been overlooked as active participants in the new market. 
The Government encouraged NHS bodies to seek the views of their service users 
directly, on a Hirschman-style model of responding to feedback to improve customers‟ 
experience of services (Hirschman, 1970).  NHS organisations started to use new models 
of consultation with the public, such as health panels and citizens‟ juries, which did not 
involve Community Health Councils.  The voluntary sector also benefited from the 
guidance Local voices, which encouraged discussions with voluntary organisations about 
the services to be purchased locally (NHS Management Executive, 1992).  With greater 
direct engagement by NHS managers with individual patients and with voluntary 
organisations, it was hard for Community Health Councils to sustain a role as representing 
the public interest (Hogg, 2009: 48). 
Ministers expected Community Health Councils to play a role in purchasing and 
developing health services, despite their exclusion from the membership of joint 
consultative committees to develop services across health and social care.  Stephen 
Dorrell, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, wrote to the Chairs of Regional Health 
Authorities and District Health Authorities in 1992 advising that health authorities „should 
agree locally with CHCs how they should contribute‟ to assessment of priorities, 
purchasing and standards-setting for services (Gerrard, 2006: 164).  Whilst this did not 
provide health authorities with specific guidance, the letter gave Community Health 
Councils a tool that they could use to negotiate a local role in the purchasing process. 
 
Challenging national policy 
The Association of CHCs for England and Wales continued to coordinate national 
activity by the CHCs.  In the 1990s, ACHCEW opposed the introduction of the Private 
Finance Initiative (PFI).  The Private Finance Initiative was first introduced by John Major‟s 
government in 1992.  It provided a controversial approach to capital funding, as private 
funding was used to build hospitals and provide services that were then rented back to the 
NHS, a process that was interpreted by critics as a form of privatisation (Pollock, 2004: 
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54).  As Community Health Councils were all independent bodies, they reached differing 
conclusions on the value and ethics of the Private Finance Initiative.  A briefing paper 
produced by ACHCEW in 1995 includes a range of views expressed by Community Health 
Councils.  It is a very balanced report and concludes that „the prospects for PFI depend 
very largely on the existence of feasible and attractive alternatives to privately-financed 
development‟ (ACHCEW, 1995b: 19). 
The 1996 Annual General Meeting of ACHCEW adopted a resolution opposing the 
use of the Private Finance Initiative to fund capital projects in the NHS (Gerrard, 2006: 
169).  The resolution stated that the Private Finance Initiative had „delayed or blocked 
many capital developments, that the cost to the NHS was substantial and that public 
sector investment in the NHS had been cut‟ (ACHCEW, 1996: 28).  Following the Annual 
General Meeting, ACHCEW conducted a survey of Community Health Councils.  
Responses were received from 129 of the 207 Community Health Councils, which was a 
fair response, but indicated that ACHCEW was not in a position to coordinate universal 
input from local CHCs.  The report on the survey acknowledges that CHCs would 
sometimes welcome PFI-financed initiatives as private finance had proved the only way to 
achieve some developments that had been needed for many years.  One in ten (11 
percent) of the respondents indicated that the Private Finance Initiative had facilitated 
projects that would not otherwise have taken place, whilst half (54 percent) stated that PFI 
had not enabled projects to take place (ACHCEW, 1996: 26).  Whilst ACHCEW respected 
the right of individual Community Health Councils to form their own opinions, the national 
association feared that funding would flow on the basis of „best return‟, rather than greatest 
need (ACHCEW, 1996: 28). 
Where Private Finance Initiatives were proposed locally, Community Health 
Councils often had the contacts to provide a rigorous review of the proposals.  In January 
1997, South Birmingham Community Health Council received details of a proposal to 
replace the Selly Oak and Queen Elizabeth hospitals with a single PFI-funded hospital: 
„Ursula Pearce, as Chair of SBCHC [South Birmingham Community Health 
Council], led discussion with a wealth of information, often drawn from financial and 
construction industry sources.  A working group was set up and its discussions 
took on a seminar form with her and Shirley Hoole, Chair of the Acute Working 
Group, producing evidence based on then existing or planned projects around the 
country.  Research by academics like Allyson Pollock and David Price was also 
taken into consideration.  It became apparent to all that a PFI hospital was likely to 
have fewer beds and services and higher running costs over a long period.‟ 
(Spilsbury, n.d. [2003]: 49) 
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The PFI build in Birmingham did not go ahead.  As established organisations whose 
voluntary members had a range of professional skills, the CHC members were committed 
to the future of the NHS in their district and would seek out relevant information that could 
sway arguements. 
Opposing the Private Finance Initiative was unlikely to make Community Health 
Councils popular with NHS managers or with Ministers.  Their opposition, however, seems 
to have made little impression on the Conservative government.  
 
Reviewing Community Health Councils 
In 1995, Community Health Councils became a focus for Ministerial attention.  
Ministers commissioned a report from Insight Management Consulting to review the roles 
of Community Health Councils.  A review of CHCs had been promised since the early 
1980s, so Community Health Councils welcomed the move as evidence of Ministerial 
interest (Hogg, 2009: 53; Gerrard, 2006: 180-181).   
At the same time as the review, restructuring of the NHS meant that the Regional 
Health Authorities – which acted as establishing bodies for Community Health Councils – 
were being abolished and so the location of CHCs within the NHS needed to be 
considered.  The abolition of the Regional Health Authorities preceded the findings of 
Insight Management Consulting.  The actions taken therefore reflect Ministerial views, in 
this case those of Stephen Dorrell who had just replaced Virginia Bottomley as Secretary 
of State for Health, rather than a response to advice from consultants.  ACHCEW was 
invited to participate in a working group to consider how Community Health Councils would 
be established with the demise of Regional Health Authorities.  Regional Health Authorities 
were merged into eight regional offices of the NHS Executive (Ham, 2009: 45-46).  The 
remit of the working group was to consider how the regional offices of the NHS Executive 
would undertake the role of establishing Community Health Councils.  Following the report 
of the working group, ACHCEW produced a response that called for an independent 
agency to act as the establishing body: 
„It is recognised that the scope of the Working Group‟s remit was to make 
recommendations on the implementation of the decision that had already been 
taken by Ministers that, once RHAs [Regional Health Authorities] are abolished, the 
establishing functions for CHCs should be exercised by the NHS Executive through 
its regional offices.  This recognition does not alter the Association‟s existing 
position as agreed at the Association‟s Special General Meeting on 7 February 
1994 that “an independent agency should be set up to act as the establishing 
authority for CHCs”.‟ (Association of CHCs for England and Wales, 1995a: 1) 
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The nature of ACHCEW as a membership organisation meant that the resolutions taken at 
either Annual General Meetings or Special General Meetings were binding, so 
representatives from ACHCEW were not empowered to negotiate an alternative solution.  
The remainder of the response from ACHCEW consists of expressions of concern about 
the powers, resources and independence of Community Health Councils.  Using 
responses as an opportunity to raise concerns about the resources available to CHCs is a 
tactic that was frequently used by ACHCEW in the reports produced during the 1990s. 
The Statutory Instrument that followed, Community Health Councils Regulations 
1996, transferred the rights that had been held by the Regional Health Authorities to the 
Secretary of State.  The Secretary of State was therefore empowered to „vary the total 
membership and composition‟ of any Community Health Council, to determine the list of 
voluntary organisations to be involved in selecting the voluntary sector‟s third of members 
and to determine how the sixth of members who had been nominated by the Regional 
Health Authority should be appointed (Community Health Council Regulations 1996: 
1(2)(c), 3(3)).  In practice, this meant that the Secretary of State could authorise the 
regional office of the NHS Executive or any other body to act as the establishing body for 
Community Health Councils.  The distinctive appointment mechanisms for Community 
Health Councils were retained: with half of members appointed by local authorities; a third 
of members nominated by local voluntary organisations; and the remaining sixth appointed 
by the regional office of the NHS Executive on the behalf of the Secretary of State.  The 
regional offices were urged when establishing Community Health Councils to aim for a 
balance of representation in terms of race, age, sex and geographical localities (Hogg, 
2009: 55-56).  This was a different dimension to representation, with the members 
themselves being seen for the first time as reflecting the profile of the local community, 
rather than purely as individuals designated by their respective interest groups.  It also 
meant that there was an attempt to have more direct participation by members of more 
vulnerable communities, rather than representation through groups supporting their 
interests.   Whilst the transfer from Regional Health Authorities to regional offices of the 
NHS Executive was a relatively minor change, the centralisation of powers to the 
Secretary of State provided Ministers with the option of greater control, including 
determining parameters for the selection of members. 
Insight Management Consulting presented their report on CHCs to Ministers in 
November 1996.  The report developed a model for a „notional CHC‟ (Gerrard, 2006: 170-
179).  Insight identified that Community Health Councils were undertaking a wide range of 
activities, including providing information services and supporting complainants.  The 
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consultants recommended that CHCs should refocus their activity, concentrating on 
consultations and a targeted investigation function (Hogg, 2009: 53).  Essentially, these 
were the statutory rights of CHCs, to be consulted and to enter and view NHS premises.  
Community Health Councils had been conscious of variations in their activities and had 
been debating standards for CHC activity during the 1980s and 1990s, commissioning 
reports on best practice and standards for CHCs (Hogg, 1987; Hogg, 1996).  The Insight 
Management Consulting report provided Community Health Councils with an opportunity 
to reform themselves.  The CHCs failed to agree, however, on a response to the specific 
proposals in the report and the actions to take.  Christine Hogg, who had herself 
undertaken much of the standards-related activity for ACHCEW, reflected later that the 
most promising opportunity that CHCs had had to reform themselves had been lost (2009: 
55). 
In response to the general challenge posed by the Insight Management Consulting 
report, which was seen as narrowing the range of activity undertaken by Community 
Health Councils, Toby Harris, Director of ACHCEW, led on the compilation of CHCs 
making a difference (ACHCEW, 1997).  This was described by Gerrard as „a genuine 
compilation of the constructive and painstaking work of CHCs‟ (2006: 192).  It was also 
something of a morale booster for CHCs, as over half of the CHCs were mentioned by 
name in the summaries of activity. 
CHCs making a difference lists a broad range of activities undertaken by CHCs, 
including visiting health services, responding to consultations, training NHS personnel, 
providing information services, supporting complainants and providing advocacy support.  
Taken as a demonstration of the commitment of CHC members, it is an impressive array 
of activity.  The report also includes examples of CHCs mobilising local opposition, often 
over a long timeframe: 
„Croydon CHC finally persuaded its local health authority to accept the need for 
more beds at Mayday Hospital following two years of campaigning culminating in a 
public meeting, convened by the CHC, at which the Chief Executives of the health 
authority and Mayday Hospital were asked to explain why the hospital had been 
unable to cope with emergency admissions for the fourth winter running.  Shortly 
after, the health authority ear-marked money for extra beds.  Prior to this they had 
insisted that the problems were purely to do with the need for more efficient bed 
management.‟ (Association of CHCs for England and Wales, 1997: 13-14) 
This example of a successful campaign demonstrates the value of continuity of local 
knowledge.  The ability of Croydon CHC to demonstrate that emergency admissions had 
been a problem at Mayday Hospital for four consecutive winters would have had more 
weight with the health authority than a single instance of a problem.  The CHC members 
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also knew who to invite to the meeting in order to get the required result.  From an 
intermediary perspective, access to hospital beds during the winter is not a disease-
specific issue, but an issue for the whole community that is more likely to be a problem for 
vulnerable groups, such as young children and the elderly, whom CHCs were set up to 
represent. 
During the period of the internal market, Community Health Councils continued to 
represent vulnerable groups, but their mediation role was lessened as interest groups 
were becoming involved directly in local decisions.  They retained their rights to be 
consulted, but NHS-led involvement, such as citizens‟ juries increased, lessening the 
significance of input from the CHCs.  They continued to have a remit to comment upon 
health services across a geographical area, but also coordinated activity in opposition to 
national policy, notably on the Private Finance Initiative.  Having lost the right to agree 
local hospital closures, they were less likely to be in a position to take the blame for 
unpopular local decisions. 
Community Health Councils had much to celebrate in CHCs making a difference, 
but the emphasis placed on the breadth of activity did not accord with the proposal from 
Insight Management Consulting that the range of CHC activity should be reduced and 
focused on the statutory aspects of their role.  The Community Health Councils had had 
positive experiences of working with Labour, both when they were in power during the 
1970s and in opposition during the 1980s and 1990s (Hogg, 2009: 108).  With unresolved 
issues about the focus of their role, Community Health Council members would have 
looked forward with interest to the outcome of the 1997 General Election. 
 
4.4 Managing interests trends, 1974-1997 
Taking Community Health Councils as potential sheepdogs to round up 
participants and manage potential opposition, the institutions played a stronger role in 
political management of the NHS in the 1970s than they did in the 1990s.  The activities of 
Community Health Councils are considered over time against each of the sheepdog 
characteristics in Figure 4.1. 
The first period, from 1974 to1979, covers the early activity of Community Health 
Councils under Labour governments.  The appointments mechanisms that had been set 
up by the preceding Conservative administration ensured that groups representing 
vulnerable communities were members of CHCs and Labour Ministers referred issue-
specific groups to participate in health service discussions through their Community Health 
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Council, strengthening the local mediation role of CHCs.  The early CHCs had statutory 
rights to be consulted on local services within a state-determined geographical area.  
Granting the CHCs the powers to agree to the closure of local hospitals seems to have 
provided Ministers with a valued blame-avoidance mechanism.  Taken in the terms of the 
sheepdog model, Community Health Councils during the period 1974 to 1979 seem to 
have acted as sheepdogs and to have been valued by Ministers for this political role. 
Figure 4.1: Sheepdog – assessment of role played by Community Health 
Councils (CHCs), 1974-1997 
Sheepdog 
characteristics 
Early CHCs (1974-
1979) 
Middle period (1979-
1989) 
CHCs in internal 
market (1989-1997) 
Mediate between 
local interests, 
including vulnerable 
groups 
Appointments ensure 
vulnerable groups are 
represented in CHC; 
Issue-specific groups 
referred to CHCs 
Reduced numbers of 
members, but 
appointments ensure 
vulnerable interests 
represented in CHC 
Appointments ensure 
vulnerable groups are 
represented in CHC; 
Increasing direct 
involvement of 
voluntary sector 
Structure 
consultation on 
local services 
Right to be consulted 
on local changes 
Right to be consulted 
on local changes; 
Griffiths report 
encourages CHC 
gathering of 
consumer views 
Right to be consulted 
on local changes; 
Growth of NHS-led 
forms of consultation 
Consider only state-
determined range of 
issues 
Remit granted for 
health services in 
geographical area 
Remit granted for 
health services in 
geographical area; 
Criticised for national 
role in promoting The 
Black report 
Remit granted for 
health services in 
geographical area; 
Varying CHC views 
on Private Finance 
Initiative (PFI) and 
ACHCEW opposition 
to PFI 
Take responsibility 
for unpopular local 
decisions 
Hospital closure 
rights;  
Examples of CHCs 
blamed for decisions 
Hospital closure rights 
to 1985 
Not sufficiently 
powerful to be blamed 
for local decisions 
 
During the middle period, as presented in this chapter, from 1979 to 1989, the 
existence of Community Health Councils was challenged in the Patients first consultation 
and then the need for the Association of Community Health Councils for England and 
Wales was questioned in the Community Health Councils in England consultation.  These 
consultations could suggest that the statutory public involvement institutions were not 
actively valued by the incoming Conservative government.  In terms of mediation, the 
number of members in CHCs was reduced by statute, but the appointment processes 
continued to ensure that vulnerable groups were represented.  The CHCs retained their 
statutory rights to be consulted on changes to services.  In addition to the rights of CHCs 
to be consulted, NHS managers were encouraged to seek feedback from individual 
service users, although the NHS managers often sought this feedback through Community 
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Health Councils.  CHCs had a state-determined remit and were criticised for their role in 
promoting The Black report on health inequalities, suggesting that they were seen to be 
beginning to round up opposition rather than mediating interest group involvement.  The 
end of CHCs‟ rights to agree hospital closures meant that they were no longer acting as a 
means for Ministers to avoid blame for hospital closures.  During the 1980s, therefore, the 
sheepdog role of CHCs was weakened. 
The last of the three periods described in this chapter and summarised in Figure 
4.1 covered the NHS internal market, 1989 to 1997.  Community Health Councils retained 
their appointment structure and continued to include representatives of vulnerable groups.  
Their mediation role was reduced, however, by increasing Ministerial encouragement to 
NHS personnel to involve interest groups directly, particularly following the Local voices 
initiative (NHS Management Executive, 1992).  CHCs retained their statutory right to be 
consulted, but NHS organisations were also experimenting with new forms of consumer 
consultation.  The statutory public involvement institutions continued to be granted a state-
determined remit, but to operate outside their remit as well as within it.  The CHCs were no 
longer responsible for significant decisions, such as agreeing hospital closures and may 
not have been strong enough to enable Ministers to avoid taking the blame for unpopular 
decisions. 
During the 1970s, there is evidence that Community Health Councils were valued 
in the sheepdog role.  Over the course of the 1980s and 1990s, however, the powers that 
enabled CHCs to act as sheepdogs were reduced.  In the case of hospital closures, the 
power to agree the closures was removed.  The intermediation and consultation powers 
were effectively reduced through layering with other forms of involvement.  „Layering‟ of 
existing policies or institutions with new mechanisms is a recognised option for political 
actors if the existing tools no longer meet their needs (Hacker, 2004: 248).  It is possible, 
therefore, that Community Health Councils no longer operated effectively in sheepdog 
roles, but that they were too popular or too difficult to abolish, so Ministers created new 
processes to work around the Community Health Councils. 
The incoming Labour government of 1997 tackled the issue of abolishing 
Community Health Councils, choosing to replace them with Patient and Public Involvement 
Forums.  The successive changes to statutory public involvement institutions are the 
subject of Chapter Five, which continues to consider whether statutory public involvement 
institutions play a sheepdog role in the political management of the NHS. 
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Chapter summary 
Chapter Four opened by considering whether statutory public involvement 
institutions acted as „sheepdogs‟ in political management of the NHS, rounding up 
participants and managing potential opposition.  It covered the period from 1974 to 1997.  
During the 1970s, there is evidence that Labour Ministers valued the sheepdog role played 
by Community Health Councils, referring interest groups to them for mediation and 
granting powers to CHCs that meant they took the Ministers‟ share of the blame for the 
closure of local hospitals.  In the early 1980s, the Conservative government questioned the 
need for CHCs and progressively developed alternatives to their involvement as part of 
consumer input into general management of the NHS.  Throughout the period covered by 
this chapter, CHC members were appointed through a statutory process which ensured 
that vulnerable groups were represented, maintaining a forum through which 
intermediation could take place.  In practice, however, the powers that enabled CHCs to 
intermediate and manage potential opposition also enabled them to round up opposition to 
reforms, making them less valuable as sheepdogs. 
The next chapter continues to consider whether statutory public involvement 
institutions carried out a sheepdog role in political management of the NHS, reviewing the 
series of institutions during the period from 1997 to 2010. 
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Chapter Five: Changing breeds: abolitions and replacements, 
1997-2010 
Community Health Councils outlived all the other institutions introduced in the 1974 
NHS reorganisation.  Whilst their existence had been challenged, particularly in the 
Patients first and Community Health Councils in England consultations, their fundamental 
appointments structure and statutory rights, to be consulted and to enter and view NHS 
premises, remained unchanged.  The NHS plan in July 2000 brought the announcement 
that Community Health Councils were to be abolished and replaced by patients‟ forums, 
with the complaints functions that many CHCs had been undertaking transferred to 
Patients‟ Advice and Liaison Services (PALS).  Patients‟ forums, or Patient and Public 
Involvement Forums to use the title that was adopted for the forums in practice, were 
themselves abolished and replaced with Local Involvement Networks (LINks), to be 
replaced in their turn by local Healthwatch in April 2013.  Given the series of abolitions, 
Ministers had successive opportunities not to replace abolished statutory public 
involvement institutions with new institutions.  This chapter considers whether the 
successive statutory public involvement institutions were expected to undertake a 
sheepdog role in political management of the NHS and the sheepdog role was a factor in 
the series of reforms. 
The chapter opens with a discussion of the Community Health Councils following 
the election of a Labour government in 1997.  It considers the abolition of Community 
Health Councils in terms of a sheepdog role in political management of the NHS.  The 
second section reviews the role of Patient and Public Involvement Forums (PPI Forums) 
and their national body, the Commission for Patient and Public Involvement in Health 
(CPPIH).  Thirdly, the chapter considers Local Involvement Networks.  The chapter closes 
with a discussion of the trends observable in the changes to statutory public involvement 
institutions and whether changing understandings of the sheepdog role played a part in the 
institutional reforms. 
 
5.1     Last steps of the Community Health Councils, 1997-2003 
Experience of working with Labour politicians in Government and in opposition 
suggested that Community Health Council members had cause to be optimistic with the 
landslide victory of Blair‟s Labour government in 1997.  As Community Health Councils 
had struggled for Ministerial attention for much of the 1980s and 1990s, the new 
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Government was seen by many CHC members as an opportunity to raise the profile of 
public involvement in the NHS (Hogg, 2009: 108; Gerrard, 2006: 24).  Several different 
theories have been proposed to explain the Labour government‟s decision to abolish 
Community Health Councils, including a desire to create a customer service function, 
objections by CHCs to the use of the Private Finance Initiative to fund health facilities and 
relationships between individual Ministers and the CHCs in their constituencies (Gerrard, 
2006; Greer 2004a; Hogg, 2009).  This section considers public involvement when Labour 
first came to power and examines the abolition of Community Health Councils in England 
in the context of a sheepdog role to support political management of the NHS. 
 
Public involvement and New Labour 
On coming to power, the Labour party began a programme of reforming and 
modernising the National Health Service.  In place of local professional consensus on the 
treatments to be funded, the Labour party introduced the National Institute for Clinical 
Excellence (NICE).  NICE provided guidance on the clinical value and cost-effectiveness 
of drugs and treatment regimes, to be used as the basis of funding decisions.  The 
creation of NICE was followed by that of the Commission for Health Improvement, which 
was authorised to undertake clinical reviews of each NHS trust every four years.  NICE 
and the Commission for Health Improvement were key elements in the first clinical 
governance structure across the NHS in England and Wales.  The framework for clinical 
governance, A first class service, incorporated public involvement at all levels, from the 
expectation of NHS-led user involvement in local services to patient representatives sitting 
on NICE appraisal committees considering the merits of treatments (Department of Health, 
1998).  For the first time, public involvement was a core activity in the NHS.  The 
Department of Health produced a paper on Patient and public involvement in the new NHS 
[„new‟ italicised in the title], which outlined the benefits of patient and public involvement 
and emphasised the increasing role of users and carers in the Department of Health‟s 
work programmes (Department of Health, 1999).  In the foreword to Patient and public 
involvement in the new NHS, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State Gisela Stuart 
emphasised the importance of involving local people in decisions about local services as 
part of the modern NHS: 
„Since 1997 we have been engaged in a widespread programme of reforms to 
modernise the services which the NHS delivers.  Access to these services should 
be fast and convenient for the communities in which they are based. Fundamental 
to these reforms has been a commitment to give people at a local level the power 
to make decisions about the services that are needed.  This means involving all the 
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key stakeholders locally, in partnership with Health Authorities and health 
professionals.  Patients, carers, and the local public have a key role to play in this 
process.‟ (Department of Health, 1999: i; underline in the original) 
The emphasis on direct involvement of „all‟ key stakeholders is a shift, as Community 
Health Councils had been structured to be representative of the main interest groups and 
to act on the behalf of the local community in negotiations with NHS organisations.  
Expansion of public involvement into other areas of NHS activity and encouragement of 
health authorities to involve all stakeholders implicitly moved away from an interest 
intermediation role for the Community Health Councils.  The activity of CHCs is illustrated 
in case studies of public involvement within Patient and public involvement in the new 
NHS, but CHCs receive little attention in the document. 
With greater emphasis on a range of stakeholders, rather than interest 
intermediation, Community Health Councils had started to describe their membership in 
terms of their demographic profile, rather than the interest groups they represented.  
Whereas annual reports in the 1980s had listed the groups that the members represented 
(as an example, Tower Hamlets CHC in 1987 listed the very local organisations that were 
represented, including Tower Hamlets Welfare for the Mentally Handicapped and the 
League of Friends of Mildmay Mission Hospital), CHCs listed age groups represented, the 
numbers of people who were patients and the specialisations of the interest group 
experience contributed by individual members (as an example, Rochdale CHC, 2003: 3).  
In response to the requirement from 1996 that establishing bodies should consider the 
membership profile of CHCs, individual Community Health Councils were beginning to 
represent their activities in ways that met a change in the agenda that recognised 
demographic representativeness and inclusion of members from vulnerable communities, 
rather than representatives from groups for vulnerable communities.   
Community Health Councils were in a mood for reform, but the long period outside 
the spotlight of Ministerial attention had allowed problems within the Association of 
Community Health Councils for England and Wales and across the CHC movement to 
simmer (Hogg, 2009: 109).  Donna Covey was appointed as Director of ACHCEW in 1998.  
She took an energetic stance in raising the profile of Community Health Councils.  Covey 
set up an All-Party Parliamentary Group on CHCs, which in 1999 had 240 MPs as 
members, many of whom had previously been members of CHCs (Hogg, 2009: 110).  She 
also set up an independent Commission on the NHS, chaired by Will Hutton.  The 
Commission on the NHS organised a randomised public poll and found that 63 percent of 
the population regarded the NHS as the most important institution in the country, with the 
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next highest scores for Parliament (12 percent) and the police (11 percent) (Hutton, 2000: 
1).  Such findings were used in reports and media releases to raise the profile of 
ACHCEW.  The independent Commission on the NHS also recommended that Community 
Health Councils should be strengthened and that public involvement should be 
represented by CHCs as they could work across a broad range of interests, not the „ginger 
group‟ activity of issue-specific voluntary organisations (Hutton, 2000: 93, 96).   
Whilst ACHCEW was continuing to emphasise the value of intermediation between 
interest groups, voluntary sector organisations themselves were becoming more 
influential.  A compact was set up between Government and the voluntary sector to 
encourage partnership working (Secretary of State for the Home Department, 1998).  The 
Government also wanted to hear consumer views directly and organised „the biggest ever 
listening exercise‟, including a „census day‟ for the NHS on 31 May 2000 (Hogg, 2009: 
110).  To support the census day, 12 million survey forms were distributed through shops, 
pharmacies and NHS services.  Alan Milburn, Secretary of State for Health, launched the 
census day and promoted it as an opportunity for individuals to have their views heard: 
„We now have a once in a lifetime opportunity to use the extra resources that this 
Government is putting into the NHS to create a 21st century NHS where the needs 
of the patient come first.  The time has come to have an NHS where the patients 
are listened to and not talked at, which is why we are launching this huge national 
public consultation exercise that will involve staff as well as patients.  …This is a 
genuine commitment to not just consult, but to listen and act upon the views of the 
public.‟ (Alan Milburn, in: Department of Health, 2000a) 
Feedback from the census day was provided to the modernisation action teams, each of 
which, to quote the press release, „has at least one representative of a patient organisation 
on it‟ (Department of Health, 2000a).  It was against this context of increasing involvement 
by issue-specific voluntary organisations in national policy and direct consultation of the 
public that ACHCEW and the CHCs learned that they were to be abolished. 
 
Abolition of Community Health Councils in England 
The Conservative governments in the 1980s had consulted on whether Community 
Health Councils were needed, but the strength of support was such that they did not 
disband them.  The Labour government, however, was prepared to risk any unpopularity 
arising from abolishing Community Health Councils (Hogg, 2009: 112). 
The NHS plan presented three elements from the work undertaken by Community 
Health Councils to be transferred to other organisations.  The complaints work, which was 
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not a statutory function of the CHCs, was to be transferred to a new category of paid 
officials within NHS trusts, the Patient Advocacy and Liaison Services (later renamed, after 
much debate with interest groups, Patient Advice and Liaison Services) (Secretary of State 
for Health, 2000: 92).  As discussed in Chapter Six, depriving statutory public involvement 
institutions of intelligence gleaned from complaints lessened their ability to act as 
watchdogs and alert authorities to problems before they became disasters.  Secondly, the 
power to refer major planned changes to the Secretary of State was to be transferred  
„from unelected community health councils to the all-party scrutiny committees of elected 
local authorities‟, although successive statutory public involvement institutions could still 
refer issues to the Secretary of State through the local authority Overview and Scrutiny 
Committee (2000: 94).  Thirdly, the representation and consultation role, including „the 
right to visit and inspect any aspect of the trust‟s care at any time‟ was to be transferred to 
„Patients‟ Forums‟ (later known as Patient and Public Involvement Forums) (2000: 94).  
The statutory aspects of the Community Health Councils‟ activity, therefore, were being 
passed on to the new PPI Forums.  As groups of volunteers with statutory powers, it is the 
PPI Forums that formed the successors to Community Health Councils as statutory public 
involvement institutions.   
In case there was any doubt about a role remaining for CHCs, the section of The 
NHS plan on „changes for patients‟ closed with confirmation that Community Health 
Councils would be abolished: 
„This is a package of radical reform. It will enhance and encourage the involvement 
of citizens in redesigning the health service from the patient‟s point of view.  As a 
result Community Health Councils will be abolished and funding redirected to help 
fund the new Patient Advocate and Liaison Service and the other new citizens 
empowerment mechanisms set out above.‟ (Secretary of State for Health, 2000: 
95) 
„Redesigning the health service from the patient‟s point of view‟ is a very different form of 
consultation from the intermediation between interests that the Community Health 
Councils provided in their sheepdog role.  The reference in the text is to „the patient‟s view‟ 
in the singular, suggesting that this redesigning is less of a deliberative process and more 
a collation of individual views to be incorporated by NHS personnel into plans for service 
development.  The rationale given within The NHS plan for the change is that Community 
Health Councils had combined distinct functions and that „it is time to modernise, deepen 
and broaden the way that patient views are represented within the NHS‟ (Secretary of 
State for Health, 2000: 93). 
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Viewed in terms of the sheepdog role, the Labour government was shifting from 
public involvement as intermediation between interest groups to a greater degree of direct 
engagement with patients and citizens.  Whilst half of CHC members were appointed by 
local authorities, a third by voluntary organisations and a sixth by the NHS, most of the 
members were representatives of interest groups.  The new PPI Forums were intended to 
attract new members who were not already involved in voluntary groups or civic activity.  
As envisaged at the time of The NHS plan, half of the members would be „drawn from local 
patients groups and voluntary organisations‟ and „the other half of the Forum‟s members 
will be randomly drawn from respondents to the trust‟s annual patient survey‟ (Secretary of 
State for Health, 2000: 94).  This suggests a half-way house between interest 
intermediation and a membership intended to represent current users of hospital services.  
In practice, as outlined in the discussion of Patient and Public Involvement Forums below, 
the mix of interest representation and patients appointed as individuals was not 
implemented. 
In terms of the state-determined remit, a much narrower role was imposed by the 
state: Community Health Councils covered health services across a geographical area, 
whereas Patient and Public Involvement Forums were limited to activity with a particular 
NHS trust, whether a hospital or a Primary Care Trust.  The PPI Forums were therefore 
seen as needing to have a closer relationship with NHS trusts.  Alan Milburn later 
suggested that this close relationship with NHS trusts had been seen as a solution to 
problems identified by the Bristol Royal Infirmary inquiry (which was then in progress): 
„I took the decision to abolish CHCs because I took the view that patients needed 
to have a voice inside the National Health Service.  As you know this was the point 
that was made very forcibly by Professor Sir Ian Kennedy in his inquiry into the 
tragic events at Bristol Royal Infirmary.  …I could never understand the arguement 
of those who said that the proposal to abolish CHCs would somehow weaken 
patients‟ presence in the NHS.  In fact, the reforms that I put in place – both 
organisationally in terms of patients‟ forums etc., and institutionally in terms of 
patients being able to express a choice about where they are treated, when and by 
whom – represented a real strengthening of patient power in the Health Service.‟ 
(Alan Milburn, in: Gerrard, 2006: 270-271) 
The emphases in Milburn‟s account are on placing involvement within the NHS and on the 
involvement of individual patients, rather than the involvement of interest groups or 
mechanisms to manage interest groups.  A remit within the NHS placed the Patient and 
Public Involvement Forums in a position where they might influence the attitudes of health 
professionals within specific institutions.  In the period leading up to the abolition of 
Community Health Councils, there had been a series of events resulting in public inquiries 
that revolved around the attitudes of health professionals: over-confidence of staff using 
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new surgical techniques resulting in the deaths of babies at Bristol; and ethically-
questionable retention of organs from dead children at Alder Hey (Secretary of State for 
Health, 2001; Royal Liverpool Children‟s Inquiry, 2001).  As a solution to a political 
problem, restricting the remit of statutory public involvement institutions to a specific NHS 
trust may have been seen as a means to develop more patient-centred attitudes towards 
clinical practice. 
Considered in terms of the sheepdog role, the abolition of Community Health 
Councils may have been a means to limit mobilisation of opposition.  Whilst the CHC 
movement was fragile, it could mobilise on specific issues.  Since 1998, Community Health 
Councils had been working with ACHCEW to produce Casualty Watch reports: the 
majority of CHCs took part in Casualty Watch (in 2000, 176 of 181 Community Health 
Councils took part), visiting Accident and Emergency units during the same 24 hour period 
and monitoring how long people had to wait before they were seen (ACHCEW, 2000a).  
The data from the Casualty Watch visits were compiled very rapidly and produced reports 
that drew media attention to shortcomings in health services.  Abolishing CHCs and 
ACHCEW therefore muzzled a voice that could be oppositional.     
The Community Health Councils demonstrated their ability to mobilise opposition in 
their response to the announcement that they were to be abolished.  They objected to the 
new proposals on the grounds that they lacked special provision for representation of 
vulnerable groups and that the new PPI Forums would be too close to NHS trusts for their 
inspections to be seen as objective (ACHCEW, 2000b: unpaginated [1]).  Parliamentary 
contacts of the Community Health Councils were drawn into the debate, with the result that 
the arrangements for the replacement of CHCs did not appear as planned in the Health 
and Social Care Act 2001, but were delayed and incorporated into the NHS Reform and 
Health Care Professions Act 2002.  Wider duties requiring NHS organisations to consult 
the public were included in the Health and Social Care Act 2001, as discussed below, 
which duplicated the rights of Community Health Councils to be consulted in their last 
months of existence.  The Parliamentary debates on the nature of the Patient and Public 
Involvement Forums clarified their statutory powers and led to the inclusion of a national 
body, the Commission for Patient and Public Involvement in Health (CPPIH) in the 
legislation. 
With devolution of responsibility for the National Health Service in Wales to the 
National Assembly for Wales in 1999, decisions relating to Community Health Councils in 
Wales were handled by the National Assembly.  In April 2000, a new federal model for 
Community Health Councils was established, enabling CHCs to collaborate regionally 
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(Assembly Secretary for Health and Social Services, 2000a: §7.5).  Jane Hutt, Assembly 
Secretary for Health and Social Services, announced on 12 July 2000 that she had 
commissioned a review of CHCs (Assembly Secretary for Health and Social Services, 
2000a: §7.5).  Jane Hutt‟s response to The NHS plan, when it came out on 27 July, was to 
frame it as being „for England‟ and that „ideas‟ within it needed to be shaped into „an 
approach that is right for us‟ (Assembly Secretary for Health and Social Services, 2000b: 
§1-5).  The NHS plan was a wide-ranging document and Hutt‟s only specific example of an 
area of activity that might be different in Wales was the proposed abolition of Community 
Health Councils (Assembly Secretary for Health and Social Services, 2000b: §6-7).  The 
decision to retain CHCs in Wales was announced within Improving Health in Wales, the 
plan for the NHS in Wales (National Assembly for Wales, 2001).   
The situation in Wales differed from that in England when considered in terms of 
interest group management.  With a smaller national population, fewer people were likely 
to get involved in activities and there was the potential for individual interest group 
representatives to be very influential.  The Welsh review of CHCs concluded that „CHCs‟ 
strengths lie in their statutory status and their ability to represent the interests of the public, 
free from any vested interest‟ (Health and Social Services Committee, 2001: 45).  There 
was therefore perceived to be a need for intermediation between interest groups, to avoid 
dominance by any of the issue-specific groups.  The Welsh Community Health Councils 
also had a reputation for adopting a less oppositional style than CHCs in England38.  They 
were therefore less likely to mobilise opposition. 
 
Changes to consultation and referral rights 
The Health and Social Care Act 2001 Section 11 introduced a duty for the NHS to 
consult the public on decisions relating to planning, providing and potentially changing 
health services, a process which became known as Section 11 consultations.  Rather than 
a privileged right of the Community Health Councils to be consulted, the new duty referred 
to consulting „persons to whom those services are being or may be provided‟ and that 
patients and potential patients should be consulted or involved „directly or through 
representatives‟ (Health and Social Care Act 2001, Section 11).  This places the decision 
on who should be consulted with the NHS organisation, rather than giving statutory public 
involvement institutions a statutory right to be consulted.  The reference to the consultation 
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 Source: Interview with Malcolm Alexander, former Director of the Association of Community Health 
Councils for England and Wales 
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as „directly or through representatives‟ means that individual users of health services or 
their representatives, such as voluntary organisations, may be consulted.  The withdrawal 
of a statutory right to be consulted weakened the position of Community Health Councils in 
their last months and the position of their successors.  Whether or not the statutory public 
involvement institutions were included in the Section 11 consultations depended upon 
local influence, rather than nationally-granted rights.  
Connected to rights to be consulted, Community Health Councils had the right to 
refer disputed plans to the Secretary of State.  This right was transferred to the Overview 
and Scrutiny Committees within local authorities: 
„In any case where an Overview and Scrutiny Committee considers that the 
proposal would not be in the interests of the health service in the area of the 
committee‟s local authority it may report to the Secretary of State in writing who 
may make a final decision on the proposal and require the local NHS body to take 
such action, or desist from taking such action as he may direct.‟ (Local Authority 
(Overview and Scrutiny Committees Health Functions) Regulations 2002) 
Successors to CHCs were able to refer problems to the Secretary of State through their 
Overview and Scrutiny Committee (or through the Commission for Patient and Public 
Involvement in Health in the case of PPI Forums), but did not have the right to refer 
problems directly.  When Community Health Councils objected to proposals for health 
service changes, as discussed in Chapter Four, they were expected to provide a costed 
alternative proposal when referring a case to the Secretary of State.  As part of the 
broader Section 11 consultation, statutory public involvement institutions might choose to 
generate alternative proposals, but this was neither an automatic right nor a requirement.  
Successors to Community Health Councils were granted rights to refer unresolved issues 
to the Overview and Scrutiny Committee of the relevant local authority, but they were then 
dependent on the determination of the committee as to whether an issue should be 
referred on to the Secretary of State. 
Discussion in Chapter Four suggested that the right to be consulted, particularly 
once extended by the 1974 Labour government into a right to agree local hospital 
closures, provided evidence of the blame-avoidance aspects of the sheepdog model.  In 
2000, the Blair government announced the largest real-terms increase in funding that the 
National Health Service had seen (Secretary of State for Health, 2000).  This did not 
mean, however, that difficult decisions did not need to be made, as additional funding was 
conditional on modernisation.  Health services were also becoming more costly, with new 
technologies and more people living longer with complex health service needs.  Reflecting 
in 2003 on the experience of Central and South Birmingham CHCs, David Spilsbury 
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commented that „in most cases, the general public objected to change‟ and that „there 
were many instances where the CHC‟s intervention proved necessary and welcome to 
improve the situation‟ (n.d. [2003]: 46, 47).  As sheepdogs, the Community Health 
Councils had acted as mechanisms to manage opposition to change.  With the loss of 
privileged consultation rights and the transfer to Overview and Scrutiny Committees of the 
right to refer proposals to the Secretary of State, successors to Community Health 
Councils were in a weaker position and less likely to act as tools to shift blame for changes 
away from Ministers. 
 
5.2     Patient and Public Involvement Forums, 2003-2008 
Community Health Councils were replaced with PPI Forums in December 2003.  
The PPI Forums were established by the Commission for Patient and Public Involvement 
in Health (CPPIH).  As CPPIH played a fundamental role in setting up the Patient and 
Public Involvement Forums (PPI Forums) and setting the parameters for their activity, this 
section opens by considering the role played by the Commission for Patient and Public 
Involvement in Health.  The section continues with a review of the nature of the 
membership of PPI Forums, the activity of the Forums (particularly in terms of whether 
they played a sheepdog role) and the abolition of both CPPIH and the PPI Forums. 
 
Commission for Patient and Public Involvement in Health (CPPIH) 
The Commission for Patient and Public Involvement in Health was set up in 
January 2003 as an independent, non-departmental public body, sponsored by the 
Department of Health.  It was given statutory duties to appoint members of the PPI Forums 
and to facilitate the co-ordination of activity by PPI Forums, including making 
arrangements for staff to support the volunteers in each Forum (NHS Reform and Health 
Care Professions Act 2002 Section 15(2); Commission for Patient and Public Involvement 
in Health (Functions) Regulations 2002).  The Commission was also given wider 
responsibilities for promoting patient and public involvement within the NHS and to act as 
a national voice for the public.  Prior to their dissolution, the Community Health Councils 
had campaigned hard for a national organisation that would be able to have a national 
voice (Hogg, 2009: 120). 
The name for the Forums in legislation was „Patients‟ Forums‟.  More inclusively, 
but confusingly, the CPPIH referred to the Forums as „Patient and Public Involvement 
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Forums‟, which is the title used here for consistency with documentation produced by the 
CPPIH and the PPI Forums themselves.  Members of staff from the Community Health 
Councils were disappointed to find that CPPIH had decided to ask voluntary and non-profit 
organisations to tender to act as forum support organisations, rather than employing staff 
directly to provide support to the PPI Forums.  People who had been employed to support 
CHCs had expected to have an opportunity to be appointed to posts supporting the new 
Forums and the decision to contract-out support for the PPI Forums alienated ACHCEW 
and the CHCs during their final months of operation (Hogg, 2009: 128). 
As a national organisation that coordinated communication and provided a national 
voice for patients and the public, the Commission for Patient and Public Involvement in 
Health acted as the peak organisation and intermediary on the behalf of the individual 
Patient and Public Involvement Forums.  The Commission had the potential to act as an 
intermediary with national issue-specific organisations, but this aspect of its role did not 
have sufficient time to flourish, particularly as the decision was taken to abolish the 
Commission for Patient and Public Involvement in Health as part of the Department of 
Health‟s review of arm‟s-length bodies in July 2004.  Mechanisms were considered for 
alternative support structures for the PPI Forums after the abolition of CPPIH, but 
successive extensions were given to the life of CPPIH and it continued for the duration of 
the PPI Forums. 
The Commission for Patient and Public Involvement in Health was successful in 
recruiting and sustaining sufficient volunteers for the PPI Forum network, including 
meeting the initial deadline of 4,000 members for 572 PPI Forums by 30 November 2003 
(Hogg, 2009: 134).  Members were recruited as individuals, rather than as representatives 
of interest groups.  This marked a shift away from the local intermediation role and 
changed the nature of representation of vulnerable groups. 
 
Members of Patient and Public Involvement Forums 
The first references to the membership structures for the PPI Forums, as discussed 
above, came in The NHS plan, which stated that half of the members would be „drawn 
from local patients groups and voluntary organisations‟ and half „randomly drawn from 
respondents to the trust‟s annual patient survey‟ (Secretary of State for Health, 2000: 94).  
This would have given a mix of interest group representation with participation by 
individual patients.  Whilst this was not the model that was implemented, it gives an 
indication that from the outset there was a wish to bring new participants into public 
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involvement.  Within the Statutory Instrument for the membership of the PPI Forums, they 
were expected to have at least seven members, the majority of whom would be current or 
former patients of the NHS trust to which they were attached and at least one of whom 
would be a member or representative of a voluntary organisation (Patients‟ Forums 
(Membership and Procedure) Regulations 2003).  In the case of PPI Forums for Primary 
Care Trusts, the regulations stipulated that in addition to the seven patients or former 
patients, the PCT-based PPI Forums needed to include a representative from the PPI 
Forums for each of the NHS trusts (principally hospitals, but also trusts for mental health 
and ambulance services) within the district of their Primary Care Trust.  At the discretion of 
the Commission, a PCT-based PPI Forum could also include a representative of any body 
„which represents members of the public in the Primary Care Trust‟s area in matters 
relating to their health‟ (Patients‟ Forums (Membership and Procedure) Regulations 2003). 
Prior to the establishment of the Commission for Patient and Public Involvement in 
Health, Ministers had indicated that they wanted to encourage people from communities 
who had not traditionally been involved to be a part of the PPI Forums: 
„We want to ensure not only that people respond to an advertisement but that we 
seek out people from communities who, traditionally, have not put themselves 
forward.  That is easier said than done.  In many cases, people will need 
encouragement, support, training, advice and back-up to come forward and feel 
that they can be part of the Patients‟ Forum.  That is very different and a much 
more proactive approach – not simply issuing an advertisement, waiting for people 
to apply and allowing a very self-selecting group to come forward to be part of our 
public involvement, but going out to deprived, maginalised, excluded communities 
that, traditionally, have not been part of running our services and making those 
decisions.‟ (Hazel Blears, Parliamentary Under Secretary for Health, HC Deb 
(2001-02) 386 col. 321) 
Encouraging people who are not part of „a very self-selecting group‟ to be involved does 
not treat statutory public involvement institutions as a sheepdog to manage local interest 
groups‟ participation in decision-making processes. 
The Commission for Patient and Public Involvement put a great deal of energy into 
recruiting people who did not have experience of involvement in voluntary organisations or 
other civic activity; they avoided the „usual suspects‟ (Hogg, 2009: 5).  The Commission 
developed a recruitment campaign that was deliberately aimed at people who had not 
previously been involved.  As illustrated in Figure 5.1, the campaign used the image of a 
runner in a superchicken suit and presented the message, „ordinary people only – experts 
and chickens need not apply‟.  The implication was that the Commission was trying to 
attract ordinary users of health services, rather than people who were involved in voluntary 
organisations (who might, in terms of the superchicken image, have undertaken 
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fundraising activities in fancy dress) and those who might regard themselves as „experts‟ 
in public involvement.   
The strategy was successful in bringing people into PPI Forums who had not been 
involved in voluntary organisations or CHCs previously.  Of the members of PPI Forums: a 
third had not volunteered previously; a third had volunteered previously, but not in health; 
and a third had volunteered in health in the past (Martin, 2008: 45).  Within the third who 
had volunteered in health, most had been involved in Community Health Councils – with 
perhaps a quarter of the overall membership being people who had been either CHC 
members or staff supporting CHCs39.   The Commission was successful in both recruiting 
and retaining PPI Forum members.  Despite the uncertainties with the abolition of CPPIH 
and later the abolition of the PPI Forums, there were still 4,250 members in place towards 
the end of 2007, of whom over 2,500 had been members of PPI Forums for over two years 
(CPPIH, 2007a: 21).  The ratio of men and women was similar to that in the general 
population, with 48 percent male and 52 percent female members (2007a: 21).  The 
Forum members also had 6 percent of members who classed themselves as Asian, 4 
percent who classed themselves as black or African and 3 percent regarded themselves 
as white but not British (2007a: 21).  The Commission did not report the age profile of the 
members; Hogg alludes to 55 percent of members being over 65 years of age and only 10 
percent under 45 years, although she does not cite her source (2009: 147).  In terms of 
bringing in new volunteers, the Commission‟s finding that a third of the PPI Forum 
members were new to volunteering and a third had not volunteered in health previously 
indicated that it was very successful (Martin, 2008: 45). 
The PPI Forums did not formally represent interest groups or mediate between 
them, so they did not report their membership in terms of the affiliation of PPI Forum 
members to interest groups.  Representation of vulnerable groups was discussed in terms 
of numbers of people from different communities, rather than interest groups representing 
vulnerable groups.  They were not formally set up with an intermediation remit.  In practice, 
as discussed below, the PPI Forums worked closely with interest groups.   
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 Source: Interview with Leslie Forsyth, formerly Director of Operations for the Commission for Patient and 
Public Involvement in Health 
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Figure 5.1:  Recruitment flyer for PPI Forum Members 
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Activity by PPI Forums 
The PPI Forums worked on projects with local voluntary organisations, monitored 
existing services and mobilised opposition to changes.  Not having the consultation 
responsibilities of Community Health Councils, they were able to generate petitions and 
set up campaigns without having to take responsibility for agreeing hospital closures or 
producing a costed alternative to disputed proposals. 
When the PPI Forums undertook activity that had national significance, they 
referred issues to the Secretary of State through the Commission for Patient and Public 
Involvement in Health, rather than through local Overview and Scrutiny Committees.  In 
this sense, the CPPIH undertook the national intermediary role that the Association of 
Community Health Councils for England and Wales had rejected.  The activities on which 
CPPIH acted as an intermediary for the PPI Forums tended to relate to the needs of 
minority groups: 
„The London Network of Mental Health PPI Forums and the London Ambulance 
PPI Forum were successful in their request to the Secretary of State for Health to 
extend the consultation on the race equality implications of the proposed Mental 
Health Bill.  In November 2005, the Forums agreed to ask the Chair of the 
Commission, Sharon Grant, to write to the Secretary of State for Health requesting 
further consultation on the Race Equality Impact Assessment of the Mental Health 
Bill.  The Forums raised concerns that the proposed Bill would have detrimental 
implications for black and minority ethnic communities.‟ (Commission for Patient 
and Public Involvement in Health, 2006: 6) 
In its commentary on this case, CPPIH alluded to the need for time to build up the 
networks to develop more of this type of activity (2006: 6).  The eleven PPI Forums for 
mental health trusts in London went on to produce “Unheard voices”: listening to refugees 
and asylum seekers in the planning and delivery of mental health provision in London 
(CPPIH, n.d. [approx 2006]).  The “Unheard voices” report was praised by the All Party 
Parliamentary Group on Refugees and welcomed both for its content and its 
recommendations (CPPIH, 2007a: 8).  The report was published and presented by the 
Commission on behalf of the PPI Forums, reflecting the Commission‟s national 
intermediary role. 
Ministerial comments and the actions of CPPIH supported the recruitment of 
individuals who were not associated with interest-specific voluntary organisations; 
nonetheless, the PPI Forums worked with local and national voluntary organisations.  
Whereas the membership structure for Community Health Councils had restricted direct 
involvement to local voluntary organisations or organisations with specific interests in local 
NHS institutions, the PPI Forums did not have allocated relationships with local groups 
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and could call in national voluntary organisations to contribute towards specific activities.  
In Milton Keynes, the Primary Care Trust PPI Forum brought in support from a national 
programme operated by Age Concern to strengthen their opposition to the closure of a 
local podiatry service: 
„Milton Keynes PCT PPI Forum helped to halt the closure of a podiatry service in 
Milton Keynes, after responding to the consultation initiated by the Milton Keynes 
Primary Care Trust. … The Forum discussed the issue with various local voluntary 
and statutory organisations and found that many felt that the podiatry services were 
needed.  The Forum called in Age Concern, which offers advice on podiatry 
programmes around the country, to ask their opinion on how the closure of the 
service would affect patients.  Together they met with the PCT to ask them to 
reconsider the steps they were taking.  The Forum made the case that the costs 
saved from withdrawing podiatry services were negligible but the effect on the 
public was huge.  As a result, Milton Keynes PCT agreed to withdraw their 
proposals and to fill some of the existing vacancies in order to create a proper and 
efficiently run service.‟ (Commission for Patient and Public Involvement in Health, 
2007a: 11-12) 
The example from Milton Keynes demonstrates that the PPI Forums worked with interest 
groups both locally and nationally.  It also shows that the PPI Forum was able to 
coordinate opposition to a service closure.  Within the newsletter for PPI Forums, Forum 
Focus, there is a wide range of examples of PPI Forums mobilising opposition.  Redbridge 
Primary Care PPI Forum held a public meeting, attended by 150 members of the public, 
two Members of Parliament, three local councillors and the Chair of Redbridge PCT, to 
raise concerns about changes to local services, including downgrading of the local 
Accident and Emergency service.  This meeting resulted in the MPs leading petitions to 
oppose the changes (CPPIH, 2007b).  Derbyshire County PPI Forum started a petition to 
save Heanor Minor Injuries Unit from closure, leading the activity of local residents and 
community groups (CPPIH, 2007c).   
There are also examples of PPI Forums working with a range of agencies to find 
funding to retain or reopen services.  The Poole Hospital PPI Forum lobbied the trust‟s 
Executive Committee to consider re-opening a hydrotherapy pool and worked with the 
League of Friends and physiotherapy department to raise the funds for the pool (CPPIH, 
2007d).  The Mid Staffordshire General Hospitals NHS Trust PPI Forum and the Cannock 
Chase PCT PPI Forum set up a working group to improve public transport between the 
Mid Staffordshire General and Cannock Chase hospitals.  Their activity was spurred by 
comments from patients that they could not get to their appointments on time due to poor 
public transport.  The PPI Forums persuaded the local council and the Arriva bus company 
to invest jointly in a bus service running between the two hospitals (CPPIH, 2007e).  This 
was a very laudable activity, but at the Mid Staffordshire General Hospital, shortly to 
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become the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust, there were more significant issues 
that needed to be identified in 2006 to 2007, which are discussed in Chapter Six.  The 
creation of the new bus services demonstrates, nonetheless, the ability of PPI Forums to 
collaborate with each other and with other organisations to identify sources of funding for 
services. 
The appointment of individuals rather than representatives of organisations as 
members of PPI Forums meant that the Forums did not have a formal sheepdog role in the 
sense of mediating between local interest groups.  The examples above demonstrate that 
they would mobilise activity, including involving national organisations in the case of the 
podiatry services in Milton Keynes.  Without a specific interests intermediation role, PPI 
Forums worked with interest groups in a far less structured fashion than Community 
Health Councils had done.  In evidence presented to the House of Commons Health 
Committee for its 2007 inquiry into public involvement in the NHS, the Health Advocacy 
Partnership suggested that the low numbers of people involved in each PPI Forum „often 
result in Forums being exposed to “political”, “interest”, and even personal agendas‟ 
(House of Commons Health Committee, 2007b: Ev102).  Considered from an interests 
intermediation perspective, the PPI Forums, with a legal minimum of seven members and 
an average of eight members (CPPIH, 2006:12), were not in a position to moderate the 
influence of interest groups or to manage potential opposition to reforms.  
 
Abolition of PPI Forums 
The Department of Health announced in July 2004 that the Commission for Patient 
and Public Involvement in Health was being abolished, following a review of arm‟s-length 
bodies.  This placed the PPI Forums in a vulnerable position.  The PPI Forums were still 
newly established, having started to operate in December 2003.  The Department of 
Health considered options for the support of PPI Forums after the closure of CPPIH (Hogg, 
2004).  The future of public involvement became incorporated into the consultation on the 
future of health services that culminated in the White Paper Our health, our care, our say 
in January 2006.  Our health, our care, our say presented a more integrated approach to 
health and social care services, including encouraging social care as well as health 
professionals to involve the public (Secretary of State for Health, 2006: 159).  This 
integrated approach did not match the trust-specific remit of the PPI Forums within the 
NHS. 
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Our health, our care, our say pledged the completion of „our existing fundamental 
review designed to strengthen the arrangements for ensuring a strong local voice in health 
and social care by April 2006‟ (Secretary of State for Health, 2006: 160).  This 
„fundamental review‟ took the form of an expert panel.  Neither the Commission nor the 
PPI Forums were represented within the expert panel, although they were able to provide 
evidence for consideration.  The expert panel was co-chaired by Harry Cayton, National 
Director for Patients and the Public at the Department of Health, and Ed Mayo from the 
National Consumer Council.  The organisations represented covered both health and 
social care, including the Healthcare Commission, the Local Government Association and 
the Commission for Social Care Inspection.  Rather than individual patient groups, the 
voluntary sector was represented by two membership organisations for voluntary 
organisations, the Long-Term Conditions Alliance and the National Council for Voluntary 
Organisations.  The two membership organisations were effectively being used as national 
intermediaries for the voluntary sector. 
The expert panel announced its recommendations in May 2006.  The panel 
considered some of the broader issues around public involvement, including whether the 
pledge of greater individual choice for patients meant that they would still need to have the 
support of collective voice (Department of Health, 2006a: 2).  The recommendations 
included the need for a stronger national voice as well as a stronger voice in local service 
planning, operating across both health and social care (2006a: 4, 5, 8).  The panel felt that 
a more flexible approach needed to be taken to what it meant for people to be involved, so 
that people could contribute when they were able to do so rather than having the regular 
commitment of committee meetings, and there would be a mixture of individuals and 
organisations engaged in what the panel described as „local involvement networks‟ 
(2006a: 5).  In terms of powers, the panel felt that the new organisations should have the 
statutory powers of the PPI Forums, although they were not convinced that the 
organisations themselves should be statutory (2006a: 7).  These were recommendations 
from an expert panel, rather than a binding commitment.  As a panel that had been co-
chaired by the National Director for Patients and the Public, however, the findings were 
likely to have weight. 
In July 2006, the Department of Health announced the abolition of PPI Forums and 
their replacement with Local Involvement Networks (LINks).  In keeping with the direction 
of Our health, our care, our say and the recommendations of the expert panel, the Local 
Involvement Networks would operate across social care as well as health care.  The 
proposals for LINks were outlined in A stronger local voice (Department of Health, 2006b).  
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The document, issued „for information and comment‟ rather than consultation, introduced: 
more explicit duties for Overview and Scrutiny Committees and commissioners; clearer 
roles for public involvement in regulation; the new Local Involvement Networks; and the 
option for national voluntary organisations to work together to create a networked body at 
national level that would liaise with the Government.  The creation of Local Involvement 
Networks was therefore part of a broader package of reforms that integrated public 
involvement across health and social care. 
Ann Keen, who oversaw part of the implementation of Local Involvement Networks, 
described the transition from PPI Forums to Local Involvement Networks in terms of 
changing the remit to cover both social care and health: 
„The Government wants everyone to be able to have their say about local health 
and social care services and have the ability to influence how they are run.  A 
patients‟ forum can scrutinise health services, but not social care services run by 
local councils.  Forums could be more representative – they only have a few 
thousand members across England, when the NHS has tens of millions of patients.  
LINks will build on the good work of the forums and will have similar powers to hold 
local services to account.  However, they will be larger and will aim to represent 
everyone in the community.  Importantly LINks will cover all publicly-funded 
services in an area – no matter who provides them – and should provide a one-
stop shop for care professionals who want to talk to the community and vice versa.‟ 
(Ann Keen, Parliamentary Under Secretary for Health, in: Commission for Patient 
and Public Involvement in Health, 2007f) 
Considered in terms of the sheepdog role, part of the value to Ministers of state-sponsored 
institutions is that the remit of the organisations can be changed to address perceived 
political issues.  As presented by Ann Keen, and drawing on the recommendations of the 
expert panel, a problem to be addressed was that individuals use both health and social 
care services and so they need a single mechanism to hold those services to account.   
Keen also referred to a desire for the public involvement institutions to be more 
representative of the population as a whole.  When asked to present evidence on the 
changes to the House of Commons Health Committee‟s 2007 inquiry into public 
involvement in the NHS, the Department of Health used the unrepresentative membership 
of PPI Forums as a rationale for the transition to LINks: 
„The Department of Health believes that PPIfs [PPI Forums] fail to represent their 
communities.  First, too few people are members of forums. The average for the 
country is 8 per forum.  Moreover, those people who are members tend to be older 
adults, often retired. There are relatively few participants from non-white 
backgrounds. This means that the views of working adults, those with young 
families and from black and minority ethnic groups are poorly represented.‟ (House 
of Commons Health Committee, 2007a: 28) 
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The Commission for Patient and Public Involvement in Health had taken steps to recruit 
people from a wide range of backgrounds.  People who were prepared to commit to being 
members of a Forum, with the associated expectations that they would attend meetings 
and inspect services, would be likely to be unrepresentative of the community at large, as 
they had both time and sufficient interest in health services to participate.  Community 
Health Councils had also been criticised for being unrepresentative of the population 
(House of Commons Health Committee, 2003: 4).  As state-sponsored forms of 
participation, the state was in a position to define and re-define the nature of the 
representation, whether of interest groups or of a sample of the population. 
The PPI Forums did not have the interest group structure or the powers to 
moderate opposition to reform.  As the examples of activity showed, the PPI Forums 
mobilised opposition, by convening events, setting up petitions and drawing the attention 
of interest groups to proposed changes.  Bringing voluntary organisations into Local 
Involvement Networks provided an arena in which interest intermediation could take place.  
The closure of the PPI Forums at a time when major changes were about to take place 
within the NHS may also have been a tactic by Ministers to prevent mobilisation of 
opposition to the new commissioning arrangements.  Sharon Grant, Chair of the 
Commission for Patient and Public Involvement Health, told the House of Commons 
Health Committee that it was the wrong time to have a gap in public involvement in the 
NHS: 
„The point is that that two years is going to be a critical two years in the context of 
system reform, particularly in the context of commissioning, which it is said that 
LINks are going to be focusing on. By the time LINks get to be functioning, one is 
concerned that a huge number of huge commissioning decisions will have been 
made and contracts will be let which are for five or ten years and from which the 
public has been by and large excluded‟ (Sharon Grant, Commission for Patient and 
Public Involvement in Health, in: House of Commons Health Committee, 2007a: 
49). 
The transition from PPI Forums to Local Involvement Networks created a hiatus in the 
local co-ordination of the public at a time that might have smoothed local commissioning of 
services. 
Patient and Public Involvement Forums do not seem to have been considered by 
Ministers as having a sheepdog role for political management of the NHS, or if they did so 
it was a limited role in representing vulnerable groups through the direct participation of 
people from vulnerable communities.  As discussed in Section 5.4 below, they were the 
statutory public involvement institutions whose powers were least closely matched to a 
sheepdog role.  They had a limited capacity to act as interest intermediaries, as interest 
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groups were not included as members or represented formally within the PPI Forums.  The 
replacement of rights for statutory public involvement institutions to be consulted with a 
wider duty of NHS organisations to consult meant that the PPI Forums were not in a 
position to structure or to be guaranteed local consultation.  The PPI Forums had a state-
determined remit: in this instance, it was a narrow remit associated with a particular NHS 
trust following concerns about the culture in hospitals, particularly following the Bristol 
Royal Infirmary inquiry.  As they did not have direct responsibilities within consultation, 
such as the early right of Community Health Councils to agree closures of local hospitals, 
PPI Forums were too weak to take blame on the behalf of Ministers.  Lacking an interest 
intermediation role, the PPI Forums helped to coordinate opposition to health service 
changes.  An element in the timing of their abolition, as Sharon Grant suggested, may well 
have been to ease reforms as the new commissioning arrangements came into place.  
Their successors, Local Involvement Networks, provided a different model again of 
statutory public involvement. 
 
5.3     Local Involvement Networks, 2008-2010 
The transition from a centrally-managed recruitment mechanism for the PPI 
Forums to the looser model of Local Involvement Networks (LINks) was a major change.  
To contextualise LINks‟ activity, this section opens with a discussion of the creation of 
LINks, including the statutory powers that were allocated to them.  In the discussions 
leading up to the creation of LINks, Ministers and Department of Health officials 
emphasised that LINks were different from PPI Forums and that referring to them as 
having „members‟ might be misleading (Department of Health, in: House of Commons 
Health Committee, 2007b: Ev2).  The second part of this section considers how the 
participation in LINks was analysed and presented in practice by the Department of 
Health.  This leads into a discussion of the activity of LINks and the section closes with the 
2010 proposals to replace LINks with local Healthwatch in 2013. 
 
Creation of LINks 
Funding for Local Involvement Networks was distributed from the Department of 
Health to local authorities.  The remits for LINks were matched to local authority 
boundaries, covering both the NHS-funded and social care services across the local 
authority area.  The local authorities were expected under the Local Government and 
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Public Involvement in Health Act 2007 to appoint a host organisation that would provide 
support for the LINk in their area (Department of Health, 2007a).  The Department of 
Health provided guidance to local authorities based on the experience of seven early 
adopter sites for the LINk model (Department of Health, 2007b; NHS Centre for 
Involvement, 2007).  The Local Involvement Networks had rights to „enter and view‟ 
premises for social care as well as premises in which NHS-funded care was taking place, 
as opposed to just NHS premises; they could refer both social care and health issues to 
their local authority‟s Overview and Scrutiny Committee; and they had rights to receive 
responses within 20 working days to any report or recommendation they made (Local 
Involvement Networks Regulations 2008).   
In 2006, the Department of Health had issued a call for tenders to provide a 
resource centre that would advise health professionals on how to develop NHS-led 
involvement mechanisms.  The successful tender was a joint application from the Centre 
for Public Scrutiny, the Long-Term Conditions Alliance and Warwick University.  The 
partnership was funded for three years to create the NHS Centre for Involvement, based at 
Warwick University.  Local Involvement Networks were established without a national 
body, but the NHS Centre for Involvement was commissioned, within its existing funding, 
to provide guidance to the Local Involvement Networks40.  The NHS Centre for 
Involvement issued e-bulletins to local authorities, to LINks and to interested individuals, 
providing some coordinated information flow.  The NHS Centre for Involvement also 
developed a series of guides for LINks, on key matters such as interpretation of the Local 
Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007, understanding health and social 
care structures and codes of conduct for visiting and inspecting services (NHS Centre for 
Involvement 2008a, 2008b, 2008c).  Whilst the decision had been taken not to have a 
national organisation in place of the Commission for Patient and Public Involvement in 
Health, the NHS Centre for Involvement, until the end of its three-year grant in 2009, 
provided some support for communications and consistent guidance during the period 
when LINks were being established.  The Department of Health also provided a web-
based forum for Local Involvement Networks, operated by the Department‟s health 
information website NHS Choices, through which the LINks could exchange ideas and 
documents41. 
The expert panel and A stronger local voice both suggested that there was a role 
for a national intermediary organisation working with the national interest-specific voluntary 
                                                 
40
 Source: Interview with Jonathan Tritter, former Director of the NHS Centre for Involvement 
41
 Website for LINks, The LINks Exchange http://www.lx.nhs.uk [Accessed June 2012] 
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organisations.  With this agenda in mind, the Long-Term Conditions Alliance changed its 
name to National Voices and worked to expand its membership (Taggart, 2007; National 
Voices, 2009: 1). The Long-Term Conditions Alliance had had a membership base of 
national patient organisations for people with long-term health conditions, so it expanded 
its remit to include associations covering acute health conditions and wider social issues.   
National Voices built relationships with the Local Involvement Networks, but it was 
developing a role with national issue-specific organisations, rather than acting as a 
national body for LINks.  Once the NHS Centre for Involvement closed in August 2009, 
therefore, there was no central point for guidance or support to the Local Involvement 
Networks. 
 
Participants in LINks 
The Department of Health emphasised from the outset that „LINks will be open to 
all, there will be no set membership‟ (Department of Health, 2007f).  In evidence to the 
House of Commons Health Committee, the Department of Health indicated that „the term 
“membership of a LINk” may be misleading‟ and that „the key issue is that LINks are able 
to reach out to and hear from as wide a range of people as possible rather than relying on 
the views of a small group of heavily “involved” people‟ (House of Commons Health 
Committee, 2007b: Ev2).  When guiding local authorities on the establishment of LINks, 
the Department of Health advised that „it is important to remember that LINks are not 
merely groups of individuals, but are primarily networks that will bring together diverse 
groups in the area and representatives of other networks‟ (2007b: 4).  The accounts of 
participants oscillate between exclusion of groups of “involved” people and inclusion of 
those individuals through their membership of voluntary organisations and other networks.  
When establishing a LINk, the Department of Health emphasised the value of mapping out 
the existing networks, to see how the Local Involvement Network would fit with existing 
feedback systems in local health and social care services (Department of Health, 2007e).  
Despite indicating that „membership‟ was not a helpful term when referring to Local 
Involvement Networks, Ministers were keen to demonstrate that the transition to LINks had 
resulted in involvement of more people and a more diverse range of people than PPI 
Forums had demonstrated.  Shortly before the closure of the PPI Forums, the Secretary of 
State for Health, Alan Johnson, visited the Hull PPI Forum in his capacity as their local 
MP.  He stressed that LINks would incorporate the experience of existing PPI Forum 
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members, but would also increase the number of people involved in influencing local 
health and social care services: 
„LINKs are about linking together health and adult social care services, about 
providing a greater opportunity for involvement and greater flexibility.  The 
Department of Health would not want to lose the expertise of present Forum 
members, but the idea of LINks is to promote much wider involvement.‟ (Alan 
Johnson, Secretary of State for Health, in: Commission for Patient and Public 
Involvement in Health, 2007g: 9). 
As Ministers and civil servants had presented the transition as a means to increase the 
number of participants in state-sponsored public involvement, they needed to be able to 
demonstrate that more people were involved in LINks than had been involved in PPI 
Forums.  In effect, despite the looser structures, details were needed of the number of 
members. 
Without a national organisation for LINks, either as a membership organisation or 
an institution with the non-departmental public body status of the Commission for Patient 
and Public Involvement in Health, the Department of Health took a more direct role in 
receiving and analysing the annual reports of Local Involvement Networks, rather than 
receiving information that had been analysed for the Department.  In 2009, the Department 
presented an analysis of the 2008-2009 LINks annual reports as a Powerpoint 
presentation on the LINks Exchange website (Commissioning, Analysis and Intelligence 
Team, 2009).  By 2010, the analysis of the 2009-2010 annual reports had reached the 
status of a formal document published by the Department of Health, which included 
comparisons between the first and second year of LINks operation (Commissioning, 
Analysis and Intelligence Team, 2010 [Updated February 2011]). 
To illustrate the breadth of involvement, the Commissioning, Analysis and 
Intelligence Team at the Department of Health considered the numbers of individuals and 
groups involved in LINks.  For the 2009 annual reports, the LINks were asked to supply 
data on the number of non-white and disabled members.  Most of the LINks did not supply 
this information; 146 of the 150 LINks had supplied annual reports to the Department of 
Health, of which 57 provided information on non-white members and 52 supplied data on 
disabled members (2010 [updated February 2011]: 8).  The loose nature of the Local 
Involvement Networks meant that individual LINks gathered information about their 
participants differently and they may not have been able to demonstrate their 
representativeness in terms of the numbers of non-white or disabled people involved. 
On the basis of the data in the annual reports, the team at the Department of 
Health estimated that the average LINk in 2008-2009 had, to use the terminology in the 
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summary, 201 „members‟ and that in a typical LINk 69 percent of the members were 
individuals and 31 percent of the members were groups (Commissioning, Analysis and 
Intelligence Team, 2009: slides 6-7).  The analysis of 2009-2010 reports included a 
distinction between „members‟, who had made a commitment to take part regularly in the 
LINks‟ activity, and „participants‟, who might be interested in a single issue (2010 [updated 
February 2011]: 12).  The number of members estimated in 2009-2010 was 69,600, which 
is cited as „more than treble the total number of members in 2008-2009‟ and an average of 
483 members (both individuals and groups) in each LINk (2010 [updated February 2011]: 
12).  If the LINks were intended to involve people from groups who were rarely engaged in 
public involvement activities, the data from the annual reports did not enable the 
Commissioning, Analysis and Intelligence Team to establish whether representatives of 
more vulnerable or less engaged groups were participating: 
„There is an indication that LINks engaged with seldom heard groups, but it is 
difficult to assess the level at which this happened.  There was a lack of 
consistency in the data and many LINks gave no data on diversity of membership.‟ 
(Commissioning, Analysis and Intelligence Team, 2010 [updated February 2011]: 
13) 
In sheepdog terms, the Local Involvement Networks did not have the structured interest 
intermediation that had been put in place for Community Health Councils.  The tacit 
expectation seems to have been that by including more individuals and more groups, the 
involvement would become more representative by virtue of engaging more people.  
Whether or not the LINks mediated engagement, either with established or excluded 
groups, is considered in the discussion of individual LINks‟ activity below.    
With a state-funded model of engagement, Ministers are able to change the remit, 
in this case the extension to cover social care as well as health services across a local 
authority area.  The summary by the Commissioning, Analysis and Intelligence Team 
included examples of activity in social care, with case studies of improvements to the 
treatment of elderly people by care agencies in Lancashire and advising on training 
standards for carers looking after people with neurological conditions in York (2010 
[updated February 2011]: 29, 30).  The team at the Department of Health suggested from 
their reading of the annual reports that 42 percent of engagement by the LINks related to 
social care rather than health activity (2010 [updated February 2011]: 13).  In this sense, 
the remit had been modified to address the problems experienced by people in their own 
homes and in care services, rather than just when they were receiving health services. 
The Local Involvement Networks were not granted powers to agree closures, nor 
did they have privileged consultation rights.  The role individual LINks played in 
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consultation activities in practice is discussed below.  In terms of the general rights of 
LINks, however, they were not given powers that would enable them to act as a blame-
avoidance tool for Ministers.  In considering the success of LINks, the Commissioning, 
Analysis and Intelligence Team presented LINks as saving money.  They estimated that 
Sefton LINk had saved the NHS £346,000 per year by improving discharge arrangements, 
that Wakefield LINk had introduced cost savings of £242,000 per year by making 
suggestions to reduce the length of hospital stays and the number of cancelled operations, 
and that improvements to signage and communications instigated by Blackburn and 
Darwen LINk saved the NHS £115,000 per year by reducing the number of people who did 
not attend appointments that they either did not know about or that were at locations they 
could not find (2010 [updated February 2011]: 16-17).  This suggests a justification of 
expenditure on LINks in terms of overall cost savings to the NHS rather than as a means 
for greater engagement of the public. 
 
Activity by LINks 
As Local Involvement Networks were given more freedom in their structure and 
communications than either PPI Forums or Community Health Councils had been, the 
style and content of their reports and internet presence varied considerably.  Some LINks 
were explicit about groups within their membership and how they worked with voluntary 
organisations to help them to reach people who are not usually engaged in discussions 
about health or social care services.  Sutton LINk appointed an Outreach and 
Communications Officer as well as using its connections through the voluntary sector as a 
means to reach more people: 
„We have reached out to groups who do not traditionally engage in consultation, 
through voluntary organisations and the work of our Outreach and Communications 
Officer. … [examples of activity] Independence and Choice event for older people 
which included many vulnerable, frail adults who had not previously taken part in 
consultations.  Enabling the views of users of mental health services to be heard by 
the Health and Wellbeing Overview and Scrutiny Committee.  Working with new 
migrant communities (Polish, Albanian and Tamil) to identify their healthcare 
needs.‟ (Sutton LINk, 2009: 14) 
Local Involvement Networks also used their position across health and social care to 
facilitate collaborative working and agree priorities for joint action.  Lambeth LINk 
developed the Lambeth Living Well Collaborative to improve the experience of mental 
health and wellbeing across statutory and voluntary services: 
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„The Collaborative brings together service users and carers, members from Vital 
Link (a service user and carer mental health engagement group), local General 
Practitioners (GPs), members of community services and other local NHS 
organisations (hospitals, health centres, community services mental health teams) 
and the voluntary sector.  The Collaborative recognises that no one organisation 
can provide all the elements that contribute to good mental health and wellbeing.  
Therefore, LINk members have put forward ideas on how those involved in the 
Collaborative could work differently to improve opportunities for people with long-
term, serious mental illness.‟ (Lambeth LINk, 2011: 14) 
As a state-sponsored organisation with a broad portfolio, Lambeth LINk was in a position 
to mediate between providers and service users to consider how matters „could work 
differently‟ for people with mental illness in Lambeth.  The mediation included working with 
statutory organisations and voluntary groups on their priorities.  In facilitating the 
collaboration, Lambeth LINk took on a sophisticated intermediation role centred on the 
needs of local people with mental illness and their carers. 
Local Involvement Networks were not granted privileged consultation rights, but 
were consulted under the terms of Section 242 of the National Health Service Act 2006.  
Like the consultations under the earlier Health and Social Care Act 2001, this placed a 
duty on service providers to consult rather than granting a right to statutory public 
involvement institutions to be consulted.  The North Tyneside LINk used its right to request 
additional information to support local consultation on a proposed Emergency Care 
Hospital, following which it produced its own proposals: 
„In 2009/10, several LINk members were involved in producing the final LINk 
Emergency Care Hospital Report, which was submitted as part of the formal 
consultation process.  NHS North of Tyne (the commissioners of this project) have 
taken on board LINk members‟ concerns, requesting that Northumbria Healthcare 
do further work on some aspects of their plan to ensure that patients are 
appropriately served by the new hospital.‟ (North Tyneside LINk, 2010: 17) 
The North Tyneside LINk was not, unlike the CHCs, under a legal obligation to produce an 
alternative proposal, but was able to combine its ability to request additional information 
with the consultation process in order to influence the commissioners funding the 
Emergency Care Hospital.   
Outside the health arena, local authorities had not worked with either CHCs or PPI 
Forums as part of their development of social care plans.  Torbay LINk  learned shortly 
after it had elected a core stewardship group for the LINk that the local council was 
conducting a very short consultation on its budget over the Christmas period.  The LINk 
used the opportunity both to comment on the significance of the local council budget for 
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the social care needs of vulnerable members of society and to raise its own profile in the 
media: 
„The budget, for social care provided by the Care Trust, was likely to have most 
impact on care homes, who faced above-inflation cost increases; and the LINk was 
concerned about the impact on the quality of care.  Press coverage of the LINk 
followed.  Representations were made to the [Overview and] Scrutiny Committee, 
some changes were made to the budget, and the LINk continues to raise questions 
about the quality of the services now being provided; will continue to monitor the 
situation; and will seek earlier involvement in the budget process in future.‟ (Torbay 
LINk, 2009: 17-18) 
The local council may have deliberately held a shortened consultation over the Christmas 
period in the hope that any changes to the budget would pass unscrutinised.  The broader 
representational role of a LINk, with individual and organisational members, had the 
potential to have greater authority than individual comments on the social care budget 
would have done previously. 
The examples of North Tyneside and Torbay LINks present positive uses of the 
powers available to Local Involvement Networks.  The ability of local LINks to develop their 
own ways of working provided them with opportunities for innovative practice, but meant 
that there was not a single approach to their activity.  As Hogg has observed, Community 
Health Councils were criticised for their inconsistencies, whilst LINks were developed with 
the expectation that they would be different in each area (2009: 162). 
 
Abolition of LINks 
Following the May 2010 General Election, a Coalition government was established 
by the Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties.  The new Secretary of State for Health, 
Andrew Lansley, had been Shadow Secretary of State for six years and had radical ideas 
for the reform of the National Health Service.  One of the first consultation documents from 
the new Government was on public involvement in health, circulated on 22 July 2010 
(Department of Health & Communities and Local Government, 2010).  This consultation 
proposed that Local Involvement Networks would „become‟ local Healthwatch, a local 
organisation that would refer concerns about the quality of services to Healthwatch 
England within the Care Quality Commission, whilst maintaining a representative role for 
the public across health and social care (2010: 4, 5). 
Consultation documents and guidance notes issued early in 2012 provide insights 
into the nature of representation within the new bodies.  The national organisation 
Healthwatch England is a statutory committee of the Care Quality Commission, with a 
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maximum of 12 members.  It is proposed that members will be „representative of a range 
of interests‟ and appointed through a process to be developed by the Chair of Healthwatch 
England and the Care Quality Commission (Department of Health, 2012a: 10).  The local 
Healthwatch groups will be corporate bodies carrying out statutory functions (Department 
of Health, 2012b: 12).  The membership of local Healthwatch will incorporate local interest 
groups: 
„To be truly representative of local communities the ambition is that local 
Healthwatch will be part of a system rooted in local expertise, harnessing the 
experience of the public, community and voluntary sectors and others at the local 
level, particularly those working with people and groups who have a difficult time 
getting their voices heard.‟ (Department of Health, 2012b: 10) 
The local Healthwatch model moves away from the loose network of LINks to „identifiable 
bodies‟ with a recognisable corporate structure (Department of Health, 2012b: 13).  This 
provides an opportunity for a more structured interest intermediation role.  The explicit 
reference to „local expertise‟ moves away from the „ordinary people only‟ message that 
had been included in recruitment for PPI Forum members (Commission for Patient and 
Public Involvement in Health, n.d. [2003a]).   As discussed in Chapter Six, local 
Healthwatch groups have a stronger role in the scrutiny of services and Ministerial re-
assessment of the value of the watchdog role is likely to be a part of the transition from 
Local Involvement Networks to local Healthwatch. 
Local Involvement Networks were too loose a structure to undertake formal interest 
intermediation, although they worked with and included interest groups within their 
networks.  They worked with groups representing more vulnerable communities, but the 
diversity of operation meant that the Department of Health‟s Commissioning, Analysis and 
Intelligence Team were unable to quantify the extent of activity with vulnerable groups.   
As discussed in the review of trends below, the lack of consultation rights meant that LINks 
were not in a position to take the blame for unpopular local decisions.  With greater 
freedom to work with local interest groups, LINks undertook a form of intermediation that 
connected services rather than balancing interests. 
 
5.4     Managing interests trends, 1997-2010 
The discussion of Community Health Councils in Section 4.4 suggested that CHCs 
were most valued in a sheepdog role in the 1970s and that, as they started to mobilise 
opposition rather than intermediate between interests, they were less valued by Ministers 
and their powers were reduced.  This section considers the sheepdog roles played by the 
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successive statutory public involvement institutions, as summarised in Figure 5.2, and then 
reviews the transitions in the context of broader changes to interest group and NHS-led 
alternative forms of public involvement.    
Figure 5.2: Sheepdog – assessment of role played by successive statutory public 
involvement institutions, 1997-2010 
Institutional role 
Community Health 
Councils (1997-2003) 
PPI Forums (2003-
2008) 
Local Involvement 
Networks (2008 – 
[2013]) 
Mediate between 
local interests, 
including vulnerable 
groups 
Appointments ensure 
vulnerable groups are 
represented in CHC; 
High profile direct 
involvement of 
voluntary sector 
Individual members, 
not interest groups; 
One voluntary sector 
representative per 
PPI Forum;  
Demographic 
representativeness 
Encouragement of 
interest groups as 
members; 
Not structured 
mediation role; 
Demographic 
representativeness 
Structure 
consultation on 
local services 
Duty of NHS to 
consult the public, not 
specifically CHCs, 
from 2001 
Duty of NHS to 
consult the public, not 
specifically PPI 
Forums;  
Right to request 
information;  
Right to response 
Duty of NHS to 
consult the public, not 
specifically LINks; 
Right to request 
information;  
Right to response 
Consider only state-
determined range of 
issues 
Remit granted for 
health services in 
geographical area; 
ACHCEW 
coordinates Casualty 
Watch 
Remit granted for 
specific health 
institutions 
Remit granted for 
health and social care 
services across 
geographical area 
Take responsibility 
for unpopular local 
decisions 
Not sufficiently 
powerful to be blamed 
for local decisions 
Not sufficiently 
powerful to be blamed 
for local decisions 
Not sufficiently 
powerful to be blamed 
for local decisions 
 
Community Health Councils, during their last years, were less valued by Ministers 
as interest intermediaries than they had been in the 1970s.  As illustrated in Figure 5.2, 
their appointments mechanisms meant that they retained a structured membership that 
included representatives of vulnerable groups.  The introduction of Section 11 
consultations following the Health and Social Care Act 2001 meant that CHCs no longer 
had privileged consultation rights and were not in a sufficiently powerful position to take 
the blame for locally unpopular decisions.  They were, however, able to coordinate activity 
and opposition over time to national policies, such as the Private Finance Initiative.  The 
Association of CHCs for England and Wales also coordinated CHCs‟ activity to produce 
swift comparisons between waiting times in Accidence and Emergency units as part of the 
annual Casualty Watch.  This coordination at local and national levels meant from a 
Ministerial perspective that they were, to extend the sheepdog analogy, rogue dogs that 
were using their ability to round up interests as a means to round up opposition. 
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Of the statutory public involvement institutions, the PPI Forums were the least likely 
to be able to take on a sheepdog role.  The response to the CHCs whipping up interest 
group activity seems to have been to take interest groups out of the equation and to focus 
on individual members rather than interest group representatives.  As the members were 
recruited as individuals, they did not have interest group constituencies even if they 
happened as individuals to be members of interest groups.  Instead of representation of 
interest groups, the Commission for Patient and Public Involvement in Health worked hard 
to recruit people who had not been involved in interest groups and to ensure demographic 
diversity of members.  The PPI Forums did not have rights to be consulted, although they 
might be included in consultation exercises undertaken by NHS organisations.  Their remit 
was associated with specific NHS trusts, so they could influence the culture in that trust, 
but they were too closely allied to the trusts to be a Ministerial tool to support radical 
changes that might involve the closure of the NHS trust with which they were associated.  
Like CHCs in the closing stages, PPI Forums were not sufficiently powerful to be able to 
take the blame for unpopular local decisions.  
The abolition of the PPI Forums coincided with the introduction of commissioning 
arrangements that changed the balance of authority within the NHS, as budgets were 
devolved to Primary Care Trusts.  This placed the lead for decisions about funding 
specialist (secondary care) services with generalist health practitioners in the community.  
An arena was needed for local interest groups‟ participation in decisions about local health 
services, that would provide an opportunity for input by interest groups for people who 
needed specialist care.  There was also a move towards greater integration across health 
and social care; the trust-specific remit of the PPI Forums did not enable them to operate 
across health and social care.  The interest intermediation and state-determined remit 
aspects of the sheepdog role could therefore be interpreted as factors in the transition 
from PPI Forums to LINks. 
Local Involvement Networks, as outlined in Figure 5.2, took a far looser form than 
either Community Health Councils or PPI Forums.  Whilst they were encouraged to have 
interest groups as participants, it was not in a structured form to ensure inclusion of 
disadvantaged or vulnerable groups.  Without formal powers to represent interest groups, 
they were not in a position to undertake formal interest intermediation, although many 
LINks undertook liaison to improve coordination of local services.  LINks did not have 
statutory rights to be consulted and were not sufficiently powerful to be blamed for 
unpopular decisions. 
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Considered overall, there is less evidence of statutory public involvement 
institutions providing a sheepdog role in political management between 1997 and 2010 
than there was in the 1970s.  The risk for Ministers may have been that organisations 
which could intermediate could also round up opposition.  The timing of the successive 
changes seems to have been intended to weaken the ability of statutory public 
involvement institutions to mobilise opposition at points when major reforms were going 
through.  The Community Health Councils were abolished at the point of The NHS plan 
reforms; PPI Forums were abolished whilst new commissioning arrangements were being 
put in place; and Local Involvement Networks were abolished at a point of major reforms 
to the National Health Service, with a realignment of public health services within local 
authorities and the creation of a National Commissioning Board overseeing the NHS in 
England. 
Klein suggested in 1984 that part of the value of Community Health Councils was 
that the membership structures ensured that vulnerable groups were represented: 
„The constitution of Community Health Councils is instructive in this respect.  It 
represents a deliberate attempt to rig the political market in favour of those with the 
least resources for participation.  By ensuring the presence of members 
representing pressure groups for the mentally ill and the handicapped, among 
others, the constitution of CHCs gives a voice to those citizens least able to 
participate in political processes: that is, the most vulnerable.‟ (Klein, 1984: 30) 
The political value of the ability of the sheepdog to round up and ensure the participation of 
more vulnerable groups depends upon the relative profile of direct interest group 
engagement and NHS-led forms of involvement.    
Issue-specific interest groups were largely placed outside strategic decisions about 
NHS services during the 1970s and began to take a direct role at a local level with the 
development of joint consultative committees in 1984 (Department of Health and Social 
Service, 1984).  Interest groups were consulted in their own right on local service 
developments from 1992 onwards, with the Local voices initiative (NHS Management 
Executive, 1992).  Since the 1990s, many voluntary organisations have been contracted to 
provide services, as well as providing a collective voice to comment on the needs of 
people with the health condition or social problem that they represent (Nevile, 2010).  The 
charities that have been most likely to be contracted to provide services are often those 
that support vulnerable groups, such as older people or people with mental health 
problems.  This complicates the nature of consultation with issue-specific groups at a local 
level and leaves a role for a more independent collective voice through statutory public 
involvement institutions. 
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The evolution of NHS-led forms of involvement in England has been bound up with 
consumerism and the desire to learn from service users in order to improve service 
provision.  NHS personnel have developed mechanisms for consulting service users 
directly, rather than through interest groups, which are perceived to be „not necessarily 
representative either of constituents or communities with whom they work‟ (Chambers, 
Drinkwater and Boath, 2003: 5).  As discussed in Chapter Two, some of the NHS-led 
forms of involvement, such as citizens‟ juries and Foundation Trust membership, have 
been described in the literature on public involvement in health as outflanking the statutory 
public involvement institutions (Baggott, 2005: 538).   The NHS-led mechanisms in 
England have included an increasing emphasis on choice mechanisms and learning 
through customer preference (Dowding and John, 2011).   The choice mechanisms enable 
patients to indicate preferred options for where they will be treated and also to provide 
feedback on their experience of the services received.  In addition to the individual-level 
choice mechanisms, NHS-led involvement includes deliberative institutions, such as the 
NICE Citizens Council, to provide a citizens‟ perspective on controversial treatment issues 
(Davies, Wetherell and Barnett, 2006).  Ongoing investment in statutory public involvement 
institutions suggests that the range of NHS-led initiatives does not fully address political 
aspirations for public involvement in the NHS. 
The sheepdog role is not a comfortable one.  The state corporatist origins of the 
modelling for this theoretical approach describe a state-determined gathering of 
participants to undertake a range of activities that are also determined by the state.  
Schmitter uses the term „intermediation‟ rather than „representation‟ to describe the 
corporatist role as corporatist bodies „also often assume or are forced to acquire 
governmental functions of resource allocation and social control‟ (Schmitter, 1977: 36).  
Like the herding dog of the analogy, a sheepdog both rounds up the sheep to ensure that 
they are accounted for and keeps them penned in the fold so that they can be managed.  
The model in this study used the blame-avoidance literature to generate the specific point 
on the statutory public involvement institutions taking responsibility for unpopular decisions 
(Weaver, 1986).  The instance of blame-avoidance that emerged in this study was the role 
played by Community Health Councils in agreeing local hospital closures.  Schmitter 
suggests that corporatist bodies may be involved explicitly in rationing decisions.  In some 
cases, Community Health Councils helped to prioritise local service developments, but 
most were unwilling to take part in discussions about rationing (Hogg, 2009: 34, 163).  
Debates about rationing resources tend to be NHS-led activities, such as those though 
citizens‟ juries or NICE.  In this study, the only extensive rationing activity identified in 
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examination of documentation produced by the successive statutory public involvement 
institutions was the involvement of Community Health Councils in hospital closures. 
The Local Involvement Networks are due to be replaced with local Healthwatch in 
April 2013.  Whilst there may be interest intermediation elements in the most recent 
transition, the next chapter suggests that it is also due to a reassessment of the watchdog 
role and an increase in its value to Ministers following the inquiry into the Mid Staffordshire 
NHS Foundation Trust. 
 
Chapter summary 
This chapter considered the changes to statutory public involvement institutions 
between 1997 and 2010, beginning with Community Health Councils and leading on to PPI 
Forums and then Local Involvement Networks.  The institutions and changes to them were 
considered from the perspective of whether the institutions were expected to take on a 
sheepdog role in political management of the NHS.  Sheepdog elements were found in the 
roles played by CHCs and by LINks, but were not part of the role expected of PPI Forums, 
other than some representation of vulnerable communities through the membership profile 
of the PPI Forums.  The timing of the changes suggests that statutory public involvement 
institutions were expected to play a sheepdog role that managed opposition and if there 
was a risk that they would oppose reforms, a reframing of public involvement would take 
place to weaken the institutions at key times.  The sheepdog role does not entirely answer 
the puzzle of the ongoing investment in funding and reforming statutory public involvement 
institutions, however.  For additional insights into the puzzle, the next chapter assesses 
selected public inquiries to examine whether statutory public involvement institutions 
played a watchdog role in political management of the National Health Service. 
 
 
Ruth Carlyle           Sheepdog or watchdog? Statutory public involvement in the NHS 160 
Chapter Six: Watchdog? Alerting politicians to problems 
This chapter considers whether statutory public involvement institutions may be 
understood to be playing a role in political oversight of the NHS.  Seen in this light, the 
institutions would be watchdogs alerting Ministers to problems before they become 
disasters.  Whereas the main mechanisms to be considered alongside the sheepdog role 
were NHS-led and direct interest group involvement in the NHS, changes to any oversight 
role played by statutory public involvement institutions need to be considered in 
conjunction with the more formalised regulators over the same time period.  The chapter 
opens by considering the operationalisation of both the more formalised police-patrol 
oversight and the potential watchdog role played by statutory public involvement 
institutions, matching the powers of the successive institutions of both types against the 
operational elements in the forms of oversight.  Expectations of how these powers may be 
used in practice are explored through four public inquiries.  As public inquiries take place 
after disasters, questions asked of statutory public involvement institutions and comments 
on their performance provide insights into expectations of how problems should have been 
identified and rectified before they became disasters.  The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of the extent to which statutory public involvement institutions may have fulfilled 
a watchdog role over time. 
 
6.1 Public involvement institutions as oversight 
In common with other public services, the NHS has been subject to a range of 
different schemes to improve performance and to protect the public against the failure of 
services (Hood et al., 1999).  Politicians are keen to avoid disasters in the NHS, as they 
are aware that the media and the electorate may criticise Government for not preventing 
the problem (Alaszewski and Brown, 2012: 139).  Since 1983, different performance 
indicators and assessment frameworks have been used to encourage NHS personnel to 
develop services that met particular targets (Ham, 2009: 235-236).  The performance 
management mechanisms include regulators.  Walshe suggests that the distinctive feature 
of regulators is that they are a „third party‟, rather than being directly involved in any 
transaction within a service (2003a: 10).  The third party model of regulation only received 
marked attention as a mechanism for the NHS after 1997, when the Labour government 
moved away from depending upon market forces to maintain the quality of health services 
(Ham. 2009: 243; Walshe, 2003a: 113).  The professional regulators (or police patrols) 
have been subject to a series of reforms within a similar timeframe to the reforms to 
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statutory public involvement institutions.  As discussed in Chapter Three, oversight can 
take the form of an alarm raised by interest groups (the watchdog model in this study).  
This watchdog model of oversight can be used by politicians in place of the regulatory 
police patrol or as a complement to it. 
The second sub-question in this study considers whether statutory public 
involvement institutions act as watchdogs, alerting national politicians to problems before 
they become disasters.  Political oversight of expert agents may be most effective when it 
is least apparent (Ogul and Rockman, 1990: 6).  On this basis, McCubbins and Schwartz 
proposed that a less-formal alert system (which they refer to as fire-alarm oversight, but is 
described here as a watchdog role) may be a rational preference over the high costs of a 
professional regulatory mechanism (police-patrol oversight), or that politicians may choose 
to combine the mechanisms (1984: 167). 
As statutory public involvement institutions sometimes describe themselves as 
watchdogs, this analogy is used in exploring whether statutory public involvement 
institutions barked or sounded an alarm to notify Ministers of problems before they 
became disasters.  Since more formalised processes may be the preferred oversight 
mechanism or combined with this watchdog role, this chapter discusses police-patrol 
oversight alongside the less formal watchdog oversight.  This opening section considers 
the powers that would enable institutions to act as oversight mechanisms.  It considers the 
professional police patrol institutions first and then the statutory public involvement 
institutions as watchdogs.  In each case, there have been several top-down changes 
introduced during the period of this study, 1974 to 2010. 
 
Police-patrol oversight in the NHS 
Police patrols are described by McCubbins and Schwartz as having a surveillance 
role, authority to discourage violations and access to information, including rights to 
commission studies, conduct fieldwork and call hearings.  Figure 6.1 outlines the most 
likely candidates to be police-patrol oversight mechanisms in the English NHS.  As 
McCubbins and Schwartz describe a centralised process, this figure presents national 
organisations with a responsibility for monitoring health services, rather than local 
organisations such as the Overview and Scrutiny Committees within local authorities.  It 
focuses on the third-party regulators, rather than mechanisms applied within NHS 
organisations, such as performance indicators.  The national bodies described in this 
section reviewed the quality of services, rather than individual professionals‟ competence, 
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which has been predominantly the domain of the professional associations, or Royal 
Colleges, for clinical specialists. 
Figure 6.1: Overview of NHS monitoring bodies against police-patrol oversight 
Police patrol 
characteristics 
Hospital [later 
Health] Advisory 
Service (1969-
1997) 
Commission for 
Health 
Improvement 
(2001-2004) 
Healthcare 
Commission 
(2004-2009) 
Monitor (2004 
onwards) 
Care Quality 
Commission 
(2009 onwards) 
Surveillance 
role 
 
Rejected an 
inspection model 
in favour of 
working with NHS 
organisations to 
improve the 
quality of services 
Mandated to 
undertake clinical 
governance 
review of every 
NHS trust every 
four years 
Determine 
whether NHS 
trusts fulfil 
Foundation 
Trust (FT) 
status; 
Surveillance 
proportionate to 
perceived risk 
Process of 
registering all 
NHS and social 
care 
organisations 
(including NHS 
Foundation 
Trusts) and 
monitoring 
activity 
Discourage 
violations 
 
Reports were not 
published until the 
mid 1980s; 
Approach of 
compliance not 
blame 
Reviews 
(presented as star 
ratings) could 
result in strong 
public criticisms 
and change of 
leadership; 
Referrals to 
Secretary of State 
De-authorisation 
of FT 
registration; 
Referrals of 
problems to 
Care Quality 
Commission 
Publishing 
results and 
enforcement of 
regulation, 
including 
cancelling 
registration 
Access to 
information 
Limited statutory 
role 
Data collection Data collection Data collection, 
including real-
time 
Commission 
studies 
No statutory 
powers 
Commission 
surveys 
No statutory 
powers 
Commission 
surveys and 
studies 
Field work Visits to NHS 
organisations, 
averaging once 
every ten years 
Systematic cycle 
of visits, timings 
based on random 
sample 
Visits to FTs 
proportionate to 
risk 
Regular review 
of services, 
including 
unannounced 
visits 
Hearings No statutory 
powers 
Consultation with 
stakeholders to 
inform reviews 
No statutory 
powers 
Consultation with 
stakeholders to 
inform reviews 
 
The Hospital Advisory Service, later known as the Health Advisory Service, is the 
first organisation presented in Figure 6.1.  Walshe describes the Hospital Advisory Service 
as the first regulator in the NHS (2003a: 112).  It was established by Richard Crossman as 
Secretary of State in response to the Ely Hospital Inquiry in 1969.  Crossman‟s diary 
entries suggest that he intended the Hospital Advisory Service to be an independent 
inspectorate (Crossman, 1977: 418).  Once established, however, the institution rejected 
an inspection approach and modelled its activity on the basis of peer review by health 
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professionals of fellow professionals‟ activities (Walshe, 2003a: 115).  The Hospital 
Advisory Service formed a weak police patrol, as its sole access to information was 
through visits to hospitals once every ten years approximately on a rotation basis.  The 
focus of the Hospital Advisory Service was also predominantly on one aspect of NHS 
services: long-stay hospitals (Webster, 2002: 119).  It took the approach of encouraging 
compliance with recommendations and only started to publish reports from its visits in the 
1980s.   
For the purposes of Figure 6.1, the Commission for Health Improvement and its 
successor, the Healthcare Commission (or, more formally, the Commission for Healthcare 
Audit and Inspection), have been entered in one column.  The two organisations undertook 
broadly similar roles.  The Commission for Health Improvement introduced a star-rating 
system, which was continued by the Healthcare Commission during its first two years of 
operation (Ham, 2009: 238).  The organisations were mandated to undertake a clinical 
governance review of each NHS trust every four years.  Unlike the Hospital Advisory 
Service, the Healthcare Commission published its reports from the outset, although the 
evidence remained confidential.   The stipulated activities of both the Commission for 
Health Improvement and the Healthcare Commission seem to reflect police-patrol 
oversight: data collection; commissioning of surveys; a systematic cycle of visits; and 
consultation with stakeholders to inform reviews.   
The introduction of Foundation Trusts into the English National Health Service from 
2004 complicated consistent national surveillance.  An independent regulator, Monitor, 
was set up to authorise and regulate Foundation Trusts.  In return for demonstrating their 
ability to meet Government targets, hospitals could apply for Foundation Trust status.  In 
keeping with the greater autonomy of Foundation Trusts, Monitor‟s approach to regulation 
was proportionate to risk: if a Foundation Trust demonstrated that it was well governed 
and that its likelihood of breaching Monitor‟s compliance framework was low, then Monitor 
would require limited information from the trust (Ham, 2009: 242).   
In 2009, the Healthcare Commission was replaced by the Care Quality 
Commission.  The Care Quality Commission‟s remit covered social care as well as health 
services.  Unlike its predecessors, the Care Quality Commission undertook a process of 
registering all health service providers and adult social care services; organisations that 
were not registered with the Care Quality Commission as meeting essential quality 
standards were not permitted to operate (Care Quality Commission, 2009a: 6).  The 
registration process provided the Care Quality Commission with baseline data on all health 
and social care services against which to record future progress.  As with the Commission 
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for Health Improvement and the Healthcare Commission, the Care Quality Commission 
seems to fulfil a police-patrol role when presented in Figure 6.1: data collection, including 
real-time data; commissioning of surveys; a systematic programme of visits, including 
unannounced visits; and consultation with stakeholders to inform reviews. 
The trend indicated in this overview of regulatory bodies suggests a progressive 
strengthening of police-patrol oversight since 2001. 
 
Watchdog oversight in the NHS 
As discussed in Chapter Three, a watchdog in the context of this study is a 
mechanism through which interest groups or members of the public alert politicians to 
problems before they become disasters.  A watchdog can be attractive to Ministers as it 
alerts them to issues that are of concern to the electorate and enables politicians to gain 
credit from being seen to respond.  The watchdog is also likely to focus on matters that 
might cause harm to service users, rather than procedural matters, and the main costs of 
intensive monitoring are borne by volunteers. 
Successive statutory public involvement institutions in England are framed in 
Figure 6.2 against a watchdog role (based on the McCubbins and Schwartz fire-alarm 
model).  The overview implies a good match between the model and the rights and 
responsibilities of Community Health Councils.  From the point when Community Health 
Councils first appeared in legislation, the National Health Services Reorganisation Act 
1973, they had rights „to enter and inspect‟ NHS premises, suggesting that from the outset 
they had a role in scrutinising health services.  They had rights to access information, 
enshrined in guidance to the NHS and later in the Community Health Councils (Access to 
Information) Act 1988.  NHS organisations had an explicit statutory duty to consult 
Community Health Councils, covered by a series of statutes, the last of which was The 
Community Health Council Regulations (1996): Statutory Instrument 1996 No. 640.  The 
same statutory instruments gave Community Health Councils the right to refer unresolved 
consultations and problems to the Secretary of State.  The recruitment processes for 
Community Health Councils also ensured that they represented all interests, not just well-
organised groups, and could filter issues. 
Patient and Public Involvement Forums (PPI Forums) linked to hospital trusts had a 
duty „to monitor and review‟ the services in the hospital to which they were connected 
(Patients‟ Forums (Functions) Regulations 2003).  The PPI Forums linked to Primary Care 
Trusts (PCTs) retained the broader right „to enter and inspect‟ NHS premises throughout 
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their PCT area.  The PPI Forums had less access to decision making than Community 
Health Councils had done, as the duty of NHS organisations to consult that was introduced 
in the Health and Social Care Act 2001 referred to consulting the public more broadly.  
Also, PPI Forums did not coordinate the involvement of interest groups in the way that 
Community Health Councils had done or Local Involvement Networks were granted the 
opportunity to do (Patients‟ Forums (Membership and Procedure) Regulations 2003).  
Figure 6.2: Overview of NHS statutory public involvement institutions in England 
against watchdog oversight 
Watchdog 
characteristics 
Community Health 
Councils (CHCs) (1974-
2003) 
Patient and Public 
Involvement 
Forums (PPI 
Forums) (2003-
2008) 
Local Involvement 
Networks (LINks) 
(2008 -2013
42
) 
Gather 
intelligence 
about local 
services 
Rights „to enter and 
inspect‟ NHS premises; 
Rights to access 
meetings and associated 
papers; 
Right to appeal to 
Secretary of State if 
„reasonably required‟ 
information is declined; 
Ability to support 
complainants 
Duty „to monitor 
and review‟ NHS 
trust in which 
based; 
Rights of PCT-
based PPI Forums 
to „enter and 
inspect‟ NHS 
premises 
Rights to receive 
information in response to 
requests within set 
timeframe; 
Duty of service provider to 
allow „to enter and view‟, 
except where this 
compromises „effective 
care‟ or „privacy and 
dignity‟ 
Influence 
decisions 
about local 
services 
Rights to consultation; 
Duty of NHS 
organisations to consult 
the CHC 
Duty of NHS 
organisations to 
consult the public 
Duty of NHS organisations 
to consult the public 
Challenge local 
decisions and 
refer problems 
 
Right of CHC to refer 
unresolved issues to 
Secretary of State 
Rights to refer 
locally to Overview 
and Scrutiny 
Committee or 
nationally through 
Commission for 
Patient and Public 
Involvement in 
Health  
Right to make 
recommendations to 
service providers and to 
receive a response; 
Rights to refer issues to 
and receive a response 
from the Overview and 
Scrutiny Committee 
Filter significant 
issues from 
problems raised 
by interest 
groups 
Interest groups 
represented by 
appointees to the CHC 
Broader 
representation of 
the community, 
with at least one 
representative of 
the voluntary sector 
Interest groups can 
become members of a 
LINk 
 
The NHS and Health Care Professions Act 2002 granted very broad referral rights to PPI 
Forums, as they could refer issues: to the Overview and Scrutiny Committee of the 
relevant local authority; or to the Commission for Patient and Public Involvement in Health 
                                                 
42
 Local Involvement Networks are to be  transferred into local Healthwatch groups in April 2013 (under the 
terms of the Health and Social Care Act 2012) 
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(the national statutory coordinating body for PPI Forums).  The Overview and Scrutiny 
Committee or the Commission would then refer issues on to Ministers.  This may be a 
revised watchdog role, modified to ensure that only major issues were raised through the 
Commission for Patient and Public Involvement in Health with the Secretary of State. 
The third type of organisation outlined in Figure 6.2 is the Local Involvement 
Networks (LINks).  Rather than having a right of entry to NHS premises, service providers 
were given a duty to allow LINks members „to enter and view‟ services (Local Involvement 
Networks (Duty of Service-Providers to Allow Entry) Regulations 2008).  The Local 
Involvement Networks, unlike their predecessors, were set up to cover both health and 
social care.  Local Involvement Networks were granted the right to receive a response if 
they made a recommendation to an NHS or social care provider. Under the Local 
Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007, rights of referral were to local 
councillors through the Overview and Scrutiny Committee, although the LINks were also 
given a right to receive a response from the committee and problems could be referred on 
to the Secretary of State by the committee.  Like Community Health Councils, LINks were 
set up to cover a geographical area and they had the right to include voluntary 
organisation as members and so could work with local groups to identify significant issues.  
Referrals to the Overview and Scrutiny Committee provided a watchdog opportunity, but 
one that was filtered locally. 
This overview of institutions suggests that both police-patrol and watchdog 
oversight mechanisms are found in the NHS.  The trend for the watchdog oversight seems 
on the assessment of institutional characteristics to have varied whilst police-patrol 
oversight has increased.  For expectations of how each form of oversight would operate in 
times of crisis in the NHS, we turn to NHS inquiries. 
 
6.2 NHS inquiries: the failure of oversight? 
An NHS inquiry is a Committee of Inquiry established to conduct a retrospective 
investigation of an event or of circumstances that cannot be evaluated using the standard 
quality control mechanisms available within the National Health Service (Kewell and Beck, 
2008: 376).  NHS inquiries take place when there has been a failure of oversight, in that 
effective oversight mechanisms should resolve issues before they become major 
problems.  Inquiries, particularly public inquiries, are essentially examinations of disasters. 
Comments from Ministers and evidence provided by witnesses include reflections 
on what should have happened to prevent the disaster.  This provides insights into 
Ruth Carlyle           Sheepdog or watchdog? Statutory public involvement in the NHS 167 
expectations of oversight at the time of a particular inquiry.  Ministers have choices over 
the oversight mechanisms to use, so the nature of expectations may change over time.  
When Ministers prefer professional police-patrol oversight, statutory public involvement 
institutions may be ignored as a watchdog.  If Ministers regard watchdog oversight as the 
primary mechanism, statutory public involvement institutions may be blamed directly for 
not raising the alarm.  In a mixed model of oversight, the response will vary according to 
the precise expectations of the watchdog within the model.  If watchdog oversight is a 
significant mechanism, watchdog institutions may be blamed for not acting sooner.  If the 
watchdog provides an additional source, more along the lines of a back-up support, it may 
be praised or blamed for particular actions, but not blamed to the same degree for failing 
to prevent the disaster. 
 
Selection of NHS inquiries for this study 
Changes to both the potential police-patrol and watchdog oversight mechanisms, 
outlined in Section 6.1, indicate when there may have been shifts in Ministerial preference 
for oversight mechanisms.  Specific public inquiries of themselves have sometimes acted 
as turning points: where there has been a major disaster, politicians may wish to be seen 
to be acting decisively.  Changing oversight mechanisms is within the powers of the 
Secretary of State, whereas managing experts within the NHS is more complex.  A 
Secretary of State may therefore change oversight mechanisms in order to be seen by the 
electorate to be taking action that may prevent future disasters. 
The first inquiry, into events at the Ely Hospital, Cardiff, in 1969 has been credited 
with inspiring both the Hospital Advisory Service and Community Health Councils 
(Webster, 2002: 119; Hogg, 2009: 16).  The report and responses to it should therefore 
cast light on the rationale for the creation of the new institutions and how they might 
prevent disasters in the future.  Criticisms within the report of previous structures may also 
indicate what Ministers hoped to avoid through the creation of new structures. 
 Following the establishment of both the Hospital Advisory Service and the 
Community Health Councils, the first major NHS inquiry examined events at Normansfield 
Hospital in Teddington, Surrey.  Normansfield Hospital, like Ely, was a long-stay 
psychiatric hospital supporting both children and adults.  The Normansfield Hospital 
Inquiry was selected to explore expectations of the oversight mechanisms in the late 
1970s. 
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The Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry acted as a turning point both for regulatory 
mechanisms and for the nature of public involvement in the NHS.  Early findings from the 
Bristol Inquiry were cited by the Secretary of State as part of the rationale for replacing 
Community Health Councils with PPI Forums (Department of Health, 2003b: vii-viii; 
Gerrard, 2006: 270-271).  Recommendations from the Bristol Inquiry also shaped the 
Commission for Health Improvement.  The Bristol Inquiry has therefore been selected both 
for its reflections on the failure of oversight and for its role as a turning point in political 
oversight mechanisms.   
Finally, the multiple inquiries into the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust, in 
2009, 2010 and 2010-12, have been selected as the initial inquiry led to a review of early 
warning systems and regulatory monitoring and to the closure and reform of the 
Staffordshire Local Involvement Network.  The events at the Stafford Hospital are 
discussed as a potential turning-point in political preferences, as reforms proposed 
following the inquiry could be interpreted as strengthening the role of statutory public 
involvement institutions in watchdog oversight. 
 
Ely Hospital, Cardiff, 1969 
The Ely Hospital in Cardiff was a long-stay psychiatric hospital for adults and 
children, many of whom had physical as well as mental disabilities.  Conditions at the Ely 
Hospital were brought to the attention of the public and politicians by a former nursing 
assistant, who wrote to a national newspaper, The News of the World.  Independent 
inquiries had previously been set up into allegations of ill-treatment of patients in long-stay 
hospitals for people with mental illness or mental disability; unlike previous inquiries, the 
inquiry led by Geoffrey Howe into the conditions at the Ely Hospital found that the 
allegations were largely true (Ham, 2009: 259).   
In the late 1960s, the oversight of hospitals was the responsibility of Hospital 
Management Committees.  These committees consisted of both lay and professional 
members.  The Hospital Management Committee members were appointed by the 
Regional Health Boards and could be understood to be indirect agents of the Minister 
(Klein, 2006: 57).  Hospital Management Committees, however, tended to work closely 
with the management teams in hospitals they oversaw.  Members of staff in current 
employment at the Ely Hospital did not feel able to complain or to raise concerns with the 
Hospital Management Committee (Secretary of State for Social Services, 1969: §70).  
Whistleblowers could not, therefore, be depended upon to raise issues. 
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The Hospital Management Committee overseeing the Ely Hospital was heavily 
criticised by the Committee of Inquiry for failing to use its rights to access information in 
the interests of patients.  The rights of Hospital Management Committee members 
included the ability visit premises in order to inspect hospital services (1969: §433).  The 
former nursing assistant who wrote to The News of the World (referred to in the inquiry 
report as XY) was critical of the way in which members of the Hospital Management 
Committee made use of their visiting rights: 
„XY was candid in his view of this: "I saw some of the members of the Committee 
coming every three or four months here. I am not making an accusation, of course. 
I am just saying how I came to the conclusion to say these things. They were 
coming in, seeing one or two of the senior staff, walking from one ward to the other, 
not asking the junior staff how they liked their job, or creating an atmosphere of co-
operation or respect ... I have no doubt that the Management Committee are very 
good at their jobs outside, but here they are ineffective. …There is no point in them 
coming around.  Because they do not interest themselves in anything. They see 
[the Chief Male Nurse] or if they go into the wards, the Chief Nurse. They come 
round, pass through the door, and finish. What they are interested in is: "You have 
got a very nice shining floor".” XY was not the only member of the staff to have 
formed this impression.‟ (Secretary of State for Social Services, 1969: §434) 
The description by XY of the visiting process demonstrates that the Hospital Management 
Committee members saw senior members of staff as their point of contact, rather than 
attempting to speak to junior personnel or to interact either with patients or with the 
patients‟ families.  The brief reference to the members as being „very good at their jobs 
outside‟ is an allusion to the social profile of the members, who tended to hold positions of 
respectability or authority in the local community.  The Committee of Inquiry visited Ely 
Hospital and indicated that many of the problems were visible to a lay inspector (1969: 
§88).  The inquiry team proposed that visiting premises should be the main means to 
identify problems (1969: §564).  They criticised the rota set up by the Hospital 
Management Committee overseeing Ely, as the rota meant that individual members of the 
Hospital Management Committee visited Ely just once every 20 months (1969: §435).   
Watchdog oversight mechanisms need to be able to access local decision-making 
processes and to challenge decisions.  In the case of the Hospital Management 
Committees, members formed part of the decision-making processes in hospitals, which 
made it complicated for them to undertake the consumer representation part of their role 
(Klein and Lewis, 1976: 7).   
One of the strongest concerns expressed in the Ely Hospital Inquiry is the lack of 
representation for vulnerable patients.  Although the Committee of Inquiry endeavoured to 
interview patients, „because of the severe disabilities of most of them, little assistance was 
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derived from this source‟ (1969: §76).  The Hospital Management Committee covering the 
Ely Hospital was responsible for seven hospitals, of which two hospitals (including the Ely 
Hospital) were psychiatric hospitals.  Despite having two psychiatric hospitals in their care, 
none of the committee members had been recruited from groups with an interest in mental 
health or mental disability (1969: §447).  The Committee of Inquiry also found that none of 
the members of the Hospital Management Committee were „battling for‟ patients at the Ely 
Hospital (1969: §417a).   
In effect, the Hospital Management Committee combined police patrol and 
watchdog functions.  The Committee of Inquiry alluded to broader questions about the 
nature of the Hospital Management Committees and „watchdog‟ roles, but refrained from 
commenting on whether new mechanisms were needed (1969: §451).  The interpretation, 
nonetheless, that the Secretary of State, Richard Crossman, gave of the report on 
presenting it to the House of Commons was that „the main recommendation of the Report 
is that a new system of regular visiting and inspection is needed. I agree‟ (HC Deb (1968-
69) 780 col. 1809).   
Richard Crossman was forced to act quickly on the Ely Hospital Inquiry: the report 
had been the subject of dispute between Howe and civil servants for three months before 
Crossman saw the document, so his first sight of the report was on 10 March 1969, just 
days before responsibility for the NHS in Wales was transferred to the Secretary of State 
for Wales on 1 April 1969.  The parliamentary constituency of the Secretary of State for 
Wales, George Thomas, included the Ely Hospital, so the report needed to be published 
before responsibility was transferred.  Howe wanted the report to be published in full and 
civil servants were reluctant to take this unusual step.  As Crossman indicated in his diary 
entry for 11 March 1969, he took the view that he could only survive politically if a full 
publication was followed by the creation of oversight mechanisms in the NHS: 
„So tonight I went to bed and read and read and read and it seemed clearer than 
ever that the whole thing had to be published.  The report completely substantiated 
the News of the World story and I might as well make the best of it by outright 
publication.  But I was also clear in my own mind that I could only publish and 
survive politically if in the course of my statement I announced necessary changes 
in policy including the adoption by the Ministry and the RHBs [Regional Hospital 
Boards] of a system of inspectorates, central and regional, such as there are in 
almost every other Ministry and such as the Health Service has never yet permitted 
itself.‟ (Crossman, 1977: 409) 
Crossman oversaw the creation of the Hospital Advisory Service personally.  Rather than 
reporting to civil servants or within the internal hierarchy of the NHS, Crossman ensured 
that the reporting line went directly to the Secretary of State (Crossman, 1977: 418).  The 
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origins of the Hospital Advisory Service therefore lie in a Secretary of State‟s need for 
police-patrol oversight so that he could be informed about any difficulties in hospitals 
before a disaster arose on a similar scale to that at the Ely Hospital.  He was also 
concerned about the membership of the Hospital Management Committees and told the 
House of Commons that he wanted „young vigorous people who really will do a job‟ (HC 
Deb (1968-69) 780 col. 1816).  This concern about representation can be seen as a 
contributory factor in the development of the Community Health Council concept by 
Crossman‟s successor, Keith Joseph. 
 
Normansfield Hospital, Teddington, 1978 
The first major inquiry to take place following the introduction of Community Health 
Councils and the Hospital Advisory Service was the Normansfield Hospital Inquiry.  The 
inquiry was chaired by Michael Sherrard and was, at the time, the longest inquiry in British 
legal history (Merriman, 2007: 199).  Normansfield, like the Ely Hospital, was a long-stay 
hospital.  The hospital was originally founded by Dr Langdon Down, the physician who first 
identified „Mongolism‟, later known as Down‟s Syndrome (Ward, n.d.: 106).  The hospital 
had been a private establishment for disabled members of well-to-do families, but it had 
been falling into disrepair since being incorporated into the NHS and was badly managed 
by the consultant in charge (Earl, 2010: 16; Merriman, 2007: 129, 187).  The Kingston, 
Richmond and Esher Community Health Council started to raise concerns about quality of 
care and conditions at the Normansfield Hospital soon after the CHC was established.  
The initial trigger for the CHC‟s concerns was a letter of complaint from a former member 
of staff (Secretary of State for Social Services, 1978: 39).  The Community Health Council 
raised its concerns initially with the Area Health Authority and later at a more strategic 
level with the Regional Health Authority, with correspondence copied to the Secretary of 
State and a press release issued to the local papers (1978: 40).  The Committee of Inquiry 
into Normansfield was established following the first strike by medical personnel in the 
history of the NHS, rather than as a result of the concerns raised by the Community Health 
Council.  Klein recognised the role played by the CHC in alerting the Area Health Authority 
to problems at Normansfield, but later suggested that the lack of attention paid by the 
authority to the warnings demonstrated „the limits to CHC influence‟ (1984: 28; 2006: 94).   
The report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Normansfield Hospital is structured 
into twenty two chapters, one of which is devoted to the activity of the Community Health 
Council.  By contrast, there are very few references to the Hospital Advisory Service.  The 
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Hospital Advisory Service visited Normansfield in 1972 and is quoted in the report as 
describing itself as „not an inspectorate, but propagating good ideas‟ (Secretary of State 
for Social Services, 1978: 32).  The Hospital Advisory Service had reported that the north 
and south wings of the hospital constituted a serious fire risk and were not suitable for 
patient accommodation, but the imminent NHS reorganisation meant that the health 
authorities did not act on the recommendation (Merriman, 2007: 188).  In effect, the 
Hospital Advisory Service‟s recommendation was overlooked without any ramifications. 
The Committee of Inquiry did not express any expectation that the Hospital Advisory 
Service would conduct surveillance, discourage violations, access information, 
commission studies or carry out field work.  Thus there is no expectation within the 
Normansfield report that the Hospital Advisory Service would or could have acted as a 
police patrol. 
The Area Health Authority was aware of the problems, but the inquiry report 
indicates that it had not taken action (Secretary of State for Social Services, 1978: 9).  The 
Community Health Council had repeatedly provided information to the Area Health 
Authority, but still no action had been taken.  The Committee of Inquiry heard the Chair of 
the CHC read out a statement of how the Community Health Council had decided to refer 
matters to the Secretary of State: 
„During a private43 session of the Community Health Council on Wednesday, 5th 
February 1975, great concern was expressed at conditions found at Normansfield 
Hospital during a visit by Members, under its programme of familiarising the 
Council with hospitals in the area.  After careful consideration, it was felt that the 
Area Health Authority could offer little hope of immediate improvements being 
made to bring the standards up to those of other subnormality hospitals.  It was 
decided therefore, that a letter should go to the Regional Health Authority, and a 
copy be sent to the Rt Hon Barbara Castle, Secretary of State.  This letter would 
contain details of observations made of the conditions found at the hospital during 
Members‟ visits.‟ (Kingston, Richmond and Esher CHC, 1977: 4-5) 
The Community Health Council‟s referral of the issues to Barbara Castle is cited within the 
inquiry report (1978: 40).  In giving evidence, however, the Community Health Council 
indicated that no direct response was received from the Secretary of State (Kingston, 
Richmond and Esher CHC, 1977: 6).  The Community Health Council therefore took the 
opportunity to raise an alarm, but it was not heard by the then Secretary of State. 
At the conclusion of the inquiry, the Community Health Council was praised by the 
Secretary of State in post, David Ennals, in his introduction to the Normansfield report for 
                                                 
43
 Community Health Councils held their full meetings in public, but with some committee meetings on 
sensitive matters in private. 
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„its persistent efforts to improve conditions at Normansfield‟ (Secretary of State for Social 
Services,1978: iv).  Similarly, the Committee of Inquiry spoke highly of the CHC: „The 
Kingston, Richmond and Esher Community Health Council is to be congratulated on its 
tenacity in exposing and reporting on the situation it found at the hospital‟ (1978: 11).  This 
praise suggests that the newly-created CHCs were seen to have similar preferences to 
those of the Secretary of State, in exposing poor NHS services.   
In the course of the inquiry report, the CHC is described as demonstrating each of 
the main attributes of a watchdog role.  The CHC accessed information largely through 
visits to the hospital, including regular monitoring visits (1978: 42).  Members of the 
Community Health Council also made comparative visits to similar hospitals and 
encouraged neighbouring CHCs to visit Normansfield, so that they could draw on 
comparative experiences to comment on Normansfield (Kingston, Richmond and Esher 
CHC, 1977: 9).  Sections from some of the reports made by CHC members following their 
visits are quoted by the Committee of Inquiry „to show that the CHC members were readily 
able to detect deficiencies which those more closely concerned, and with a statutory duty 
to do so, apparently failed to do‟ (Secretary of State for Social Services,1978: 39).  
Demonstrating the ability of the CHC to make a valuable contribution to planning, the 
Committee reported a visit made by CHC members to a 69-bed unit in another hospital 
that was similar to a unit proposed for Normansfield.  The CHC members indicated that the 
unit was not suitable and did not meet national guidelines, on which the Committee of 
Inquiry comment that „this was indeed so, as the Authorities should have known‟ (1978: 
41).   
Ministers and health authorities also expected the Community Health Council to 
filter issues raised by local interest groups.  The main local charity with an interest in 
Normansfield was the Richmond upon Thames Society for Mentally Handicapped 
Children, which was advised both by the Area Health Authority and by David Owen, 
Minister of State, to raise any concerns about Normansfield through the Community Health 
Council (Secretary of State for Social Services, 1978: 41).  This reference in the inquiry 
report to exclusive representation through the Community Health Council is confirmed in 
an article by Morris Malin, Vice Chair of the Wandsworth Society for the Mentally 
Handicapped: 
„On 9 June 1975 Dr David Owen, then Minister of State for the DHSS [Department 
of Health and Social Security], informed an MP that the suggestions of the 
Richmond upon Thames Society for Mentally Handicapped Children, and the view 
of other interested bodies, should get to health authorities through the medium of 
the CHC.  This neat arrangement, making the CHC the recognised spokesman for 
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the entire community, would work if the CHC made proper use of the expertise the 
voluntary organisations have gathered over many years.  But if the CHC, for one 
reason or another, chooses to disregard the voluntary society, then one might well 
ask whether the CHC has become a mini-authority instead of the grass-roots 
organisation it was intended to be.‟ (Malin, 1978: 4) 
Malin‟s response to local interest groups being referred to the Community Health Council 
reflects the role of statutory public involvement institutions in filtering issues raised by local 
groups.  As part of the role in alerting a Secretary of State to problems, this filtering 
process ensured that only issues that were of concern to a wide group of interests would 
be raised. 
Whilst the Community Health Council did not trigger the Normansfield Hospital 
Inquiry, it did use its powers to act as a watchdog.  The Association of Community Health 
Councils for England and Wales cited the activity at Normansfield as exemplifying the 
„determination‟ with which CHCs „pursued the interests of the public‟, in contrast to the 
approach of Area Health Authorities (Working Group on the Role and Development of 
CHCs, 1980: 2).  The praise expressed both by David Ennals as the Secretary of State 
and by the Committee of Inquiry suggests that, at this early stage in their career, the 
Community Health Councils were seen by Ministers as providing watchdog oversight. 
 
Bristol Royal Infirmary, 2001 
The Bristol Inquiry investigated the high death rate amongst babies during open-
heart surgery, or in the 30 days after surgery, at the Bristol Royal Infirmary.  During the 
period 1984-1995, more children aged less than 12 months died than would have been 
expected statistically from comparisons with other paediatric surgery units (Secretary of 
State for Health, 2001: 2).  The public inquiry, chaired by Ian Kennedy, was triggered by 
the concerns of an anaesthetist at the hospital, Dr Bolsin, who had collated his own 
statistics and compared them with those for other services (2001: 9).   
A problem that could only be identified through statistical comparison is more likely 
to be identified by police patrols than by fire alarms.  Bristol Royal Infirmary was „awash 
with data‟, but „little if any of this information was available to the parents or to the public‟ 
(2001: 3).  The rights of Community Health Councils to enter and inspect hospital premises 
would not enable the members to identify higher than average death rates amongst a 
small number of patients. 
During the period investigated by the Bristol Inquiry, the Health Advisory Service 
(formerly the Hospital Advisory Service) was in place.  This was not considered by the 
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Committee of Inquiry to provide a police patrol function.  The report is introduced as „an 
account of a time when there was no agreed means of assessing the quality of care‟ 
(2001: 2).  The Committee of Inquiry allude to political assumptions that the quality of 
health care should be „a matter for individual healthcare professionals‟ and conclude that 
Bristol „has taught us that this is not enough‟ (2001: 303, 305).  The Committee of Inquiry 
recommends that the new Commission for Health Improvement should undertake a 
stronger monitoring role, with access to data in order to identify trends (2001: 386), 
commissioned studies (2001: 407) and field work to include unannounced visits (2001: 
390).  These powers exemplify stronger police-patrol oversight.  In evidence provided to 
the inquiry, the Department of Health emphasised the importance of „modern information 
systems‟ that would „provide timely audit data to help clinical teams to identify issues 
before they become real problems‟ (Department of Health, 2000b: §29).  This response 
from the Department of Health underlines the assumption that quantifiable and 
comparable data are needed in order to identify problems. 
The ability of Community Health Councils and other public interests to challenge 
health service managers is presented as problematic in the Bristol Inquiry.  When an 
interest group makes an issue public, then someone has „to be singled out for blame‟ 
(Secretary of State for Health, 2001: 271).  The Committee of Inquiry suggested that public 
involvement „should be “on the inside”, rather than represented by some organisation “on 
the outside” ‟ (2001:18).  Alan Milburn, as Secretary of State for Health, later cited this 
finding as his rationale for replacing Community Health Councils outside NHS institutions 
with PPI Forums aligned with NHS trusts (Gerrard, 2006: 270-271).  Involvement inside 
the NHS is presented as more empowering for patients as it enables them to „feel truly in 
partnership with the professionals who run and provide our healthcare service‟ (2001: 
401).  Such partnership does not sit comfortably with a watchdog role.  The Committee of 
Inquiry proposed that Community Health Councils „were tolerated mechanisms for venting 
public concern, because ultimately they could do nothing‟ (2001: 407).  This suggests a 
weak oversight mechanism, as it is not one that would be heard. 
The Committee of Inquiry explicitly considered whether there was a need for a 
watchdog to represent the interest of patients in the NHS.  In this case, the committee 
considered the watchdog as a national body: 
„On a separate matter, there is an argument as to whether there is a need for 
Government to establish some body at a national level to represent the public‟s 
interest but which stands outside the organisational structure of the NHS. There is 
some force in the idea of some form of permanent watchdog: a national, publicly 
funded body to represent and promote the patient‟s perspective. There are, 
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however, counterarguments. First, by being outside the system, the scene may be 
set for the development of confrontational attitudes between the patients‟ watchdog 
and the NHS which serve the interests of neither. Secondly, without formal powers 
to challenge or change, the body may soon lose credibility and be seen as 
„toothless‟, a gesture towards public engagement rather than a reality. If, on the 
other hand, the body were given formal powers, it would, perhaps, endanger the 
creation of that partnership between professional and public which we regard as 
the essential building block for the future, by appearing to endorse the sovereignty 
of patient power. This would be to go too far. A patient-centred service is not a 
patient dominated service.‟ (Secretary of State for Health, 2001: 411) 
The emphasis in the Bristol Inquiry is on reducing blame so that professionals feel able to 
raise concerns; in this context, a formal watchdog is problematic.  In order to be effective, 
a watchdog needs to be able to challenge current practice, so the confrontation that is 
presented as posing a problem by the Committee of Inquiry is part of the role.  As the 
report states, without the powers to confront poor practice in the NHS a watchdog would 
be seen as lacking credibility.  The closing statement that „a patient-centred service is not 
a patient dominated service‟ is indicative of an approach that emphasises patients working 
with professionals rather than the involvement of members of the public as citizens 
commenting on acceptable standards for services. 
In terms of the characteristics of a watchdog, Community Health Councils are 
presented in the Bristol Inquiry as having a very limited role.  Rather than problems being 
visible for volunteers to view, the problems at Bristol could only be identified by gathering 
performance data and making statistical comparisons.  The CHCs were not seen as 
influencing decisions, but as „tolerated mechanisms‟ that could do nothing (2001: 401).  
Their ability to challenge professional practice was rejected as leading to confrontation and 
a culture of blame.  The dimension of filtering issues raised by different interests did not 
arise with a weaker watchdog, as the emphasis of the report was on partnership between 
individual patients and professionals, rather than the involvement of interest groups. 
Changes attributed to the Bristol Inquiry led to weaker scrutiny powers initially for 
PPI Forums and then for Local Involvement Networks than had been held by Community 
Health Councils.  The inquiry seems to mark a shift in the preferences of political principals 
from utilising watchdog oversight to focusing on police-patrol oversight.  More recent 
findings at the Stafford Hospital demonstrate that in the complexity of health services 
police-patrol oversight alone may not be sufficient. 
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Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust, 2009, 2010 and 2010-12 
The poor quality of care at the Stafford Hospital came to light through a 
combination of mortality rates data and concerns raised, initially with the Healthcare 
Commission, by a group of local patients and family members known as Cure the NHS.   
This local group did not have the official standing of the statutory public involvement 
institutions, which during this period were the PPI Forum for the hospital and then the 
Staffordshire Local Involvement Network (LINk).  Despite lacking formal status, Cure the 
NHS could be interpreted as having acted as a watchdog, as its members compiled 
information on patient experiences, arranged to meet with the NHS trust Board to express 
their concerns and challenged local decisions about service quality (Francis, 2010a: 8, 20).  
The founder of Cure the NHS, Julie Bailey, was advised by a solicitor that her only means 
to alert authorities outside Stafford to the problems was to contact the Healthcare 
Commission.  Cure the NHS was asked by the Healthcare Commission to collect more 
evidence to determine whether an investigation was needed (Francis, 2010b: 284).   
The Healthcare Commission conducted an investigation, but Cure the NHS 
continued to call for a public inquiry following the Healthcare Commission‟s report 
(Healthcare Commission, 2009; Francis, 2010a: 30).  Andy Burnham, as Secretary of 
State, declined to establish a public inquiry, but agreed to set up an independent inquiry 
chaired by Robert Francis.  This independent inquiry was followed by a public inquiry, also 
chaired by Robert Francis, which was commissioned by Andrew Lansley, the Secretary of 
State within the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition government of 2010.  When 
Andy Burnham was asked to give evidence to the public inquiry, he indicated that he 
would have expected a greater outcry if a Minister were to understand that problems were 
on the scale of those found at the Stafford Hospital: 
„I would particularly have expected any concerns or issues in relation to Mid 
Staffordshire to have been highlighted by the local public involvement structure – 
the PPIF [PPI Forum] at that time – but to my knowledge, nothing came through 
this channel either.‟ (Burnham, 2011: §45)  
This comment was included in the written evidence submitted by Andy Burnham, 
suggesting that he was keen to report that he would have expected the PPI Forum to alert 
him to any significant problems at the Stafford Hospital.  Continuing his comments on the 
lack of information received through public involvement mechanisms, Andy Burnham 
volunteered the view that „the abolition of the Community Health Councils (CHCs) was not 
one of the Government‟s finest moments‟ (2011: §47).  In context, the implication is that as 
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Secretary of State he would have expected that if a Community Health Council had still 
been in place the problems at the hospital would have been drawn to his attention sooner. 
The statutory public involvement institutions that were in place during the period of 
the Mid Staffordshire inquiries were the PPI Forum (2005-2008) and the Staffordshire LINk 
(2008-2009).  The PPI Forum was closely embedded within Stafford Hospital (Counsel to 
the Inquiry, 2011: 215).  This working relationship is exemplified in the Healthcare 
Commission report by an incident in which a member of the PPI Forum was expelled by 
the Chair for releasing information to a newspaper on the Clostridium difficile (C. difficile) 
infection rates at the hospital (Healthcare Commission, 2009: 89).  Following this incident, 
„confidential‟ information was screened by the PPI Forum Chair before being passed on to 
other members (Healthcare Commission, 2009: 89).  Owing to this screening of 
information, the members of the Forum did not discuss the death rates at Stafford Hospital 
(Francis, 2010a: 388).  The PPI Forum was not seen to be coordinating interest 
representation and the rules established for PPI Forums were regarded by respondents to 
the independent inquiry as restricting the Forum‟s ability to engage with interest groups 
(Francis, 2010a: 397).  Former members of the PPI Forum were called as witnesses to the 
full public inquiry and questioned about their awareness of their powers.  The member who 
had been expelled for disclosing C. difficile infection rates was asked whether he was 
aware that the PPI Forum had the right to be able to refer issues to the Secretary of State: 
„Q: Were you, and other members of the PPIF [PPI Forum], aware of the power to 
go to the Minister of Health or a Minister? 
A: No, I – I would think most members of the PPI would have sort of held up their 
hands in amazement if that had been made available to us.  So I don‟t recall that 
ever coming up on the agenda at all.‟ (Bastin, 2010: 121) 
The lack of awareness of the power to refer issues to Ministers meant that individual 
members of the PPI Forum were not in a position to propose use of those powers. 
The Staffordshire Local Involvement Network was subject to a separate review in 
the wake of the Healthcare Commission‟s investigation, commissioned by the Department 
of Health (Wood and Cunnett, 2009a and 2009b).  After receiving the report, Staffordshire 
County Council decided to close the existing LINk and to recruit a new support 
organisation and new LINk members (Francis, 2010a: 389).  The Staffordshire LINk was 
criticised for not having fulfilled its watchdog role.  During the period 2008 to 2010 it failed 
to use its powers to enter and inspect the Stafford Hospital (Counsel to the Inquiry, 2011: 
109).  The reason given by the Staffordshire LINk for not visiting was that, despite 
Department of Health advice to the contrary, the LINk decided that its members would 
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need to be insured before any inspections were carried out (Counsel to the Inquiry, 2011: 
227).  The LINk did not use its scrutiny rights to access information effectively, it was not 
seen as a credible participant in decision-making processes and it had not created a 
network for interest representation, including struggling to build effective relationships with 
Cure the NHS (Wood and Cunnett, 2009a: 5, 3, 2).  In summing up at the end of the public 
inquiry, the Counsel to the Inquiry commented on the impact of politics within the 
Staffordshire LINk at a point when the events at the Stafford Hospital were having a 
significant impact across the NHS: 
„At a time when the shockwaves from the publication of the HCC [Healthcare 
Commission]‟s report into the trust were still being felt throughout the NHS, the 
external organisation supposed to ensure public involvement with the trust‟s affairs 
was completely consumed with an internal, factional struggle.‟ (Counsel to the 
Inquiry, 2011: 191) 
Respondents to the public inquiry expressed the expectation that a LINk should act as a 
watchdog.  Malcolm Alexander, formerly Director of the Association of CHCs for England 
and Wales, informed the inquiry that the division of the complaints function from public 
involvement had made it harder for statutory public involvement institutions to raise an 
alarm, as they did not hear about problems (Counsel to the Inquiry, 2011: 246). 
Staffordshire County Council expressed the expectation that the LINk should act as a 
watchdog, as it wanted to ensure that concerns were raised by the LINk with the Overview 
and Scrutiny Committee at the local authority – which, in the Council‟s view, would result in 
prompter action than referring problems to the national regulator (Francis, 2010a: 389).   
 The role of LINks was also considered more broadly as part of an examination of 
early warning mechanisms commissioned following the Healthcare Commission‟s report 
into the Stafford Hospital (National Quality Board, 2010).  The National Quality Board 
expressed the expectation that Local Involvement Networks would act as early warning 
systems.  Two of the seven recommendations by the National Quality Board to improve 
early warning mechanisms relate to strengthening the feedback routes for Local 
Involvement Networks (2010: 50-51). 
A review of the role played by regulatory bodies fell outside the scope of the initial 
independent inquiry led by Robert Francis, but the terms of reference for the public inquiry 
cover „the operation of the commissioning, supervising and regulatory organisations‟ 
including „local scrutiny and public engagement bodies‟.  The full public inquiry therefore 
considers both police-patrol and watchdog oversight.  As a police patrol accessing 
information, the Healthcare Commission expressed concern about the lack of narrative to 
explain data received from Stafford Hospital (Healthcare Commission, 2009: 3).  Whilst the 
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data indicated that there might be a problem, it was the narrative provided by Cure the 
NHS that illuminated the nature and scale of the issue.  In terms of discouraging violations, 
the Healthcare Commission referred the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust to 
Monitor with a view to de-authorising the trust‟s Foundation status (2009: 12).  The 
Healthcare Commission‟s report did not stop the problems at the hospital, however, so 
there were limits to the extent to which the Commission could discourage violations 
(Francis, 2010b: 285).  The events at Stafford Hospital seem to demonstrate the limits to 
police-patrol oversight and, as discussed below, a potential shift in Ministerial preference 
to strengthen the watchdog role. 
 
6.3     Demonstrating watchdog characteristics 
The four NHS inquiries were selected to cast light on understandings of the 
potential oversight roles that could be played by statutory public involvement institutions.  
The Ely Hospital Inquiry was very critical of the Hospital Management Committee 
arrangements and informed the development of NHS oversight mechanisms.  The 
elements that were lacking at the Ely Hospital and were integrated into the powers of 
Community Health Councils seem to reflect a watchdog role.  At the Normansfield 
Hospital, the Community Health Council was expected and encouraged to act as an early 
warning mechanism.  With the Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry, there was a shift to greater 
reliance on data collection to identify problems, which implied stronger police-patrol 
oversight.  The events at the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust, however, have 
called into question the effectiveness of police-patrol oversight, cast doubt on the value of 
a close relationship between a PPI Forum and the organisation to which it was connected, 
and encouraged Local Involvement Networks and their successors, the local Healthwatch, 
to take on a greater role as watchdogs.   
Statutory public involvement institutions were not in place at the time of the Ely 
Hospital Inquiry.  The inquiry was included in this chapter for the light the report and 
Crossman‟s response to it casts on the development of oversight mechanisms.  In each of 
the following inquiries, however, the reports provide examples of whether the institutions 
acted as watchdogs in practice or were expected to do so.  The extent to which the 
institutions demonstrated or were expected to have each of the watchdog characteristics is 
summarised in Figure 6.3 and discussed below. 
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Figure 6.3: Demonstration of watchdog characteristics in public inquiries 
Watchdog 
characteristics 
Normansfield 
(CHC) 
Bristol (CHC) Mid Staffs (PPI 
Forum) 
Mid Staffs (LINk) 
Gather 
intelligence 
about local 
services 
Regular visits, 
including 
comparative 
visits to similar 
services;  
Access to 
information from 
complaints 
Lay visits 
replaced by 
professional 
statistics 
Lay visits and 
limited access to 
performance data 
Limited 
information and 
criticised for not 
prioritising 
Stafford Hospital 
Influence 
decisions 
about local 
services 
Gathered 
information on 
policy and other 
hospital units to 
change planned 
unit 
CHCs seen as 
„tolerated 
mechanisms‟ as 
could do nothing 
Close to Trust 
Board and seen 
to be part of 
decisions 
Criticised for not 
being credible 
participant in 
decision making 
Challenge 
decisions and 
refer problems 
Referred issue 
to Regional 
Health Authority 
and Secretary of 
State 
Challenge 
rejected by 
inquiry team as 
generates blame 
Too close to the 
Trust to 
challenge; 
Members not 
aware of right to 
refer to Minister 
Not a credible 
challenge to local 
decisions 
Filter 
significant 
issues from 
problems 
raised by 
interest 
groups 
Issue-specific 
groups referred 
to CHC by 
Minister 
Emphasis of 
inquiry on 
partnership with 
individual 
patients, not 
groups 
Criticised for 
failure to work 
with Cure the 
NHS 
Criticised for 
failure to develop 
network or work 
with Cure the 
NHS 
 
Statutory public involvement institutions‟ ability to gather intelligence, the first 
characteristic, has predominantly been through visiting services and observing problems.  
Whilst the Bristol Inquiry called this practice into question, as some problems are only 
apparent through statistical comparison, this has continued to be a major activity for 
statutory public involvement institutions.  At Normansfield, the Community Health Council 
undertook regular visits to the hospital, but it also asked other CHCs to view the problems 
at Normansfield and visited similar services in other districts.  The CHC‟s concerns about 
Normansfield were first triggered by a letter of complaint from a former member of staff 
(Secretary of State for Social Services, 1978: 39).  Complaints, usually from patients or 
family members, provided Community Health Councils with valuable insights into possible 
problems.  As discussed above, Malcolm Alexander advised the Mid Staffordshire public 
inquiry about the impact of the loss of a complainants support role on the successors of 
CHCs (Counsel to the Inquiry, 2011: 246).  The combination of intelligence sources and 
comparative visiting activity gave the Kingston, Richmond and Esher Community Health 
Council a perspective on the extent to which the standards at Normansfield were either 
acceptable or fell short of what was being delivered in other long-stay hospitals.  The 
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Community Health Council at Bristol was able to see complaints and to visit, but the role of 
lay visiting was disregarded in favour of statistical analysis of data in the Bristol Inquiry 
report.  The reports into the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust include extracts from 
visits made by the lay PPI Forum to the Stafford Hospital, but only the Chair of the PPI 
Forum saw other performance data and so the intelligence from the visits could not be put 
into context.  The Staffordshire LINk was criticised for not prioritising visits to the Stafford 
Hospital (Wood and Cunnett, 2009a: 5).  The inquiries demonstrate examples of the 
successive statutory public involvement institutions gathering intelligence, predominantly 
through visits to hospitals; as discussed in Section 6.4 below, however, the value placed 
by Ministers on such information has varied over time. 
In order to be watchdogs for the local community, statutory public involvement 
institutions need to be able to influence local decisions in the interests of patients and the 
wider population.  The Normansfield Inquiry report included the example of the CHC 
checking national guidelines and visiting a 69-bed unit to inform its advice that a proposed 
unit would not be suitable, on the basis of which the decision about the unit was 
overturned (Secretary of State for Social Services, 1978: 41).  At Bristol, by contrast, the 
Community Health Council was described as a „tolerated mechanism‟ that could not 
influence decisions (Secretary of State for Health, 2001: 407).  The PPI Forum at the 
Stafford Hospital was too close to the hospital Board to influence decisions, whilst the 
Staffordshire LINk was criticised for not being a credible participant in local decisions 
(Healthcare Commission, 2009: 89; Wood and Cunnett, 2009a: 3).  If issues are to be 
resolved before they become serious problems, statutory public involvement institutions 
need to be able to influence local decisions. 
The right to challenge decisions and, if necessary, refer matters to Health Ministers 
is a fundamental element in the watchdog role.  At Normansfield, David Ennals praised the 
CHC in the published report for raising the issue of problems at the hospital (Secretary of 
State for Social Services, 1978: iv).  Examination of the evidence presented to the 
Normansfield committee of inquiry, however, shows that his predecessor, Barbara Castle, 
did not respond when the Community Health Council tried to alert her to problems at 
Normansfield (Kingston, Richmond and Esher CHC, 1977: 6).  The balance of sources 
therefore suggests that David Ennals was happy to be seen to be responding to a concern 
raised through the watchdog, but that Barbara Castle had ignored an earlier opportunity to 
respond.  Alan Milburn used the response to the Bristol inquiry as part of the rationale for 
changes to statutory public involvement institutions, but the local Community Health 
Council would not have had access to the data that would enable them to raise an alarm.  
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Evidence presented to the Mid Staffordshire inquiry suggests that PPI Forum members 
were not aware of the broad right of PPI Forums to refer issues either through the local 
Overview and Scrutiny Committee or through the Commission for Patient and Public 
Involvement in Health, but that Andy Burnham as Secretary of State would have expected 
to hear of the PPI Forum‟s concerns (Bastin, 2010: 121; Burnham, 2011: §45).  The short-
lived initial Staffordshire LINk did not have sufficient time to develop a role in challenging 
decisions either locally or nationally.   
The last of the dimensions to the role is the filtering of issues raised by interest 
groups, ensuring that issues of broad interest, rather than those of the best-resourced 
groups, were raised.  At Normansfield, this chapter has outlined evidence both through the 
inquiry and other articles that local voluntary organisations were referred by David Owen, 
as Minister, to the Community Health Council (Secretary of State for Social Services, 
1978: 41; Malin, 1978: 4).  There is less evidence of this filtering role in the later public 
inquiries.  Part of the shift between the Community Health Councils and PPI Forums was 
to individual members rather than representation of interest groups and the Stafford 
Hospital PPI Forum interpreted its role as not working with interest groups.  Local 
Involvement Networks were expected to include interest groups as members, however, 
and the Staffordshire LINk was criticised for its failure to create a network of groups and 
for not working effectively with Cure the NHS (Wood and Cunnett, 2009a: 2). 
The characteristics outlined in Figure 6.3 and discussed above suggest that there 
have been shifts in political preference for the use of a watchdog.  This examination of the 
watchdog role considered statutory public involvement institutions as presented in public 
inquiries at specific points in time.   The next section draws on information from the 
statutory public involvement institutions‟ archives to place the inquiries into a historical 
narrative and considers the trends in the value placed on statutory public involvement 
institutions as watchdogs in political management of the NHS. 
 
6.4     Changing political value placed on watchdog role 
To establish whether the patterns identified at the specific points of the public 
inquiries formed part of trends over time, this section considers the watchdog role through 
the examination of archival sources from the statutory public involvement institutions and 
in policy documentation.  It then reviews the trends in the value placed on statutory public 
involvement institutions as watchdogs.  The response to the Normansfield Inquiry 
suggested that the watchdog role was welcomed in the late 1970s.  The Patients first 
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consultation questioned in sheepdog terms whether there was a need for Community 
Health Councils if smaller health authorities were able to consult directly with health 
authorities (Department of Health and Social Security and Welsh Office, 1979: 14).  The 
watchdog role of CHCs was not included as a matter for debate in the Patients first 
consultation; and, once support for CHCs had been confirmed, the Community Health 
Councils in England consultation paper stated that the role of CHCs in inspecting NHS 
services should continue (Department of Health and Social Securty, 1981a: 3).  This 
suggests that it was the value of the sheepdog role rather than the watchdog role that was 
being questioned in the early 1980s consultations. 
None of the public inquiries discussed in this chapter reported their findings in the 
1980s, although the cases covered in the Birmingham Royal Infirmary Inquiry started in 
1984.  During the 1980s, however, Community Health Councils were commended where 
they played a role in identifying or reporting on problems.  In the case of nineteen deaths 
from food poisoning at the Stanley Royd Hospital in 1984, the „considerable assistance‟ of 
the CHC was put on record even though reports from the CHC and others about risks from 
open drainage channels in the kitchens had not been acted upon (Hogg, 1986: 20).  The 
assumption leading up to the Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry seems to have been that 
problems in hospitals and other NHS services would have been visible to Community 
Health Council members undertaking visits to monitor services. 
The discussion of the Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry showed that a lower value was 
placed on the watchdog role played by CHCs by the late1990s.  Community Health 
Councils continued to have a value for Ministers in the 1990s, however, in commenting on 
issues and responses to problems in the NHS from a public perspective.  When Virginia 
Bottomley was challenged in the House of Commons on the rationale for an independent 
rather than a public inquiry into the deaths of children under the care of Nurse Beverly 
Allitt, she justified it on the grounds that the Community Health Council covering the 
Grantham and Kesteven general hospital had agreed that an independent inquiry would be 
more appropriate for the NHS personnel and the parents involved (HC Deb (1993-94) 237 
col. 590). 
Leading up to the abolition of Community Health Councils, the Association of CHCs 
for England and Wales facilitated a national form of the watchdog role.  This was Casualty 
Watch, a coordinated monitoring of casualty services, noting numbers, such as the 
number of people on trolleys, which could be combined quickly and brought to the 
attention of national politicians (as an example, ACHCEW, 2000a).  In this approach, 
CHCs were using the data-generating techniques associated with police-patrol oversight.  
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Casualty Watch created confrontation at a national level.  In the Bristol Royal Infirmary 
Inquiry, there was an assumption that local confrontation was detrimental to identifying 
problems.  As discussed above, the inquiry at Bristol shifted the emphasis away from what 
was visible to the collation of data in order to identify problems through statistical 
comparison.  Whilst individual Community Health Councils could not develop comparative 
data alone, ACHCEW had the capability to support consistent data collection and compare 
the findings.  This watchdog role utilised the mechanisms of police-patrol oversight and 
does not seem to have been welcomed.  It is possible that this national watchdog role 
contributed to the decision to abolish Community Health Councils. 
Whilst Patient and Public Involvement Forums retained the rights of Community 
Health Councils to enter and inspect NHS services, their activity was steered towards 
monitoring hospital cleanliness.  The political value placed on inspection at this point in 
time seems to have been influenced by the contemporary issue of methicillin-resistant 
staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), a bacterium that causes infections in different parts of the 
body and cannot be treated with common antibiotics.  The spread of MRSA is associated 
with poor hospital hygiene and the application pack for PPI Forum members advised them 
that they would be „inspecting wards for MRSA and cleanliness‟ (CPPIH, n.d. [2003b]: 
unpaginated [2]).  This specific role in a politically-resonant issue suggests that the 
watchdog role had a value, but that it was a symbolic link with current issues rather than a 
powerful watchdog to alert the Secretary of State to major problems. 
The inquiries into the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust covered the activity 
of both the PPI Forum and the Local Involvement Network.  The transition from Local 
Involvement Networks to local Healthwatch seems to have been triggered by the political 
need to be seen to strengthen the watchdog role in response to the problems at the 
Stafford Hospital.  Local Healthwatch groups will be supported by Healthwatch England, a 
statutory committee within the Care Quality Commission.  Guidance notes on local 
Healthwatch indicate that they will receive advice from Healthwatch England and that 
Healthwatch England will have access to the data and analytical support found in its host 
organisation: 
„CQC [Care Quality Commission] will also be able to offer Healthwatch England 
valuable expertise in data management, gathering and use of intelligence, analysis 
and evidence base of information about services across the country.  Whatever 
arrangements are made for sharing policy knowledge or pooling intelligence, 
Healthwatch England will have operational and editorial independence from CQC; 
it will reach its own conclusions and publish its own findings and advice.‟ 
(Department of Health, 2012b: 11) 
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Despite changes in statutory powers, the watchdog-related activities of the 
statutory public involvement institutions have remained fairly consistent in their visiting of 
services to gather intelligence, although the reporting of this and the value placed upon it 
has varied over time.  The changes in the political value do not just relate to the activities 
of the statutory public involvement institutions in isolation, but broader changes to the 
options for police-patrol oversight, particularly with the increasing ease of data collection 
and analysis with the development of computer systems in the NHS.   
Examining NHS inquiries illuminates the role played by the evolution of 
computerisation and statistical analysis in shaping political preferences between 
watchdogs and police patrols.  The Ely and Normansfield inquiries in the 1960s and 1970s 
both concluded that problems in hospitals should be visible to lay people.  By the period 
covered by the Bristol Inquiry, in the 1980s and 1990s, computerisation meant that data on 
small samples of patients could be gathered over time and compared to outcomes for 
patients in similar services.  This led to greater dependence on the data collection and 
analysis abilities of police patrols.  Events at the Stafford Hospital then showed that 
dependence upon data and statistical comparison was not sufficient.  Although data were 
supplied to the Healthcare Commission, the hospital did not provide a clear narrative to 
explain the information supplied.  Matters had reached an extreme point by the time that 
Cure the NHS had formed itself into an issue-specific group to call for health services at 
Stafford Hospital to be investigated.  The shifting preferences elucidate the impact of 
information management systems on quality management in the NHS, but also show the 
limitations of depending upon standardised data collection to identify problems.  This has 
ramifications for the nature of police-patrol oversight and its combination with watchdog 
oversight.  On the basis of experience in the NHS, a police-patrol could be predominantly 
a mechanism to collect and analyse data, combined with a watchdog visiting role. 
Access to information for the PPI Forums and Local Involvement Networks was 
predominantly through visiting services.  Community Health Councils also had rights to 
enter and inspect services, but these were complemented by a role in supporting 
complainants.  The CHCs never had a statutory role in complaints management, but 
supporting people who had complaints about NHS services provided the CHCs with 
insights into potential problems in local services that they could examine.  The role of 
supporting complainants was transferred on the abolition of the Community Health 
Councils to organisations within the NHS trusts, the Patient Advice and Liaison Services 
(PALS).  Considered from a Hirschmanian perspective, it is valuable to managers to learn 
directly from the voice of complaining consumers in order to rectify individual problems and 
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improve services (Hirschman, 1970:  42).  In the wake of the Bristol Royal Infirmary, 
management of complaints through PALS was probably also seen as less confrontational, 
supporting a culture of greater openness between patients and professionals so that 
professionals could learn from their mistakes without feeling as through they were being 
blamed.   As the evidence to the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry 
suggested, however, the lack of information about complaints may have weakened the 
watchdog abilities of statutory public involvement institutions (Counsel of Inquiry, 2011: 
246). 
One of the shifts in the relationship between Ministers and statutory public 
involvement institutions over time has been the ease with which the local organisations 
could refer problems directly to the Secretary of State, or whether referrals were made 
through another institution.  The Community Health Councils could refer unresolved issues 
directly to the Secretary of State.  PPI Forums could refer issues either through the 
Commission for Patient and Public Involvement in Health or through the Overview and 
Scrutiny Committees within local authorities.  The referral rights for Local Involvement 
Networks covered local referrals to the Overview and Scrutiny Committees, so LINks were 
dependent on the willingness of their local Overview and Scrutiny Committee to refer an 
issue on their behalf.  Taken alongside the shifts in watchdog and police-patrol 
preferences indicated in the NHS inquiries, the direct referrals to the Secretary of State 
occur when greater prominence was given to a watchdog role.  The transition to local 
Healthwatch develops a body that still has close connections with its Overview and 
Scrutiny Committee, but also has opportunities to raise national issues through 
Healthwatch England.  
  The empirical example of statutory public involvement institutions in the NHS 
adds to the legislative oversight model developed by McCubbins and Schwartz.  
McCubbins and Schwartz suggest that fire alarms are created through the development of 
„rules, procedures and informal practices‟ that enable citizens and interest groups to act as 
fire alarms (1984: 166).  The example of statutory public involvement institutions in the 
NHS demonstrates that organisations can also be created specifically to provide a 
watchdog or fire-alarm oversight.  Where there are multiple local interests, creating an 
institution to filter issues may avoid the problem of alarms only being raised by well-
organised interests (Hopenhayn and Lohmann, 1996: 209).  The analysis in this chapter 
indicates that statutory public involvement institutions have been intended to raise alarms 
in the general public interest, but that they may be seen as too antagonistic (as in the 
Bristol Inquiry report) or as captured by compromised individuals (as with the PPI Forum at 
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the Stafford Hospital), leaving professionals or non-statutory organisations to take on the 
watchdog role. 
Lupia and McCubbins indicated that politicians may prefer to work with a 
combination of oversight mechanisms, rather than relying solely on one form of oversight 
(1994: 97-98).  The expectations of statutory public involvement institutions expressed in 
the NHS inquiries suggest that political preferences for the desired balance of watchdog 
and police-patrol oversight have varied over time.  The Bristol Inquiry was a high point for 
police patrols; subsequently events at the Stafford Hospital have tilted the balance back 
towards watchdogs (National Quality Board, 2010: 8).  Following the independent inquiry 
into Mid Staffordshire it was proposed that Local Involvement Networks would be 
transferred into a new statutory public involvement institution, local Healthwatch.  Local 
Healthwatch have greater scrutiny powers than LINks and clearer rights to refer issues 
(Department of Health & Communities and Local Government, 2010).  The changes 
include the creation of a national body, Healthwatch England, as part of the Care Quality 
Commission (Health and Social Care Act 2012).  Healthwatch England will work with local 
Healthwatch groups to alert the Secretary of State to problems.  Placing Healthwatch 
England within the Care Quality Commission locates the central body for local watchdogs 
within the national police patrol.  This positioning may have ramifications for modelling of 
oversight mechanisms.  The changes also suggest an acknowledgement of the need for 
greater powers, including access to data analysis, to support a watchdog role. 
 
 
Chapter summary 
This chapter reviewed the potential role of statutory public involvement institutions 
as watchdogs, alerting politicians to problems before they become disasters.  The first 
section considered the statutory powers of both professional monitoring bodies and 
statutory public involvement institutions to establish the extent to which different 
institutions over time may be understood to provide either police-patrol oversight or 
watchdog oversight.  This section applied models taken from the legislative oversight 
literature, drawing on work by McCubbins and Schwartz.  The second part of the chapter 
reviewed four NHS inquiries to examine over time whether statutory public involvement 
institutions alerted politicians to problems or were expected to do so.  The statutory public 
involvement institutions in each of the NHS inquiries were then discussed in terms of 
watchdog characteristics.  The chapter concluded with a summary of shifts over time, such 
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as the move towards performance data as a means to identify problems in the Bristol 
Inquiry and a shift following the problems at the Stafford Hospital back towards the need 
for intelligence gathered through visiting services. 
The closing chapter brings together themes from the discussion of both the 
watchdog role and the sheepdog role presented in the two preceding chapters and returns 
to the research question of the role(s) statutory public involvement institutions played in 
political management of the English NHS between 1974 and 2010. 
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Chapter Seven:  Sheepdog or watchdog? Conclusions 
In this study, I considered roles that statutory public involvement institutions may 
have played in political management of the English NHS during the period from 1974 to 
2010.  The statutory public involvement institutions are local volunteer-led organisations, 
which are established and granted statutory powers by Ministers.  The period for this study 
covered a succession of statutory public involvement institutions: Community Health 
Councils, 1974-2003; Patient and Public Involvement Forums, 2003-2008; and Local 
Involvement Networks from 2008.  Research into these institutions is timely, as Local 
Involvement Networks are due to be replaced by local Healthwatch in April 2013.  I 
identified two potential political management roles for these institutions from within the 
political science literature and explored these using documentary sources: a sheepdog, 
rounding up participants and managing potential opposition; and a watchdog, providing 
fire-alarm-style oversight and alerting politicians to problems before they become 
disasters.  Each of these roles draws on the statutory powers of statutory public 
involvement institutions.  The sheepdog reflects the consultation rights, whilst the 
watchdog utilises the rights to inspect services and to refer unresolved issues. 
This closing chapter opens with a summary of the findings on a chapter-by-chapter 
basis.  The next four sections consider each of the main conclusions in turn.  Firstly, there 
was strong evidence of the sheepdog role in the 1970s, but the political value placed on 
the sheepdog role has declined.  Secondly, the watchdog role is being reappraised; having 
fallen from favour with increasing data capacity through computerisation and the growth of 
regulatory police patrols, the watchdog role seems to have been revived following 
problems at the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust.  Thirdly, the extent to which 
sheepdog and watchdog roles have been combined has varied over time.  The last of the 
conclusions discussed in this chapter is that changes to statutory public involvement 
institutions tend to take place as part of wider NHS reforms.  This may suggest that 
transitions between statutory public involvement institutions moderate the ability of their 
committed voluntary members to oppose wider reforms.   
Drawing on these conclusions, I propose that statutory public involvement 
institutions play roles in political management of the NHS, but that the institutions 
themselves are also subject to management by Ministers.  These conclusions expand 
upon themes in the existing literature of managing local representation and monitoring 
service quality.  They also contribute to the public involvement literature by providing new 
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perspectives on the value to Ministers of statutory public involvement institutions in political 
management of public services. 
 
7.1 Summary: review of the findings in preceding chapters 
To contextualise the main conclusions, this section revisits the findings presented 
in the previous chapters.  The first three chapters of this dissertation introduced the 
empirical puzzle, the existing literature and the research framework for this study.  The 
next three chapters discussed the empirical material drawn from policy documents and 
archives to assess whether statutory public involvement institutions could be considered 
as playing either sheepdog or watchdog roles in political management of the NHS. 
Chapter One introduced the challenges faced by Ministers undertaking political 
management of the NHS.  It also described the history of the statutory public involvement 
institutions in the wider context of changes to the NHS.  The description of the statutory 
public involvement institutions touched briefly on the different forms in each of the UK 
nations, but established that the focus of this study is on the successive statutory public 
involvement institutions in England.  The opening chapter proposed that the ongoing state 
investment in statutory public involvement institutions could be seen as something of a 
puzzle in the context of the growth of two alternative forms of public involvement, self-
generating interest groups and NHS-led forms of public involvement. 
The literature review in Chapter Two examined approaches to public involvement 
in the existing literature.  The review took a chronological approach, demonstrating that 
academic interests in public involvement in the NHS have shifted over time.  In the 1970s 
and 1980s, statutory public involvement institutions were studied in terms of their 
membership and working relationships.  In the 1990s, there was considerable academic 
interest in innovative NHS-led forms of public involvement, such as citizens‟ juries.  Since 
2000, there has been a growth in the literature on interest groups and the successive 
changes to statutory public involvement institutions have also received academic attention.  
Broad themes of democratic and consumerist approaches to involvement run through the 
literature.  In reviewing the literature, I also identified the themes of managing interest 
representation and monitoring service quality.    
Chapter Three discussed the research question and the theoretical approaches 
underlying the sheepdog and watchdog models for roles in political management of the 
NHS.  The sheepdog analogy builds on the theme of managing interest representation in 
the existing literature.  Like an actual sheepdog, it both rounds up potential participants 
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and pens them into management processes.  The term „watchdog‟ in this study refers to 
the fire-alarm style oversight provided by interest groups.  I propose that in their watchdog 
role the statutory public involvement institutions monitor service quality and alert politicians 
to problems before they become disasters.  In the third chapter, I also outlined the 
selection of methods used, including the rationale for a documentary approach and the 
selection of archival sources.   
Chapter Four was the first of three empirical chapters. It considered Community 
Health Councils during the period between their introduction in 1974 and the election in 
1997 of the Labour government that would abolish Community Health Councils.  The 
chapter applied a sheepdog model to review changes and stability over time.  The 
combination of guidance on appointments and the cross-section of appointing bodies 
ensured that local interest groups were members of Community Health Councils 
throughout this period, particularly representatives of vulnerable groups, such as people 
with mental health problems (Section 4.1).  Considered from a sheepdog perspective, the 
appointment mechanisms structured membership in a way that could support local interest 
intermediation.   
The findings in Chapter Four suggested that intermediation was very much at a 
local level, rather than a national level.  The mediation of local interest group participation 
was not consistent over time, however, as from 1984 onwards local interest groups 
participated directly in joint consultative committees operating between health services and 
local authorities (Section 4.2).  During the 1990s, there was a shift in policy from relying on 
consultation with interest groups to encouraging NHS-led selection of participants to mirror 
the demographic profile of a community.  With the closure of Regional Health Authorities in 
1995, regional offices of the NHS Executive took on the role of establishing Community 
Health Councils and the offices were encouraged to seek a balance of representation in 
terms of race, age, sex and geographical localities within the membership (Section 4.3).  
This incorporated a more demographic sense of representativeness of the community into 
the selection of members, rather than focusing on the interest groups that members 
represented. 
The sheepdog role provides an opportunity for Ministers to avoid blame for 
contentious local decisions by „passing the buck‟ to statutory public involvement 
institutions (Weaver, 1986: 379).  Chapter Four presented the right of Community Health 
Councils to agree local hospital closures as a blame-avoidance strategy by Ministers.    
This was the most apparent example of blame avoidance during the period studied, 
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demonstrating that state-funded groups of volunteers can take the blame locally for 
unpopular initiatives. 
 Chapter Five reviewed the period from 1997 to 2010.  This covered a series of 
transitions between statutory public involvement institutions: Community Health Councils; 
Patient and Public Involvement Forums; Local Involvement Networks; and plans to replace 
Local Involvement Networks with local Healthwatch.  The chapter considered the changes 
in terms of a sheepdog role.  
The local intermediation role has varied between the successive statutory public 
involvement institutions.  Chapter Five opened with the final years of the Community 
Health Councils.  The initial model for their successors, referred to as „patients‟ forums‟ in 
The NHS plan, continued to have half of the members as representatives of local interest 
groups and half „randomly drawn from respondents to the trust‟s annual patient survey‟ 
(Secretary of State for Health, 2000: 94).  In practice, however, all members of the PPI 
Forums were recruited as individuals rather than as representatives of interest groups 
(Section 5.2).  This meant that PPI Forums were not in a position to act as interest 
intermediaries, although they took steps, such as working with sign-language translators, 
to enable people who were members of vulnerable communities to take part in the PPI 
Forums directly.  The relationship between interest groups and statutory public 
involvement institutions changed again with the creation of Local Involvement Networks.  
The ethos underlying LINks was one of multiple forms of engagement, not necessarily 
membership.  LINks included interest groups within their networks, but, like PPI Forums, 
LINks lacked statutory rights to be consulted.  Without statutory rights, some LINks chose 
not to participate in formal consultation exercises and some mobilised opposition to local 
plans (Section 5.3).  Whilst LINks incorporated more activity with local interest groups than 
PPI Forums, they did not mediate local interests to the same degree as Community Health 
Councils had done. 
Chapter Five also considered the national intermediary role in the period 1997 to 
2010.  National roles changed with the transitions between different forms of local statutory 
public involvement institution.  The Association of CHCs for England and Wales had 
rejected a national intermediary role.  The PPI Forums were modeled on the basis of being 
supported by a national organisation, the Commission for Patient and Public Involvement 
in Health (CPPIH), which would recruit members for the local forums and coordinate 
activity between them.  The CPPIH also had the potential to become a national 
intermediary for patient and public involvement more widely, as it was granted a role in 
representing national patient groups, although it was not given time to develop this role.  
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The Local Involvement Networks, by contrast, were set up without a national body that 
could take on an intermediation role. 
The period 1997 to 2010 saw a shift from rights of the statutory public involvement 
institutions to be consulted, to a wider duty placed on the NHS to consult the public.  The 
account in Chapter Five describes a transition from the right of Community Health 
Councils to be consulted, to a duty under the Health and Social Care Act 2001 Section 11 
(reiterated in the National Health Services Act 2006 Section 242) that health services 
make arrangements „that persons to whom those services are being or may be provided 
are, directly or through representatives, involved in and consulted‟ on plans for or changes 
to services.  The suggestion in Chapter Five was that this did not give a specific role for 
statutory public involvement institutions in the process.  If they did not have an allocated 
consultation role, the institutions were not a strong enough position to enable Ministers to 
avoid blame for unpopular decisions. 
Whereas Chapters Four and Five reviewed the sheepdog role using the archives of 
the statutory public involvement institutions themselves, Chapter Six examined the 
watchdog role using material from public inquiries into problems in NHS hospitals.  The 
rationale for using public inquiries data is that the evidence received by the inquiries, with 
Ministerial responses, provides insight at specific points in time into whether statutory 
public involvement institutions were expected to alert Ministers to resolvable problems 
before they became disasters.  I selected four public inquiries to cast light on expectations 
at different points in time.  The first inquiry, into the Ely Hospital in Cardiff, criticised the 
lack of systematic visiting by the Hospital Management Committee; this critique influenced 
the visiting rights granted to statutory public involvement institutions.  The second inquiry, 
into the Normansfield Hospital in Teddington, was the first major inquiry following the 
establishment of Community Health Councils.  Thirdly, the Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry 
influenced the transition from Community Health Councils to PPI Forums.  The most 
recent inquiry selected, into the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust, included 
criticisms of the former PPI Forum and Staffordshire LINk and is likely to have contributed 
to the replacement of LINks with local Healthwatch. 
Chapter Six opened with a review of the organisations that may have provided 
professional police-patrol oversight, followed by an assessment of whether the successive 
statutory public involvement institutions had the powers to act as watchdogs by identifying 
and alerting Ministers to problems.  The findings in the chapter suggest that Ministers have 
expected the institutions to act as watchdogs, but that this expectation has not been 
consistent.  The local Community Health Council in the Normansfield Inquiry was praised 
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by David Ennals for its tenacity in identifying and reporting on problems.  Volunteers from 
the PPI Forum and Local Involvement Network in the Stafford Hospital case were asked 
whether they were aware that they could refer problems to the Secretary of State and 
Andy Burnham indicated that he would have expected the PPI Forum to inform him of any 
major problems when he was Secretary of State.  In the Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry, by 
contrast, the watchdog role is seen as problematic because it is confrontational and so 
deters professionals from admitting to difficulties.  No expectation is expressed in the 
Bristol Inquiry report that the local Community Health Council could have raised concerns 
about a problem that was apparent only through statistical comparison with similar 
services.  The narrative in Chapter Six suggests that following the Bristol Inquiry Ministers 
focused on police-patrol oversight, including capturing data on services, and that the 
problems at Stafford Hospital demonstrated that a stronger watchdog role was needed 
alongside the professional regulatory mechanisms. 
The chapter summary above suggests that, at different points in time, both the 
sheepdog and watchdog roles have formed part of Ministers‟ political management of the 
NHS.  The value placed on the sheepdog and watchdog roles has changed over time, 
however, with a decline in Ministerial preference for the sheepdog role and a reappraisal of 
the value of the watchdog role following problems at the Mid Staffordshire NHS 
Foundation Trust.  These trends are considered within the conclusions below. 
 
7.2 Sheepdog decline 
Ministers have placed varying value on the sheepdog aspects of statutory public 
involvement institutions, but the general trend has been a decline in the sheepdog role.  As 
presented in Figure 3.1 in Chapter Three, I propose that the sheepdog role has four 
characteristics: mediation between local interest groups, including ensuring representation 
of vulnerable groups; structuring consultation on local services; focusing attention on a 
state-determined range of issues; and taking responsibility for unpopular local decisions.  
My „sheepdog‟ analogy describes public involvement in terms of corporatist-style rounding 
up of interest groups, such as patient organisations and Leagues of Friends of particular 
NHS institutions, and managing involvement in ways that enable Ministers to avoid blame 
for unpopular decisions.  Ministerial interest in the full range of sheepdog characteristics 
was most apparent during the 1970s and least apparent with the Patient and Public 
Involvement Forums.  Whilst there has been increased involvement of interest groups 
through Local Involvement Networks and local Healthwatch, this has not been as explicitly 
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an intermediation role as it was for the Community Health Councils.  This section 
considers each of the sheepdog characteristics and the overarching decline. 
Interest group intermediation seemed to be valued most during the 1970s, at a time 
of small governmental majorities and considerable unrest following the oil crisis.  The 
appointment structures for Community Health Councils ensured that the voluntary 
members would be representatives of local interest groups.  In case representatives of 
vulnerable groups were not selected as members by local authorities and local voluntary 
organisations, Regional Health Authorities were expected to use their sixth of 
appointments „to honour the Secretary of State‟s obligations to allocate places on CHCs to 
certain organisations in order to ensure continued representation of special interests‟ 
(Department of Health and Social Security, 1974a: §15).  The appointment mechanisms 
created a degree of local ownership of the appointments process: with half of the members 
appointed by local authorities; a third by local voluntary sector organisations; and a sixth 
by the Regional Health Authority.  This local involvement, particularly the requirement that 
voluntary organisations should „agree amongst themselves how the places to be filled by 
them should be allocated‟, ensured a corporatist-style intermediation in the creation of 
CHCs that could form the basis of further mediation (Department of Health and Social 
Security, 1974a: §14). 
During the 1970s, Ministers referred local interest groups that had concerns about 
health services to their Community Health Council and discouraged them from 
approaching NHS organisations directly (Malin, 1978).  At this early stage, Ministers‟ 
actions suggest that they valued statutory public involvement institutions as local 
intermediaries.  Over time, however, the Community Health Councils applied their 
sheepdog skills to coordinating opposition.  The rogue sheepdog behaviour of Community 
Health Councils meant that they could not be depended upon to intermediate.  In addition, 
the value placed on the intermediation role lessened over time, with greater direct 
involvement from the 1980s onwards of the voluntary sector in decisions about health 
services and the increase, particularly from the 1990s, in the number of health or social 
care services that voluntary organisations were contracted to provide on the behalf of the 
state.  Where interest groups were providers of services for the state, this could be argued 
to influence their perspective on local service provision, leading to greater emphasis on 
participation by ordinary members of the public rather than interest groups. 
The second characteristic of sheepdogs is that they structure the local consultation 
process.  At points when interest groups are seen by Ministers as needing to have their 
involvement moderated, this structuring is valuable.  Seen from the perspective of 
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collective voice input into decision-making in the NHS, the structured consultation aspects 
of a sheepdog role ensure that the input is received in a form that can be processed by 
NHS personnel.  In effect, the intermediation aspects of structured consultation mean that 
differences of opinion between interest groups are worked through by the interest groups 
themselves under the auspices of the statutory public involvement institution.  This is of 
less value to Ministers if they prioritise learning from individual consumers over the input of 
collective voices.  The Griffiths report in 1983 marked a turning point, with a new focus on 
the need to learn from consumer feedback (Department of Health and Social Security, 
1983).  From this point onwards, statutory public involvement institutions became 
mechanisms to gather the views of consumers, alongside NHS-led engagement and 
market research.  Seen in these terms, the input of statutory public involvement institutions 
was layered with other forms of feedback to inform managers about the quality of services.  
This meant that their input contributed to consumer feedback, but may not have been 
valued as a means to filter or coordinate comments from interest groups. 
Throughout the period studied, statutory public involvement institutions have 
retained a state-determined remit, the third of the sheepdog characteristics.  Whilst Local 
Involvement Networks were given more freedom in terms of organisational structure than 
their predecessors, the breadth of their remit was still determined by the state.  The 
breadth of the successive remits seems to have changed in line with wider Ministerial 
concerns: after the cultural issues identified at Bristol Royal Infirmary, PPI Forums were 
established to develop relationships with specific NHS trusts; and Local Involvement 
Networks were granted remits across both health and social care when the trend was 
towards creating more integrated patient experience that covered both health and social 
care services.  The remits were all local, whether health services for Community Health 
Councils, specific NHS trusts for PPI Forums or the combination of health and social care 
services for Local Involvement Networks.  In practice, however, Community Health 
Councils extended beyond their local remit as the activity of the Association of CHCs for 
England and Wales enabled them to identify national trends.  This national facilitative role 
was rejected and replaced by a more formal management through the Commission for 
Patient and Public Involvement in Health, followed by a framework in which the Local 
Involvement Networks had no national body.  Keeping the remit as essentially local has 
been a consistent part of the Ministerial steer given to statutory public involvement 
institutions.  
In developing the sheepdog model for this study, I incorporated blame-avoidance 
characteristics as the fourth dimension to the role.  Like the herding dog of the analogy, a 
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sheepdog keeps participants penned so that they can be managed.  A managed local 
group can be used to keep problems at a distance from the Minister.  Whereas other 
aspects of the role drew on Schmitter‟s model of state corporatism, this fourth 
characteristic was taken from the blame-avoidance literature (Schmitter, 1974; Weaver, 
1986).  In common with the intermediation aspects of statutory public involvement 
institutions, the blame-avoidance role seems to have been utilised and valued by Ministers 
most during the 1970s.  If a Minister is to „pass the buck‟, they either have to trust the 
institution to which the decision has been delegated or to be willing to take the risk of an 
outcome with which they might not agree (Weaver, 1986: 385).  In instances where costly 
decisions are delegated to intermediaries, Ministers need to be able to trust that the 
institutions will undertake effective intermediation to reduce the risk of criticisms being 
raised by individual interest groups.  Costly decisions are only likely to be delegated to an 
intermediary body, therefore, if it is a strong intermediary.  In Chapters Four and Five, the 
most likely evidence for statutory public involvement institutions as blame-avoidance 
mechanisms was found in the case of their rights to agree local hospital closures.  This 
took a responsibility from the Secretary of State and placed it directly with the Community 
Health Councils.  Whilst the statutory public involvement institutions were not authorised to 
agree hospital closures after 1985, the strength of this blame-avoidance example suggests 
that the creation or re-shaping of state-funded voluntary bodies provides an option for 
Ministers that adds to the models in the literature on blame avoidance. 
Considered overall, the sheepdog role seems to have been valued most by 
Ministers at points when there has been a small parliamentary majority.  As the NHS is 
revered by the public, issues raised by interest groups at a local level could have a 
significant impact in marginal parliamentary constituencies.  With a Coalition government, 
with no overall majority in Parliament, overseeing the transition from Local Involvement 
Networks to local Healthwatch, it is possible that a stronger intermediary could be 
integrated into the next generation of institutions.  Trends in consumerism and interest 
group activity outlined below, however, suggest that there is unlikely to be a marked return 
to the sheepdog role and that it is the watchdog role that is likely to be of interest to 
Ministers in the development of local Healthwatch.  
The decline in the sheepdog role seems to be connected to greater emphasis on 
the service user as a consumer.  As a consumer, an individual provides feedback on their 
personal experience of service quality.  This is a very different role from that of a citizen 
involved in decisions about the future of health services.  Part of the consumer role is to 
choose their preferred service or service provider.  Trends from these choices are 
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analysed to inform service development, rather than engaging service users either 
individually or collectively in voicing their preferences (Williamson, 2010: 122-125; Coulter, 
2011: 22-26).  This is a different form of involvement from that provided by the statutory 
public involvement institutions, as it emphasises learning from the exit or choice 
dimensions of Hirschman‟s model (Hirschman, 1970).  Ministers who value individual 
patient choice as a mechanism may not value the collective voice facilitated by statutory 
public involvement institutions in sheepdog mode. 
The politics of interest group engagement have also changed.  At the national 
level, patient organisations have become more influential and Ministers have sought direct 
engagement with them.  At the local level, some interest groups are contracted to provide 
state services, which complicates the nature of their involvement in decisions about the 
future of local services.  The experience of the Local Involvement Networks suggests that 
where voluntary sector organisations are contracted to provide services, the statutory 
public involvement institutions facilitate their involvement in care provision rather than 
taking a pure intermediation role in representing their interests as part of consultation on 
service developments.   
The case of statutory public involvement institutions demonstrates that state-
funded voluntary groups may take on a sheepdog role, but that creating a framework for 
intermediation is risky for Ministers as the sheepdog may use its powers to round up 
opposition rather than to control it.  The discussions in Chapters Four and Five include 
examples of each of the successive statutory public involvement institutions facilitating 
opposition to proposed reforms.  With the transition to local Healthwatch, I suggest that the 
watchdog role is the main focus of Ministerial interest in statutory public involvement 
institutions. 
 
7.3 Watchdog reappraisal 
I drew upon the legislative oversight literature for the characteristics of the 
watchdog role, taking the „watchdog‟ terminology from documents produced by statutory 
public involvement institutions and applying this to the fire-alarm analogy developed by 
McCubbins and Schwartz.  This watchdog is not a formalised regulator, but a means by 
which issues can be identified and referred by volunteers committed to assuring the quality 
of their local services.  As I outlined in Figure 3.2 in Chapter Three, the watchdog has four 
characteristics: gathering intelligence so that it can identify problems in services; 
influencing decisions about local services; challenging local decisions, including referring 
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unresolved issues; and filtering significant issues from the concerns raised by interest 
groups and others.  The trend in the value placed by Ministers on a watchdog role seemed 
to be in decline, outweighed by the emphasis on police-patrol regulation and the 
improvement in data collection and statistical comparison following computerisation.  I 
suggested in Chapter Six, however, that the watchdog role is being reappraised following 
the failure of data-based mechanisms to alert Ministers to problems at the Mid 
Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust. 
The ability to gather intelligence and identify problems is essential to the watchdog 
role.  Throughout the period from 1974 to 2010, statutory public involvement institutions 
had rights to enter and inspect NHS premises.  These rights were extended with the 
creation of Local Involvement Networks to include premises in which social care took 
place, with the exception of individuals‟ homes.  On the premise that any problems would 
be visible, these rights provide statutory public involvement institutions with the means to 
act as watchdogs.  Following the inquiry into the deaths of babies at the Bristol Royal 
Infirmary, the emphasis on data collection increased, as the higher than expected number 
of deaths was only apparent through statistical comparison.  Collation of data and 
statistical comparison shifted Ministerial preference towards a police-patrol model for 
oversight of NHS services.  Much of the quality of care depends upon the quality of 
interactions between NHS personnel and patients.  The quality of interactions is generally 
observable and may not be apparent through completed responses to patient experience 
surveys.  The experience at the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust demonstrated 
that services need to be observed by people with local knowledge and local relationships 
who can compile the narrative to explain any trends in data and establish whether local 
concerns amount to significant problems.  The Ministerial preference therefore seems to 
have shifted back towards a watchdog role with the new local Healthwatch.  As discussed 
below, however, the new watchdog model places the central body for Healthwatch, 
Healthwatch England, within the police patrol for the NHS and social care. 
Complaints provide a specific form of intelligence on problems in services.  
Statutory public involvement institutions were not granted statutory powers over 
complaints management at any point in the period between 1974 and 2010.  In practice, 
however, Community Health Councils acted as a „patient‟s friend‟ and provided support to 
complainants who were experiencing problems in the NHS.  Supporting complainants 
provided Community Health Councils with a valuable insight into problems in local NHS 
organisations.  Complaints could be monitored to identify trends.  As the NHS started to 
take a more consumerist approach to public involvement during the1990s, however, the 
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complaints management processes within the NHS were improved so that managers could 
refine services on the basis of customer feedback.  When CHCs were abolished, their 
informal complainant support activity was transferred to Patient Advice and Liaison 
Services (PALS).  As services within the NHS, PALS were able to ensure that problems 
were addressed swiftly and that NHS managers received information from the complaints 
to enable them to improve services.  With the advent of PALS, the PPI Forums and Local 
Involvement Networks had limited access to information from complaints.  As part of the 
reappraisal of the watchdog role, local Healthwatch will have access to data through the 
Care Quality Commission.  On the basis of the data used by Community Health Councils, 
it is possible that this may include information about complaints. 
The second characteristic of the watchdog is that it needs to be able to influence 
local decisions about health services, in order to prevent or resolve problems.  The ability 
of statutory public involvement institutions to influence local decisions has not been 
consistent.  A criticism of the institutions on an ongoing basis seems to have been their 
variability; the House of Commons Health Committee found that both Community Health 
Councils and PPI Forums had been accused by Ministers of variability (House of 
Commons Health Committee, 2007a: 31).  If perceptions of statutory public involvement 
institutions vary locally, their ability to influence local services is also likely to vary.  To 
counter this perceived variability, statutory public involvement institution seem to have 
been layered with other means of public involvement in quality mechanisms.  This has 
included involvement in the development of NICE guidelines at the national level and the 
inclusion of patients in teams of peer reviewers assessing whether services meet 
standards for particular medical conditions at the local level.  Election to the boards of 
Foundation Trusts could also be interpreted as a means of involving members of the public 
in decisions about the quality of local services.  With the transition to local Healthwatch, 
representatives of the statutory public involvement institutions are included in the Health 
and Wellbeing Boards.  Inclusion in the Health and Wellbeing Boards will integrate local 
Healthwatch into processes for reviewing local service issues and the needs of the local 
community.  This change may again reflect a strengthening of the watchdog role. 
Watchdogs need to be able to challenge and to refer unresolved problems if they 
are to be able to prevent avoidable disasters.  Community Health Councils retained the 
right to refer issues to the Secretary of State throughout their history.  The Patient and 
Public Involvement Forums had the right in legislation to refer issues either nationally or 
locally, through the Commission for Patient and Public Involvement in Health and the 
Overview and Scrutiny Committees of local authorities.  The Local Involvement Networks 
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referred issues through the Overview and Scrutiny Committees.  If Ministers are to benefit 
from a watchdog, they need either to be confident that local mechanisms will resolve any 
issues raised by the watchdog or to have a means to hear from the watchdog promptly.  
Community Health Councils had the clearest rights of referral direct to Ministers, but they 
may have over-used this right from a Ministerial perspective.  The rights of PPI Forums 
included referral to Ministers through the Commission for Patient and Public Involvement 
in Health, although they could also escalate local issues through the Overview and 
Scrutiny Committee of their local authority.  Taken with the referral process for LINks 
through Overview and Scrutiny Committees, the trend has distanced the referrals from the 
Minister.  Even the transition to Healthwatch, discussed below, has continued to distance 
the referral from the Minister, as issues are raised through Healthwatch England based 
within the police-patrol organisation, the Care Quality Commission.  This strengthens the 
ability of statutory public involvement institutions to raise concerns at a national level, but 
in a manner that retains a distance from the Secretary of State. 
The fourth characteristic of a watchdog is its ability to filter significant issues from 
the range of concerns raised about local services.  This filtering role is closely linked to the 
watchdog intelligence-gathering function and to the sheepdog intermediation role, as the 
sheepdog learns of concerns raised by local interest groups.  McCubbins and Schwartz 
refer in their modelling of fire-alarm oversight to the ability to facilitate „collective action by 
comparatively disorganised groups‟ (1984: 166).  Hopenhayn and Lohnmann raise the 
concern that better-resourced groups may be in a better position to ensure that their views 
are heard (1996: 209).  Whilst McCubbins and Schwartz were not explicit about the nature 
of collective action in their fire-alarm model, I interpreted it within the watchdog as a 
process whereby the watchdog collates views from a range of sources, including 
„comparatively disorganised groups‟, and filters the significant issues to be raised as 
concerns.  The membership structure for Community Health Councils ensured that the 
organisations themselves reflected a range of interests, but the CHCs also sought 
information from the public and additional interest groups.  Patient and Public Involvement 
Forums did not formally include members of interest groups and could only seek feedback 
on the NHS trusts to which they were attached.  The Local Involvement Networks were 
developed in a way that encouraged a filtering-style intermediation, as interest groups 
could be members of LINks and could increase or reduce their involvement depending on 
the issues that were of concern to them.  Individuals and groups who are part of LINks are 
being encouraged to transfer into local Healthwatch, maintaining a pool of people to 
provide feedback on local health and social care services.  The successive statutory public 
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involvement institutions have had differing structural relationships with interest groups, but 
they have all had the ability to gather and filter information from them. 
Voluntary members of the former Stafford Hospital PPI Forum and the 
Staffordshire LINk were called to give evidence to the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation 
Trust public inquiry.  The questions they were asked and the comments of the former 
Secretary of State, Andy Burnham, suggest that a more active watchdog role was 
expected.  The transition to local Healthwatch seems to demonstrate that a greater 
Ministerial value is being placed on the watchdog role.  It is a watchdog on a slightly 
different model, however.  In the legislative oversight literature, a voluntary watchdog (or 
fire alarm) is presented as separate from and complementary to a professional police 
patrol (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984).  In the case of local Healthwatch, the local groups 
are connected nationally to Healthwatch England, which is a statutory committee within the 
Care Quality Commission (Department of Health, 2012b: 5).  Any major issues will be 
referred by local Healthwatch through Healthwatch England and thus integrated into the 
police patrol function of the Care Quality Commission.  The referral processes for major 
problems are thus transferred through the police patrol in the first instance, rather than 
going immediately to the Secretary of State.  The local Healthwatch groups will gain from 
access to the data and analysis skills of the police patrol (Department of Health, 2012b: 7).  
They will not, therefore, be as dependent on observation to identify issues, but may be 
able to identify or contextualise potential problems for the police patrol.  This is a model 
that adds to the existing understanding of oversight options in the legislative oversight 
literature. 
 
7.4 Combining sheepdog and watchdog roles 
The extent to which statutory public involvement institutions have combined the 
sheepdog and watchdog roles has varied over time.  In this section, I consider the issues 
around combined roles, including the activity of volunteers, intermediation and feedback 
mechanisms. 
Community Health Councils combined the sheepdog and watchdog roles, as they 
both acted as interest group intermediaries and also alerted Ministers to unresolved 
problems in NHS services.  Both of these roles were weakened over time: CHCs were 
rejected as sheepdogs by Ministers when they coordinated opposition; and police patrols 
were preferred to watchdogs as an indicator of problems in services.  Patient and Public 
Involvement Forums fulfilled a weaker watchdog role, they also did not have the interest 
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group membership or connections to act as sheepdogs.  There was an element of a 
combined role in the Local Involvement Networks, as LINks included interest groups as 
members as well as providing feedback on services.  The evolution of voluntary sector 
organisations as providers of services for the state, however, complicated the extent to 
which LINks could fulfil either a sheepdog or a watchdog role. 
Taken from the perspective of the elements that are common to both the sheepdog 
and watchdog roles, both involve activity undertaken by committed volunteers.  The 
watchdog benefits from the passion of the volunteers in identifying potential problems in 
services, taking time to get to know the services and to gather feedback.  The sheepdog 
role may benefit from volunteers in different ways: if the members are representatives of 
interest groups, they can support intermediation; and if the core activity is seen by other 
voluntary groups to be undertaken by volunteers, the sheepdog may be taken more 
seriously as an intermediary.  The commonality of volunteer roles may make it apparent 
that a sheepdog and a watchdog can be combined.  Just because both roles involve 
volunteers, however, does not necessarily mean that they are most effective in 
combination.  The development of volunteer-led institutions means that Ministers need to 
be able to trust that interest intermediation and service review can be delegated to unpaid 
workers.  As discussed in the triggers for reform (Section 7.5 below), this creation of 
volunteer-led institutions also makes them difficult to abolish in a true sense. 
The sheepdog and watchdog models both include intermediation elements: in the 
sheepdog, it is a formal intermediation between interest groups; in the watchdog, the 
concerns of different interests are filtered so that significant issues are raised.  The fact 
that they both mediate interest groups involvement may make a combined role seem 
appropriate.  They are, however, different forms of intermediation.  The sheepdog rounds 
up the activity of interest groups in order to ensure representation of vulnerable groups 
and to manage opposition to changes.  This is an active form of intermediation in which 
the sheepdog interacts and negotiates with the interest groups.  The intermediation aspect 
of the watchdog model treats intermediation as a means to filter issues from different 
sources in order to establish issues that are significant problems across the population, 
rather than just concerns for a specific interest group.  As discussed below, the watchdog 
may be stronger for having the interest group relationships of a sheepdog, but the filtering 
role played by a watchdog may create difficulties for the negotiations undertaken by a 
sheepdog.  Conversely, if a watchdog identifies significant problems, the coordination 
capability of a sheepdog may lead to a confrontational situation, with the sheepdog acting 
on the behalf of concerned interest groups, rather than intermediating between the groups 
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and relevant authorities.  The two forms of intermediation may therefore not operate 
together in ways that support Ministerial preferences for sheepdog and watchdog roles. 
A watchdog may potentially be stronger for being part of a sheepdog, as interest 
groups provide information and can support monitoring of specialist services.  The 
sheepdog also ensures that the concerns of vulnerable or minority groups are represented 
(Klein, 1984: 30).  If Ministers see public involvement as a democratic mechanism, 
collective feedback from interest groups may be viewed as part of a means to hear 
collective concerns from groups of citizens.  If public involvement is interpreted as being 
part of consumerism, however, it is individual patient feedback rather than collective 
interest group feedback that is sought.  Consumer comments that are gathered by NHS 
personnel can be integrated into internal quality improvement options (Hirschman, 1970).  
As discussed under the reappraisal of the watchdog role in Section 7.3, complaints provide 
a valuable form of intelligence to watchdogs.   A watchdog will use the complaint as a 
source of information to identify problems and to assess whether there are issues over 
time that are not being addressed locally.  Where the watchdog is combined with a 
sheepdog, the sheepdog may use this information about poor services to coordinate 
campaigns.  Perceptions that a sheepdog might coordinate opposition, rather than 
intermediate, could therefore put the watchdog at risk if it is part of a combined model.  
There is a fine balance in the combined model between the benefits to a watchdog of the 
sheepdog‟s links within interest groups and the risk that the sheepdog aspects of a 
combined role may generate opposition and reduce the overall value to Ministers of the 
statutory public involvement institution. 
Each of the successive statutory public involvement institutions has included 
differing degrees of combination between the sheepdog and watchdog roles.  Whilst both 
roles involve working with volunteers and include mediating between interest groups, the 
combination of a watchdog‟s ability to identify problems with a sheepdog‟s powers to 
coordinate activity may lead to confrontation and make the combined role unattractive to 
Ministers.   
 
7.5 Triggers for reform 
This study opened with the puzzle of ongoing investment in funding and reforming 
statutory public involvement institutions.  Analysis of documentary sources shows that the 
institutions have been valued by Ministers as sheepdogs and as watchdogs, although the 
sheepdog role has declined over time and the watchdog role seemed before the problems 
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at the Stafford Hospital to be being replaced by a stronger preference for police-patrol 
regulation.  There are examples of Ministers valuing the roles, such as referring hospital 
closure issues to the Community Health Councils, but there have also been periods when 
the statutory public involvement institutions have ceased to be politically useful and have 
been the subject of reform themselves. 
Considered throughout the period from 1974 to 2010, there have been three points 
at which the institutions have been reformed and replaced and one point, with the Patients 
first consultation in the early 1980s, when abolition was overtly considered.  The active 
support for Community Health Councils in response to the 1980s consultation made it 
difficult to abolish the institutions.  As volunteer-led organisations, they have remained 
hard to abolish in a true sense, since the institutions enable volunteers to develop skills 
that they may take on to the next statutory public involvement institution or into other 
groups in the voluntary sector.  The nature of the volunteer engagement may have meant 
that Ministers felt that they had to replace the institutions in a formal sense, rather than risk 
finding that volunteers had set up alternative public involvement institutions over which 
they had no control. 
If the statutory public involvement institutions cease to be politically useful, they 
can either be ignored or replaced.  Both of these options are costly.  In the early 1980s, 
Conservative party Ministers considered abolishing Community Health Councils.  When 
the popularity of the CHCs made them difficult to abolish, the Conservative governments 
of the 1980s and 1990s largely ignored the Community Health Councils, layering their 
influence with alternative forms of public involvement.  When organisations with sheepdog 
skills sense that they are being ignored, however, there is a risk that they will mobilise 
opposition.  This opposition has included campaigns that are embarrassing to Ministers, 
such as coordinating the Casualty Watch activity to raise awareness of the length of time 
that patients had to wait on trolleys in hospitals as there were no beds available.  Where 
the statutory public involvement institutions felt that they were themselves under threat, the 
likelihood was that they would use their sheepdog skills to mount campaigns to retain their 
roles. 
Abolition was first considered publicly in the Patients first consultation.  This took 
place when the Conservatives had a majority of 43 seats, which gave them a greater 
majority than the preceding Labour government (which had had a majority of just four 
seats), but still a modest majority.  As discussed in Section 4.2, responses to the Patients 
first consultation from both professionals and the public were supportive of Community 
Health Councils.   As part of a Government with a small majority, Ministers may have felt 
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that they could not counter the wishes expressed in a public consultation.  They were able, 
however, to reduce the coordination capabilities of the Association of CHCs for England 
and Wales by cutting the funding for CHC News and the associated information service.  
The potential abolition was considered as part of a reform to reduce the layers of 
bureaucracy in the NHS.  Abolition at this point would have muzzled opposition to radical 
options that the Conservative government was considering for funding the NHS. 
The first abolition of a statutory public involvement institution took place when 
Labour had a majority of 179 seats; the strength of this majority may have given Ministers 
the confidence to abolish Community Health Councils, although the CHCs‟ activities were 
replaced.  It is possible that as part of a strong Government, Labour Ministers were less 
concerned about the electoral dimensions of local interest group management; and 
following the Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry they placed less value on the watchdog role.  
At a national level, patient organisations and other interest groups also had more influence 
and were included in the teams overseeing the modernisation of the NHS.  The abolition 
formed part of the major reforms of The NHS plan and the energy that Community Health 
Councils put into fighting abolition deflected their activity from opposing other aspects of 
the reforms. 
The abolition of Patient and Public Involvement Forums also took place under a 
Labour government, but one with a more modest majority of 66 seats.  Between the point 
of their establishment in December 2003 and the announcement in July 2006 that they 
were to be abolished, the PPI Forums did not have a great deal of time to establish a 
network of influential supporters.  Interest groups had been represented on and responded 
to the expert panel that advised on the transition to Local Involvement Networks, whereas 
they had had no direct involvement in the PPI Forums; so interest groups were likely to be 
supportive of the transition.  The abolition of PPI Forums coincided with changes that 
included new commissioning arrangements.  Long-term contracts were being put in place 
with significant ramifications for local services.  As Sharon Grant advised the House of 
Commons Health Committee, the timing of the PPI Forum abolition meant that the public 
were largely excluded from long-term contracting decisions (House of Commons Health 
Committee, 2007a: 49). 
The announcement in 2010 that Local Involvement Networks would be transferred 
into local Healthwatch was slightly different: as there was no overall majority following the 
2010 General Election, the announcement was made by a Conservative-Liberal Democrat 
Coalition government.  Unlike previous changes, this was explicitly announced as a 
transition, rather than abolition followed by replacement.  The softer transition may be due 
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to the combination of a less secure Government and the weaker position of the statutory 
public involvement institutions following successive changes.  My analysis of the watchdog 
role also suggests that the emphasis of this most recent reform is on improving the 
watchdog function, whereas the emphasis in earlier changes may, as discussed below, 
have been on reducing the risk that a sheepdog would mobilise opposition to wider 
reforms.  Like the earlier transitions, the shift from LINks to local Healthwatch takes place 
as part of a major reform to the NHS, with the introduction of the Health and Social Care 
Act 2012.  As with the earlier changes to public involvement, revising the statutory public 
involvement institutions moderated potential opposition at a point of major change. 
With the exception of the transition to local Healthwatch, the changes have 
occurred when governments have been sufficiently secure to risk alienating interest 
groups and voluntary members of the statutory public involvement institutions.  They have 
also taken place at times of major change to the NHS.  The contemplated change on 
which the Patients first consultation took place was the reform of the NHS to create 
smaller administrative units through District Health Authorities.  The abolition of 
Community Health Councils was included in The NHS plan, which announced increased 
investment in the NHS on the condition that extensive modernisation took place.  The PPI 
Forums were abolished at the point when commissioners were establishing contracts for 
services on a new model, in which the Primary Care Trusts held budgets for services in 
hospitals.  The abolition of Local Involvement Networks forms part of the Health and Social 
Care Act 2012, which changes the commissioning and accountability structures across the 
NHS.  If volunteers in the statutory public involvement institutions were likely to coordinate 
opposition to the wider reforms, Ministers may have judged that reshaping the statutory 
public involvement institutions at the same time as the other reforms would weaken the 
ability of volunteers to oppose these wider reforms. 
The timings of the changes suggest that they were triggered by Ministers‟ desire to 
minimise opposition to wider reforms.  The powers granted to a sheepdog enable it to 
mobilise opposition if it objects to Ministers‟ proposals.  Considered from the perspective of 
the welfare state retrenchment literature, Ministers contemplating NHS reforms would 
make changes to statutory public involvement institutions to distract them or limit their 
ability to mobilise opposition to the wider reforms (Pierson, 1994: 19).  The abolitions of 
Community Health Councils and PPI Forums can be understood in these terms, making 
the statutory public involvement institutions subject to political management as well as 
playing roles in political management of the NHS.  The transition from Local Involvement 
Networks to local Healthwatch also coincides with a major reform to the NHS.  In the case 
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of the move towards local Healthwatch, however, I suggest that the successive changes 
had weakened the ability of LINks to act as rogue sheepdogs and that the focus of the 
most recent reform is on reshaping the watchdog role. 
 
7.6 Close: roles in political management of the NHS 
In this study, I questioned whether statutory public involvement institutions had 
played roles in political management of the English NHS during the period from 1974 to 
2010.  I identified two potential roles from the political science literature, which I described 
using the analogies of a „sheepdog‟ and a „watchdog‟.  I examined the archives of statutory 
public involvement institutions to assess whether the institutions had acted as sheepdogs, 
rounding up participants and managing potential opposition; and I explored whether they 
had been expected to act as watchdogs to prevent disasters, drawing on the accounts in 
NHS inquiries. 
On the basis of the findings presented in the study, I propose that there is evidence 
that statutory public involvement institutions have been valued by Ministers as tools to 
support them in political management of the NHS.  The roles have not been valued 
consistently over time: developing volunteer-led organisations is risky, as the volunteers 
cannot be managed in the same way as paid personnel and, similarly, their activity cannot 
be stopped.  Nonetheless, the creation of corporatist-style intermediation through 
sheepdogs and observation-based oversight by watchdogs provides Ministers with tools 
that can coordinate local participation by the public and enable Ministers to manage expert 
health professionals, by alerting the Ministers to problems.  
As discussed in this chapter, there are four main conclusions arising from this 
study.  Firstly, the Ministerial value placed on the sheepdog role has declined over time.  
Secondly, the preference for oversight mechanisms also seemed to have transferred from 
the voluntary watchdogs to a professional police patrol, but I suggest that the problems at 
the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust have renewed interest in the watchdog role.  
Thirdly, whilst the sheepdog and watchdog roles are both volunteer-led and involve 
working with local interest groups, combining the two roles has proved problematic for 
Ministers, as the knowledge of a watchdog may be a threat when combined with the 
potential of a sheepdog to mobilise opposition.  Finally, the sheepdog powers granted to 
statutory public involvement institutions mean that they may be seen as a potential threat 
at times of major reforms to the wider NHS, as a rogue sheepdog could round up 
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opponents to the reforms, so changes to the institutions have been timed to limit the ability 
of the statutory public involvement institutions to mobilise opposition to wider reforms. 
The scope of this study was confined to the NHS in England.  It is therefore 
possible that statutory public involvement institutions for the NHS in other parts of the UK 
or for other public services may not fulfil the same roles in political management of 
services.  The findings here, however, indicate that statutory public involvement institutions 
have been valued by Ministers at different points in time for their sheepdog and watchdog 
roles.  This may suggest that either the sheepdog or the watchdog role is played by state-
sponsored and volunteer-led institutions in other public services.  The study adds to the 
corporatist and blame-avoidance literatures by providing an example, in the sheepdog 
role, of a volunteer-led intermediary with statutory powers that can be sufficiently 
authoritative to take the blame for local decisions.  I also propose that a watchdog (or 
interest group involved in fire-alarm oversight) may be a state-funded body rather than an 
independent interest group as presented in the legislative oversight literature, which 
provides opportunities for politicians to determine the information to which the institutions 
have access and to grant institutions powers to filter concerns raised by different issue-
specific interest groups.   
The findings provide a complementary perspective to existing studies of statutory 
public involvement institutions in the NHS.  The sheepdog role builds upon the issue of 
managing local representation, particularly of vulnerable groups, in the literature on public 
involvement in health (Klein and Lewis, 1976: 38; Klein, 1984: 30; Bates, 1982: 97; Hogg, 
2007: 132).  Similarly, the watchdog role extends an aspect of the existing literature on 
monitoring service quality (Klein and Lewis, 1976: 122; Hogg, 1999: 91).  In both cases, 
the roles outlined in this study relate to the statutory powers granted to the institutions, 
treating statutory public involvement institutions as a distinctive form of public involvement. 
The conclusions to this study demonstrate that the statutory powers granted to the 
institutions gave them the capability to contribute to political management of the NHS, but 
Ministerial utilisation of this has varied.  In their early days, Community Health Councils 
were clearly valued by David Owen as Minister for Health: 
„The doctors themselves were highly sceptical of any consumer “watch-dog”.  
Councillors were anxious in case a “consumer voice” might be an attempt to 
undermine the role of the democratically elected local representative and their 
ability to represent the views of the electorate.  My own view is that the decision to 
establish Community Health Councils will probably be looked back on by social 
historians as the most significant aspect of the whole of the National Health Service 
Reorganisation Act of 1973.  For the first time there exists a strong consumer voice 
to both criticise and champion the NHS.‟ (Owen, 1976: 17-18) 
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The quotation from Owen‟s In sickness and in health distinguishes between a watchdog 
role, reporting on the activity of health professionals, and a collective consumer voice, or 
sheepdog role.  Owen‟s prediction that founding Community Health Councils „will probably 
be looked back on by social historians as the most significant aspect of the whole of the 
National Health Service Reorganisation Act‟  has proved over optimistic.  As Hogg reports, 
„CHCs now barely receive a mention in books on health policy‟ (2009: 58).  I mentioned in 
the opening to Chapter One that statutory public involvement institutions represent a 
substantial financial commitment, with £4 million invested annually in 1974 and £24.4 
million in 2010 (Department of Health and Social Security and Welsh Office, 1979; 
Commissioning, Analysis and Intelligence Team, 2010).  Taken in terms of public 
involvement, this ongoing investment is a puzzle in the context of the growth of NHS-led 
and self-generating alternatives.  Considered as sheepdog and watchdog tools, however, 
their statutory powers and state-funded status mean that statutory public involvement 
institutions can contribute to Ministers‟ political management of the NHS.  Conversely, the 
control Ministers hold over the institutions‟ funding and powers means that they can 
reshape the institutions to suit their agenda.  Statutory public involvement institutions are 
therefore both part of and subject to political management. 
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Appendix: Archive sources  
 
All items used in this study are fully referenced within the bibliography. This appendix 
provides an overview of relevant archives. 
 
A. Archives for statutory public involvement institutions 
 
Community Health Councils 
 
CHC News (journal) 
Hard copies held in the library at the Wellcome Trust 
 
ACHCEW archive 
Archive of document images on CD-ROM at the Wellcome Trust library, The golden age of 
patient and public involvement, 1974-2003, referenced as computer media 55 
Some hard copy publications held in King‟s Fund library 
 
Patients’ Association archive 
The archives held by the Patients‟ Association on Community Health Councils, 1974-1983, 
and NHS Reorganisation,1972-1984, include correspondence relating to the establishment 
of CHCs and ACHCEW that are not covered within the ACHCEW CD-ROM archive.  The 
Patients‟ Association records also include copies of guidance issued to NHS personnel 
and to the voluntary sector on the establishment of Community Health Councils.  The 
Patients‟ Association archives are held at the Wellcome Trust.  Principal files relating to 
Community Health Councils are:  
SA/PAT/C/10 – Community Health Councils, 1974-1983 
SA/PAT/D/37 – NHS reorganisation, 1972-1984 
SA/PAT/C/3 [4 boxes/files] – ACHCEW, 1979-1986 
 
Papers from individual Community Health Councils 
Local authority archives – searchable through http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/a2a 
King‟s Fund Library 
Wellcome Trust library 
Royal London Hospital archives 
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Patient and Public Involvement Forums 
 
Forum Focus (journal) 
Copies available on archived copy of Commission for Patient and Public Involvement in 
Health website through the National Archives, 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20080313140813/http://www.cppih.org 
 
PPI Forum archive 
Online to January 2011 at http://www.lx.nhs.uk but no longer available 
Reports, particularly annual reports, for some PPI Forums held on hospital websites and 
local authority websites 
Some documents held by the King‟s Fund library 
 
Commission for Patient and Public Involvement in Health archive 
Website with minutes of meetings and published reports archived through the National 
Archives (the fullest version of the website is dated 13 March 2008) 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20080313140813/http://www.cppih.org 
 
 
Local Involvement Networks 
 
LINks archive 
Archive of reports and e-communications at http://www.lx.nhs.uk 
 
NHS Centre for Involvement 
Resources online until July 2011 at http://www.nhscentreforinvolvement.nhs.uk but no 
longer available 
Guidance notes produced by the NHS Centre for Involvement are included on the 
websites for some individual Local Involvement Networks 
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B. Archives for NHS inquiries 
Ely Hospital Inquiry – unusual for a report of its date in being published in full.  Access to 
the original aided by the Socialist Health Association digitisation of the resource, held at 
http://www.sochealth.co.uk/history/Ely.htm 
Archive of sources for the inquiry is held at the National Archives in Kew, but with closed 
access until January 2025.  National Archives piece reference BD 18/2527 
 
Normansfield Hospital Inquiry – report published in full and accessed through King‟s 
Fund library (Item held in offsite storage: HOOU:QYA). 
Archive of transcripts and evidence from the inquiry held (hard copy only) at the London 
Metropolitan Archives and released for public access in January 2009.  Key files relating to 
the involvement of the Community Health Council in the Normansfield Hospital Inquiry are 
H29/NF/F/06/008, H29/NF/F/07/007 and H29/NF/F/07/008 
 
Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry – archive of evidence and transcripts with the full report 
online.  The search facility does not search text within the evidence supplied.  The inquiry 
included a series of seminars; one of these, seminar 7, was on „empowering the public in 
the healthcare process‟ and the archive includes a range of position papers generated to 
inform the seminar. 
http://www.bristol-inquiry.org.uk/index.htm  
 
Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust 
Evidence to the Healthcare Commission inquiry was presented in confidence and weekly 
summaries of oral evidence were given for the independent inquiry, but full text of the 
transcripts and evidence for the full public inquiry are available online, with links to earlier 
reports.  The search facility on the public inquiry site does not search text within the PDFs 
of evidence supplied, but the itinerary for the hearings indicates which participants 
belonged to the PPI Forum or the Staffordshire LINk. 
Independent inquiry: http://www.midstaffsinquiry.com 
Public inquiry: http://www.midstaffspublicinquiry.com 
 
Documents for the separate inquiry into the Staffordshire Local Involvement Network are 
included on the websites for Patient and Public Involvement Solutions (which undertook 
the review) and Staffordshire County Council. 
http://patientpublicinvolvement.com and http://www.staffordshire.gov.uk 
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